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Browning’s famous distinction between the subjective and the objective poet, 
Shelley and Shakespeare, as well as his own abandonment of the lyric in favour of 
dramatic poetry, has been commonly interpreted as an epistemological demarcation 
that separates Browning, as a Victorian poet, from his Romantic predecessors. 
Defining Shelley as the subjective poet who looks through the individual soul toward 
“not what man sees, but what God sees—the Ideas of Plato” (283), and Shakespeare 
as the objective poet who looks, not to his own soul, but upon the material world, 
choosing “to produce things external” and to “deal with the doings of men” (284), 
Browning delineates the work of Shelley as the poetry of idealism and the dramatic 
work of Shakespeare as the poetry of realism; therefore, as idealism and realism are 
commonly viewed as diametric opposites, Browning’s concept of objectivity has been 
seen as antithetical to the philosophical idealism of the subjective poet.  
Although the recent critical consensus has been that Browning rejects 
idealism, this study will argue that it is actually in idealism, where the ideal is seen to 
embody itself in the material forms of empirical reality, that Browning develops his 
poetics of objective realism. I look at the influence of German idealism on 
Browning’s objective poetics and how he utilizes the famous distinction made by 
August and Friedrich Schlegel between classical and romantic epistemology to 
explore the origins of Christian, romantic art and to trace its modern correlative in 
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philosophical idealism. In doing this Browning presents his own dramatic poetry as 
the next objective stage in the historical development of romantic idealism. I focus on 
Browning’s neglected early verse dramas, because it is my contention that 
Browning’s theory of dramatic form and its culmination in the dramatic monologue 
cannot be considered in isolation from his plays. Indeed, these verse dramas are not 
only key to understanding Browning’s development of the monologue form, but also 
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
 
Browning’s famous distinction between the subjective and the objective poet, 
Shelley and Shakespeare, as well as his own abandonment of the lyric in favour of 
dramatic poetry, has been commonly interpreted as an epistemological demarcation 
that separates Browning, as a Victorian poet, from his Romantic predecessors. 
Defining Shelley as the subjective poet who looks through the individual soul toward 
“not what man sees, but what God sees—the Ideas of Plato” (283), and Shakespeare 
as the objective poet who looks, not to his own soul, but upon the material world, 
choosing “to produce things external” and to “deal with the doings of men” (284), 
Browning delineates the work of Shelley as the poetry of idealism and the dramatic 
work of Shakespeare as the poetry of realism; therefore, as idealism and realism are 
commonly viewed as diametric opposites, Browning’s concept of objectivity has been 
seen as antithetical to the philosophical idealism of the subjective poet.  
Although the recent critical consensus has been that Browning rejects 
idealism, this study will argue that it is actually in idealism, where the ideal is seen to 
embody itself in the material forms of empirical reality, that Browning develops his 
poetics of objective realism. I will look at the influence of German idealism on 
Browning’s objective poetics and how he utilizes the famous distinction made by 
August and Friedrich Schlegel between classical and romantic epistemology in both 
Sordello and Men and Women to explore the origins of Christian, romantic art and to 
trace its modern correlative in philosophical idealism. In doing this Browning 
presents his own dramatic poetry as the next objective stage in the historical 
development of romantic idealism. I will show how the idea of embodiment, which is 
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central to idealism, is the conceptual basis for Browning’s own development of 
objectivity and its representation in dramatic poetry. I pay particular attention to 
Browning’s neglected early verse dramas, because it is my contention that 
Browning’s formulation of dramatic form and its culmination in the dramatic 
monologue cannot be considered in isolation from his plays. Indeed the central 
premise of this study is that Browning’s verse dramas are central not only to our 
understanding of the monologue form, but to the very epistemological grounds of his 
poetic development. 
Felicia Bonaparte argues that there has not been a sufficient emphasis on the 
influence of German philosophy and German Romantic literary theory, particularly of 
the Schlegel brothers, upon the Victorian period, and she cites the many English 
translations of their works that were published and re-published throughout the 
nineteenth century. Indeed very little has been written on the crucial link between 
Browning and German Romanticism. In her work on Browning and German 
Romantic irony, Patricia Dianne Rigg concedes that one of the main difficulties 
facing a critic when pursuing the similarities between Browning's poetics and the 
ideas of German Romanticism is his denial that he knew German philosophy, citing 
Browning's well known letter to Frederick Furnivall wherein he states that “I have 
never read a line, original or translated, by Kant, Schelling, or Hegel in my whole 
life” (25). Mrs. Orr raises a similar objection when she argues that, even though there 
is a clear affinity between Browning and German idealism in the metaphysics of 
Sordello, the fact that Browning asserts that he was not conversant with German 
philosophy surely poses an obstacle to any further line of inquiry: “it is difficult to 
realize their absence, then and always, from Mr. Browning's mind. But he was 
emphatic in his assurance that he knew neither the German philosophers nor their 
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reflection in Coleridge, who would have seemed a likely medium between them and 
him” (108). Mrs. Orr's hesitation explains why critics have perhaps been wary of 
positing a direct connection between Browning and German idealism; however, I 
would like to suggest that it was not through the philosophy of Kant, Schelling and 
Hegel, nor through Coleridge's interpretation of them, that Browning was exposed to 
German Romantic ideas but instead through the popular translations of Friedrich and 
August Schlegel. 
 As Bonaparte has demonstrated, it was the Schlegel brothers who were to have 
a lasting impact on the nineteenth century. Bonaparte explains that the Schlegel 
brothers were among the first, even before the nineteenth century had officially 
begun, to recognize the crisis of faith that removed the deity as an epistemological 
basis on which everything else could rest, foreseeing that empiricism, the philosophy 
that seemed to be replacing religion, could only lead to conclusions never more than 
subjective and relative, even in science when its grounds were understood, and so to 
the absolute skepticism that held reality to be, as Leslie Stephen recognized long 
before Nietzsche made the point, ultimately only a “fiction.” The German Romantics, 
Bonaparte argues, set out to find a new epistemological basis in a philosophic 
theory—a word they used in the etymological sense in which Ruskin uses it too, of a 
perspective on the world—grounded in imagination. Bonaparte explains that for the 
German Romantics imagination was not the “decaying sense” of Hobbes, who had 
defined it for the empiricists, but a faculty that resembled the Platonic idea of noesis, 
the power that could apprehend ideas, the noumena Kant had held inaccessible, the 
inner truth of the physical world as well as the truth of the world beyond it, or what 
had once been called metaphysical. As the Romantics saw the material world as a 
hieroglyph indicating a deeper meaning, art itself was a symbol that revealed this 
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relationship between the ideal and the real. Thus the characteristic art of the century 
was what Bulwer-Lytton called, writing of fiction but including all other arts, the 
novel of “the double plot” in which character and plot tell the story of the real but in 
which has been embodied a “symbolic signification” (The Poetics of Poesis). 
John Maynard notes in Browning's Youth that the young poet would have 
undoubtedly been exposed to the ideas of German Romanticism when he studied 
under Professor Ludwig von Muhlenfels at The University of London, and although it 
is true that Browning was to later state that he was not conversant with Hegel and 
Schelling—although he mentions the latter along with Fichte in “Bishop Blougram’s 
Apology”—he shows his familiarity with the Jena group when he writes in his early 
letters to Euphrasia Fanny Haworth and Alfred Domett that he has been learning to 
read German through a study of Tieck and Schlegel's translations of Shakespeare. 
Browning would have engaged with the early German Romantic movement under the 
aegis of his close friend, Thomas Carlyle, who was a passionate proponent and 
disseminator of German Romantic ideas, and also through his relationship with 
Elizabeth Barrett, who was an avid reader of German Romantic criticism. We know 
for a fact that a copy of August Schlegel's Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature 
was indeed upon the Brownings' bookshelf because Elizabeth Barrett praised it highly 
and used it to re-conceive her translation of Prometheus, as Clara Drummond has 
shown. Also William Macready wrote in his diary on January 4th 1840 that, at a 
dinner with Browning and Helen Faucit, Macready gave a copy of August Schlegel's 
Lectures and Madame de Stael’s On Germany to Helen Faucit, which suggests that 
they were a topic of their intimate conversation. Mary Ellis Gibson notes that 
Browning would also have been familiar with the critical vocabulary of the Schlegels, 
Schiller and Goethe as it was reproduced in the works of Henry Crabbe Robinson, 
 5 
John Gibson Lockhart, Thomas De Quincey, Carlyle and Coleridge, among many 
others, especially in the essays that were published by W. J. Fox in the Monthly 
Repository in 1833. 
 It is not only the documented popularity of the Schlegels in England, and 
Browning's undoubted exposure to their work, that accounts for the influence of 
idealism on the development of his dramatic theory. Mrs. Orr's comment that 
Browning did not even know of German philosophy through Coleridge, “who would 
have seemed a likely medium between them and him,” points to another reason why 
Browning's connection to the Germans might have been missed. Bonaparte argues 
that while the critical consensus has always been that Coleridge was the voice of 
German Romanticism in England, it was actually Percy Shelley who the Victorians 
saw as the embodiment of German Romantic ideas. Bonaparte explains that the 
crucial distinction between Coleridge and Shelley lies in their conception of the 
imagination as an epistemological faculty: whereas for Coleridge the imagination is 
only a mediating force that enables the truths of the Reason to be embodied 
symbolically in the sensory images that belong to the material realm, for Shelley it is 
the primary faculty that apprehends the Platonic truths within and beyond the material 
world. Thus Bonaparte says, “it was not Coleridge in fact but Shelley the nineteenth 
century considered the apostle of this faculty, so much so that, despite their 
differences, it is tempting to think of him as the English Friedrich Schlegel. Of all the 
English, it is he who most completely represents the concept of the imagination as the 
German Romantic conceived it.” Bonaparte observes that “it was in their Platonism 
that Shelley and the Germans most fruitfully met,” and similarly Maynard notes that, 
as “the enthusiast for Shelley and Plato,” Browning “could hardly have withheld his 
approval” for German Romantic ideas (275). 
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Although German Romanticism was a collective movement, it of course 
incorporated diverse figures across a range of disciplines including the Schlegel 
brothers, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Ludwig Tieck and Novalis. Ernst Behler notes 
that the philosophers Fichte and Schelling were more loosely connected with this 
group but that it was their philosophy of idealism that became the ideological basis 
for the Romantics (4). For the purposes of this study I turn to the lectures of the 
Schlegel bothers, particularly to Friedrich Schlegel’s Course of Lectures on the 
History of Literature, translated into English and published in 1818, August 
Schlegel’s Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature, translated into English and 
published in 1815, which were both republished throughout the century, because they 
most directly inform Browning’s poetics. Although the Schlegel brothers are certainly 
not synonymous, I refer to them in this study through their shared concept of the 
romantic paradigm and its relation to philosophy and art, which is the foundation for 
their literary criticism. Indeed, it was the Schlegelian epistemological interpretation of 
the distinction between classical and romantic ontology that exerted the strongest 
impact on the British Romantics, as both Behler and Rene Welleck observe; and it 
was Coleridge in particular, along with Madame de Stael, who translated these ideas 
for a British audience. De Stael, who was August Schlegel's partner, helped bring his 
ideas to the rest of Europe through her book On Germany, which was read in French 
and translated into English, a copy of which was given by de Stael personally to 
Byron. Coleridge, Shelley, Byron, Hazlitt and many other Romantic figures read 
Schlegel’s Lectures and it remained extremely popular with the Victorians, including 
the Brownings, and although many of the writers whom I discuss declare their debt to 
August Schlegel, his Lectures were so well-known in nineteenth-century Britain that 
it is clear that he often provides the foundational ideas for dramatic treatises that do 
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not refer to him specifically by name.  
An instance of the Schlegels’ influence can be seen in Browning’s declaration 
to André Victor Amédée de Ripert-Monclar that German language and literature did 
not appeal to him in the same way that the Spanish tradition did: “Since I last saw 
you—(last alas)—I have learned Spanish enough [to] be able to read “the majestic 
Tongue which Calderon along the desert flung!” I am more & more possessed by a 
perfect antipathy for the North & its sights & sounds—which is strange truly, but 
real—I will not learn German for instance—& can’t help learning Spanish!” (3, 107-
114). This actually testifies to the influence of German criticism since it was August 
Schlegel’s translations of Calderon, and his definition of the playwright's work as the 
highest example of romantic poetry in Spain—just as Shakespeare was the pinnacle of 
romantic poetry in England—which brought him to prominence for Romantic writers 
such as Shelley and then Browning after him. 
The Schlegelian definition of romantic, an example of which they see in 
Calderon, is not capitalized and must be distinguished from the term “Romantic,” 
which later came to denote the broader European artistic and philosophical 
movement. Rather for the Schlegels, the designation of romantic in the lower case 
refers to the historical and epistemological transition from classical objectivity to 
Christian interiority. They argue that while in the classical age soul is perfectly 
embodied in the temporal world, this synthesis of the inward and outward, the ideal 
and real, is sundered in Christianity where the soul turns inward to contemplate its 
own transcendence and the existence of a higher power. The Schlegels explain that 
this romantic spirit emerged through the conversion of the Northern Teutonic tribes to 
Christianity and the subsequent fusion of heroism into the sentiments of Christianity, 
whereby external action was now based upon the perception of inward soul. Thus for 
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the Schlegels it was the poetry of the medieval troubadours that first signified this 
transition.  
In his Dialogue on Poetry, which Behler notes is Friedrich Schlegel’s Course 
of Lectures on the History of Literature in its embryonic form, Schlegel sees the 
culmination of this romantic spirit in the subjective predicament of the modern poet 
and in the movement of idealism, which recognizes the transcendent subjective 
foundation of human existence. Yet he argues that this subjectivity finds its dialectical 
opposite in objectivity, which is the next stage of idealism that sees the objective 
world as the embodiment of the ideal. Friedrich sees this transition in the movement 
from Fichte’s subjective idealism to Schelling’s symbolic view of nature, which sees 
the spiritual not only in the individual mind but also in its objective manifestation. He 
emphasizes that as the objective is still informed by an ideal foundation, this next 
stage of idealism will lead to an “infinite realism” in art and a renewed relationship 
between the ideal and the real. However, both Friedrich and August assert that 
although this new realism will return to the objectivity of classical age, it will never 
be a perfect embodiment of soul but only ever an imperfect approximation; this 
establishes the distinction between classical and romantic symbolism that is critical 
for Browning's poetics and to which I will return shortly. 
In chapter two, I discuss how Browning traces the development of his poetics 
within the symbolic framework of the Schlegelian distinction between the classical 
and the romantic in order to present himself as a poet who is part of the historical 
development of romantic poetry. As a medieval troubadour, Sordello’s symbolic 
significance lies in that he is on the cusp of the new romantic paradigm. Indeed, the 
dense philosophical abstractions of Sordello are more clearly explicated when they 
are seen in their connection to the Schlegel brothers’ symbolic view of history as 
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Browning follows Sordello’s soul in its transition from the classical totality of 
Eglamor, turning inward to the transcendent subjectivity of soul, which in turn seeks 
its dialectical opposite in a new embodiment in the actions of the world. I will show 
how Browning presents this transition from the subjective to the objective poet in 
Sordello as a mirror of his own modern poetic development, and to foreground his 
poetry as the next step in the objective expression of Shelley’s idealism. 
Despite the obvious resonance between Sordello and German philosophy, 
Browning was emphatic that he had not read Fichte, Schelling or Hegel. It is entirely 
possible that considering Browning’s familiarity with the Schlegelian theory of 
classical and romantic epistemology, and with the philosophical bent of his mind—an 
inclination toward abstract metaphysical thought that infuriated his contemporary 
reviewers—that he would have made the same connection as Friedrich Schlegel, who 
Bonaparte notes was himself the philosopher of the German Romantic movement, 
between the inward romantic soul of the Christian paradigm and the philosophy of 
idealism without knowing of these  works. Yet it is clear that Browning was indeed 
aware of trends in philosophical idealism. Even if Browning had not read Fichte, he 
would have been familiar with his philosophy through Carlyle who used his ideas as 
the foundation for his lectures On Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (1832), 
lectures that Browning attended. In setting up the transcendental basis of his analysis, 
Carlyle recounts how: 
Fichte the German philosopher delivered, some forty years ago at Erlangen, a 
highly remarkable course of lectures on this subject: ‘Ueber das Wesen des 
Gelehrten, On the Nature of the Literary Man.’ Fichte, in conformity with the 
Transcendental Philosophy, of which he was a distinguished teacher, declares 
first: That all things which we see or work with in this Earth, especially we 
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ourselves and all persons, are as a kind of vesture or sensuous Appearance: that 
under all there lies, as the essence of them, what he calls the “Divine Idea of the 
World;” this is the Reality which “lies at the bottom of all Appearance.” To the 
mass of men no such divine Idea is recognizable in the world; they live merely, 
says Fichte, among the superficialities, practicalities and shows of the world, 
not dreaming that there is anything divine under them. (99)  
The fact that Browning would have known of Fichte through Carlyle is also clear 
from a letter he received from Joseph Arnould asking if he had read any of the 
transcendentalist philosophers including Fichte, whom he recognized as the 
foundation of Carlyle’s work (14, 347-351). Indeed the influence of Carlyle’s 
idealism on Browning’s objective poetry cannot be overstated and this study will 
often discuss the productive symbiosis between them. Moreover, Browning shows his 
awareness of the philosophies of Fichte and Schelling in the monologue “Bishop 
Blougram’s Apology” (1855), where the distinction between them is key to the 
symbolic meaning of the poem. And we will see in the following chapter how 
“Transcendentalism: A Poem in Twelve Books” is critical for understanding 
Browning’s relationship to idealism where the young Boehme is used as an example 
of the objective poet who sees the material world as an objective manifestation of the 
divine. Indeed this poem might point to the reason why Browning felt the need to 
refute his knowledge of the German philosophers because in it he presents his 
conviction that the true transcendentalism cannot be known through systematic 
philosophy, the logical deductions of the mind, but only in poetry, which is an act of 
imagination. 
That the Schlegelian conception of romantic epistemology, and the perceived 
culmination of this subjectivity in the objective development of romantic idealism, 
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influences Browning’s poetic development can be seen in the similarity that he found 
between his own concept of soul and Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophy of will and 
its embodiment in the world of representation. The affinity that Browning’s perceived 
between himself and the German philosopher shows that his idea of soul has a much 
broader philosophical meaning than the individual spirit, and that it defines 
Browning’s understanding of embodiment and its significance for objective, dramatic 
poetry. In a letter to Mrs Ernest Benzon—written after he had read a biography of 
Schopenhauer, given to him by Mrs FitzGerald in 1876—Browning describes the 
affinities between his concept of soul and Schopenhauer's will: 
I gain an adequate notion of Schopenhauer and what he accounts his 
grand discovery. So much of it as I acknowledge for truth as I have 
believed in them from my earliest youth...the distinction and pre-
eminence of the Soul from and over the intelligence— “Soul” in the 
evident sense of Schopenhauer's “Will”—And the fact was at once so 
realized by me, that I am sure it must show through my writings, here 
and there as their substratum. (Letter to Mrs. Ernest Benzon) 
Even though Browning did not know of Schopenhauer earlier in his career, he saw the 
similarity between his idea of soul and Schopenhauer's concept of will so 
emphatically that he considers it to be the epistemological foundation, “the 
substratum” of his poetic works. Although Browning seems taken aback by the deep 
correlation that he finds between himself and Schopenhauer, this discovery is not 
surprising because Browning’s ideas about art and epistemology come out of the 
earlier context of idealism that also culminated in Schopenhauer's work. I will turn 
now to the similarity between Browning’s notion of soul and mind and 
Schopenhauer’s will and its embodiment in the world of representation because it 
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reveals the importance of idealism for Browning’s realism and it provides the 
foundation for the symbolic language that Browning uses to express his poetics. 
In The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer argues that there are 
two aspects to the world, each aspect being dependent on and inseparable from the 
other. The world of representation is the objective material world of phenomena as 
they exist in space and time. This is the world of empirical perception and is the 
manifestation of the other aspect of the world, which is the will. The will is the realm 
of the subject and exists entirely outside of time and space, and Schopenhauer 
explains that his idea of the will is analogous to Immanuel Kant's concept of the 
noumenal: it is “the being-in-itself of every thing in the world, and is the sole kernel 
of every phenomenon” (118). The will is a universal substrate, encompassing and 
comprising the essences of the world; as opposed to the mere representation and 
appearance of phenomena, the will is the thing-in-itself. 
 Schopenhauer says that in contrast to the groundless world of will, the world 
of representation that is governed by the laws of cause and effect is perceived by the 
faculty of the understanding. The senses supply the understanding with data from the 
material world that is then passed into the reflective consciousness of the reason. He 
combines these branches of knowledge—sense, understanding and reason—into what 
he calls the principle of sufficient reason, which may be understood as defining the 
laws that govern conceptual thought; however, Schopenhauer argues that these laws 
can never show us the inner nature or will of things because, in belonging to the world 
of cause and effect, they can only show “mere connexions, relations, of one 
representation to another, form without any content” (121). The will as thing-in-itself 
cannot be subject to direct investigation, as it is not the object of knowledge; 
consequently, the faculty of thought or understanding can never penetrate past the 
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phenomenal and into the noumenal, or the inner essence of things. Crucially, while 
Kant maintains the impossibility of accessing the noumenal, Schopenhauer 
distinguishes himself in asserting that although the rational mind can only know the 
how and not the what of phenomena, we can nevertheless search for the inner 
meaning of things in the realm of existence which is completely different from 
representation—in the world of will. This has an epistemological significance for 
Schopenhauer, who argues that the true opposite of rational knowledge is feeling, or 
the intuition of the imagination, which, in contrast to the logical faculties that perceive 
the world of representation, allows us to intuit the will. 
 In “With Charles Avison,” Browning avers the difficulty of conceptualizing 
soul—Schopenhauer's will—and seeks to compare it with mind, which he sees as 
corresponding to Schopenhauer's principle of sufficient reason. Browning uses 
architectural imagery to connote the processes of the mind after he imagines his 
reader asking for “an illustrative image” (l. 150) to help define what is meant by soul. 
Browning visualizes the mind as a worker who seeks to “o'erarch a gulf” (l. 153) and 
who, in using facts, assesses, connects, assimilates and builds in order to construct 
knowledge: “He digs, transports, / Shapes and, through enginery—all sizes, sorts, / 
Lays stone by stone until a floor compact / Proves our bridged causeway” (ll. 153-
156). While the precision of these varied movements of the mind are “easy even, to 
descry, describe” (l. 174), the soul is “an element which works beyond our guess” (l. 
160). Browning's soul is envisioned as a formless voice that comes from within and 
undulates under the mind. It is the “unsounded sea—whose lift of surge / Spite of all 
superstructure” of the mind, “lets emerge, / In flower and foam, Feeling from out the 
deeps” (ll. 162-163). It is important to remember that here Browning means “feeling” 
not in its empirical sense but, along with Schopenhauer, as a profound intuition of the 
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will.  
Although Browning traces the indefinable nature of soul, he asserts that 
ultimately it seeks to find form and to body itself forth in the material world: 
Yet wherefore heaving sway and restless roll 
This side and that, except to emulate 
Stability above?    To match and mate 
Feeling with knowledge,—make as manifest 
Soul's work as Mind's work... (ll. 183-187) 
 In using metaphors of encasing viscosity to show how soul endeavors to embody 
itself in forms of the material world—“run mercury into a mould like lead” (l. 192) 
and “shoot / Liquidity into a mould” (ll. 209-210)—Browning parallels 
Schopenhauer's assertion that will is embodied in the world of representation. The 
similarity that Browning recognized between his concept of soul and its embodiment 
in mind and Schopenhauer’s philosophy reveals his conviction that in the romantic 
paradigm there are two sides to the world: the inward one that looks to the noumenal 
and the outward one that looks to the material world of cause and effect. This is 
epistemological for Browning, just as it is for Schopenhauer, because it is the faculty 
of reason, or mind, that engages with the laws of the material world but it is feeling 
that accesses the inward realm of the ideal. 
Browning asserts that a path to the knowledge of what lies beyond rational 
knowledge is possible through feeling but also through what he calls the fancy. It is 
important not to misunderstand what Browning means by this term. The use of shared 
vocabulary to designate different concepts can easily lead amiss the interpretation of 
philosophical language in the nineteenth century, as Bonaparte has shown. Thus, 
although fancy for Coleridge and for Shelley designates the empiricist conception of 
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the associative imagination, Browning makes it clear in La Saisiaz that he uses the 
term fancy, in the same way as Dickens, to refer to the German Romantic and the 
Shellyian sense of the imagination that can access transcendent truth. Using the same 
language as Schopenhauer’s principle of sufficient reason, he exclaims that “What 
before caused all the causes, what effect of all effects / Haply follows, — these are 
fancy” (La Saisiaz ll. 225-6.), and he expresses this more simply in “Gerard de 
Lairesse” when he asserts that fancy deals with “fact unseen but no less fact the same” 
(l. 152), or in other words with facts that the senses cannot see and that the reason 
cannot discern. 
It is this foundational notion of the dual aspect of the world that is integral to 
the formulation of Browning’s objective poetics and its representation in drama. It 
also underlies the symbolic language that he developed in Sordello and to which he 
returns throughout all of his poetry. Indeed, observing the mystical aspect of 
Browning’s plays, Luria and A Soul’s Tragedy, a critic for The New Quarterly Review 
remarks, “Not only, like Walter Savage Landor, does he aim at the peculiar in his 
mode of thinking out and executing his subjects, but he has also invented a symbolic 
language exclusively his own, which requires interpretation. The latter, of course, has 
been a work of time” (14, 385-386).  
This symbolic language that Browning developed early incorporates a series 
of ostensible polarities that represent the dual aspect of the world, yet rather than 
being diametrically opposite they are dependent on and inseparable from each other. 
Common pairs that Browning uses are “soul and body,” “fancy and fact”, “music and 
speech,” “poetry and prose,” “reality and tradition,” “soul and thought” and “song and 
act,” among many others. These dualities will also be integral to Browning’s concept 
of lyric and drama, to which I will return shortly. All of these terms correspond with 
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Schopenhauer’s “will and representation” and Carlyle's phrase, most commonly used 
throughout his lectures, of “reality and semblance.” Browning’s sense of the double 
composition of reality is also expressed succinctly in his metaphor for the two sides of 
the moon in “One Word More” where the dark side looks to the inward—the 
infinite—and the light side looks to the outward—embodiment. 
 Browning’s symbolic language provides a different framework for looking at 
the terms subjective and objective, one which serves to expand the traditional 
definition of these terms as comprising the distinction between egoistic and 
impersonal poetry, idealism and realism, Romanticism and empiricism, individual 
relativity and empirical observation and so on. Although on the one hand these are all 
important categories, there are far reaching implications for how we interpret 
Browning’s poetry if we recognize that these seeming opposites are for Browning 
combined into the dialectical relationship between the spiritual and its embodiment in 
the material. Browning developed this symbolic language throughout the seven years 
he worked on Sordello and it is derived from his exploration of the classical and 
romantic paradigms and the relationship between subjective and objective idealism. 
 As part of this symbolic language, Browning’s terms subjective and objective 
are derived from the common currency of German Romantic idealism, which he 
alludes to when he refers in the Essay to the word objective, “as the phrase now 
goes,” and also when Elizabeth Barrett says, “you have in your vision two worlds, or 
to use the language of the schools of the day, you are both subjective and objective in 
the habits of your mind. You can deal with abstract thought and with human passion 
in the most passionate sense. Thus, you have an immense grasp in Art” (10, 25-7). 
That these terms are understood in the context of idealism is apparent from the way 
Elizabeth correlates the subjective position with the abstraction of Browning’s 
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metaphysical thought and the objective with human passion, which she emphasizes in 
its “most passionate sense” to show that she is not talking about feeling as an 
empirical emotion but as a physical manifestation of the spiritual. Her letter reiterates 
that the subjective and the objective perspectives comprise the double vision of two 
worlds: one that perceives the underlying meaning of the noumenal and the other its 
manifestation in phenomena. This is also the realization that Aurora Leigh comes to 
when she exclaims that the poet “Holds firmly by the natural, to reach / The spiritual 
beyond it,—fixes still / The type with mortal vision, to pierce through / With eyes 
immortal, to the antetype / Some call the ideal,—better called the real” (7, ll. 19-23). 
Thus while the subjective poet seeks the eternal truths of Plato through the soul, it is 
the objective poet who looks to the ideal in its material embodiment: his “endeavour 
has been to reproduce things external (whether the phenomena of the scenic universe, 
or the manifested action of the human heart and brain)” (281).  
Although in embodiment the objective is necessarily an imperfect copy, since 
the objective is a manifestation of the spiritual it is still informed by the ideal, which 
has far reaching implications for Browning’s view of the empirical world and for his 
role as the objective poet. Indeed Browning says in the Essay that the objective poet 
reproduces the world of phenomena “with an immediate reference, in every case, to 
the common eye and apprehension of his fellow-men, assumed capable of receiving 
and profiting by this reproduction.” This ability has been “obtained through the poet’s 
double faculty of seeing external objects more clearly, widely, and deeply than it is 
possible to the average mind, at the same time that he is so acquainted and in 
sympathy with its narrower comprehension as to be careful to supply it with no other 
materials than it can combine into an intelligible whole” (281). Like Elizabeth’s letter, 
Browning refers here to a “double faculty” that can perceive the transcendent 
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meaning but also has the sympathy and insight to see the ideal in its necessarily lower 
material manifestations as well. It is essential to note that this concept of sympathy 
does not imply relativity, as Robert Langbaum argues and to which I will return, but 
rather Browning’s commitment to discern truth in its myriad embodiments—to see 
that “truth is one as it is manifold” (Essay on Shelley 295). This idea of sympathy and 
its relation to symbolic embodiment will be a key issue for the interpretation of 
Browning’s concept of drama in the plays and in the monologue form. 
The notion of helping mankind to spiritually see is integral to Browning’s 
realism; thus in Sordello it is the objective poet, or the Maker-See, who strives to 
reveal the relationship between the ideal and the real so that man can endeavor to act 
in the world on the knowledge of soul, which Browning likened to Schopenhauer’s 
will to emphasize its broader meaning as noumenal truth. For Browning, this deeper 
insight is the ability to see the material world as a symbol that bodies forth its inner 
spiritual meaning. Indeed, in his defense of the naturalist painter, Francis Furini, 
Browning criticizes what he sees as the “uninstructed” empiricist who, in looking at 
the material world, “Would take all outside beauty—film that's furled / About a star—
for the star's self, endure /No guidance to the central glory” (ll.194-96). Although 
Browning criticizes those artists who take the temporal world as the aim of life in and 
of itself as opposed to a symbol that points to its inner meaning, he thinks it is worse 
to “wish all but the vapor well away, / And sky's pure product thickened from earth's 
bog” (ll. 194-99). For Browning, although the physical world is a sign that points to a 
significance beyond it, it is more important for the artist to focus on the reality that 
comprises the sign. Yet starting from the foundation of idealism, Browning’s 
conviction is that the inner meaning of the material can only be perceived by trusting 
to the “soul’s insight” (l. 201) as it is this “better sense” that “finds / An orb within 
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each halo” and “bids gross flesh / Free the spirit-pattern” (ll. 204-6-)—the “spirit-
pattern” being the noumenal substrate of reality. It is only when the uninstructed 
observer, “the vulgar eye” starts from a merely temporal perspective that he sees only 
the external material form, mistaking it for the aim of life rather than realizing that it 
is a sign that points to its inner spiritual essence.  
Browning discusses this same conviction in “With Bernard de Mandeville,” 
when Browning speaks through Mandeville to respond to Carlyle's exclamation in the 
poem that if the First Cause, or God, is beyond the comprehension of the finite mind, 
then it can only be spoken of in abstraction. Browning points out that if on a map of 
Goethe's estate we saw the symbol A or B written in place of the actual building, we 
would not be so foolish as to quibble that they do not look the same. He says that this 
is no “More foolish than our mortal purblind way / Of seeking in the symbol no mere 
point / To guide our gaze through what were else inane, / But things—their solid 
selves?” (ll. 185-8). For Browning the material world is not the only reality but a 
symbol that we must “Look through the sign to the thing signified” (l. 192). The sign 
is not an arbitrary linguistic construct for Browning but refers to the external material 
forms, as seen in phenomena and through man’s actions in the world, which in their 
embodiments at once obfuscate and signify the inward noumenal meaning. Although 
Browning does lament the elusive nature of language throughout his poetry, it is only 
because he sees it as belonging to the realm of mind, which cannot fully express the 
internal signification that is accessed through fancy and feeling—an epistemological 
distinction that explains the important comparison that Browning makes between 
language and music in his symbolic representation of his objective poetics. 
In Red Cotton Night-Cap County, or Turf and Towers (1873), Browning 
returns again to the issue of epistemology and symbolic embodiment. Referring to the 
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“vulgar eye,” the same phrase that he used in “Francis Furini” to discuss symbolism, 
Browning makes the distinction between empirical and spiritual knowledge. An 
important theme for Browning is that the empirical eye sees the material world as it 
exists in its material relations, but that it is soul that perceives the inner noumenal 
reality—that which is “signified”: 
Nothing is prominently likeable  
To vulgar eye without a soul behind,  
Which, breaking surface, brings before the ball  
Of sight, a beauty buried everywhere.  
If we have souls, know how to see and use,  
One place performs, like any other place.  
The proper service every place on earth  
Was framed to furnish man with: serves alike  
To give him note that, through the place he sees,  
A place is signified he never saw, 
But, if he lack not soul, may learn to know. (ll. 54-64) 
Browning shares his sense of symbolic embodiment and the role of the “Maker-
See” with Carlyle, who dedicates a whole chapter to symbols in Sartor Resartus and 
refers to the concept of the “Seeing-Eye” throughout his writings. Deeply influenced 
by German Romanticism, Carlyle argues that “in the Symbol proper, what we can call 
a Symbol, there is ever, more or less distinctly and directly, some embodyment and 
revelation of the Infinite; the Infinite is made to blend itself with the Finite, to stand 
visible, and as if it were, attainable there” (166). Carlyle explains how the symbol 
draws the infinite into the finite so that, although we cannot perceive the 
unadulterated infinite, we can in fact experience some intimation of it.  
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Browning’s conviction that the material world is a symbolic embodiment of the 
spiritual also defines his view of symbolic art, as he clearly states in his well-known 
declaration to John Ruskin that “I know that I don’t make out my conception by my 
language, all poetry being a putting the infinite within the finite” (Litzinger and 
Smalley 12). The key point here is that even though Browning concedes that fully 
realizing the ideal is impossible, he still proclaims symbolic embodiment as the 
ultimate goal of art. Indeed the fact that Browning uses the same German Romantic 
terminology here as Carlyle compellingly reveals symbolic embodiment as his credo. 
As the symbol partakes of the finite and the infinite, for Browning it is an 
embodiment that both obscures and expresses the transcendent. Carlyle makes the 
same assertion when he observes that “in a Symbol there is concealment and yet 
revelation: here, therefore, by Silence and by Speech acting together, comes a doubled 
significance” (166). For Carlyle, and as we see throughout Browning’s own symbolic 
language, silence represents the inexpressible infinite whereas speech represents the 
conceptual limits of knowledge that can only perceive the material world. Since the 
symbol partakes of both the ideal and the real it bodies forth the divine inner meaning 
of reality, yet in the very act of symbolic embodiment there is a space between the 
ideal and its manifestation in material form. However, this space between the ideal 
and the real in the symbols that comprise material reality is crucial for Browning’s 
objective poetics. Indeed, in “Francis Furini” Browning asserts that the objective artist 
should not enmesh the ideal in the real too closely; otherwise the “vulgar eye” will 
miss the spiritual import (ll. 206-8). For Browning, “Type needs anti-type” (l. 483) as 
it is precisely this tension between the ideal and the real that calls attention to the 
existence of another order of existence, and it is through this discrepancy that 
Browning seeks to facilitate spiritual sight in his plays and monologues. 
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In her study of German Romanticism and its influence on the Victorians, 
Bonaparte shows how this tension between the ideal and the real is the essence of 
German Romantic irony. Bonaparte analyzes the significance of Friedrich Schlegel's 
declaration that irony does not belong to rhetoric or style but to philosophy, showing 
how his seemingly contradictory statements about irony are actually different 
iterations of his central conviction that irony comprises the antagonism between the 
eternal Platonic truths, which are perceived by the imagination, and the multiplicity of 
views and possibilities that are available in the material realm. Demonstrating how 
German Romantic irony constitutes the productive space between the real and the 
ideal, Bonaparte counters the perspective of critics who argue that Schlegel's concept 
of irony anticipates the skepticism of modern irony. On the contrary, Bonaparte 
asserts that for Schlegel, and the Victorians, this space between the ideal and the real 
becomes the joyful plane of infinite striving, wherein the artist can seek to remake the 
real in the image of the ideal even while knowing that in part he will fail. 
Browning’s sense of philosophic irony has been seen by some critics to be an 
indication of his skepticism. Although Browning’s religious vision is taken for 
granted, the critical emphasis is placed on the assumption that Browning sees no 
meaningful relation between the ideal and the real in the empirical realm. Herbert 
Tucker notes that Browning's explanation to Ruskin constitutes a clear statement of 
his poetics, yet his interpretation of Browning's formulation assumes a post-structural 
perspective on the part of the poet. Identifying Browning's poetics as anticipatory of 
post-structural ideas, Tucker regards Derrida's term “différance” as a useful analytical 
tool for Browning's poetry and proposes that Browning's concept of the infinite, 
“describes not some eternal realm above mutability, but the conviction of endlessness 
or processionality to which the careful imperfections of his art of disclosure give 
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poetic currency” (14). In the section subtitled “Style: putting the infinite into the 
finite,” Tucker therefore maintains that “Browning's “infinite” and his “finite” need 
each other for mutual definition,” which suggests that the transcendent is merely a 
straw man figure for Browning, or a rhetorical device to facilitate a dialectic of 
deferred meaning. This assumption leads Tucker to conclude that Browning's 
persistent deferral of meaning indicates a corresponding belief in the impossibility of 
metaphysical closure, or the possibility of transcendent truth. 
The disagreement over the nature of Browning’s idealism and his realism is 
perhaps due to the assumption that irony necessarily undermines the symbolic 
method. Indeed, Paul de Man posits that “the act of irony... reveals the existence of a 
temporality that is definitely not organic, in that it relates to its source only in terms of 
distance and difference and allows for no end, for no totality” and as such irony and 
allegory are linked in their “common demystification of an organic world postulated 
in a symbolic mode of analogical correspondences or in a mimetic mode of 
representation in which fiction and reality could coincide” (222). However, it is the 
contention of this study that Browning's concept of symbolism is entirely compatible 
with his sense of irony because of his conviction that, in the romantic paradigm, 
symbolic embodiment necessarily both conceals and reveals transcendent truth. This 
interpenetration of symbolism and irony is analyzed at length by Browning in 
Sordello through his comparison of classical and romantic ontology, which I discuss 
at length in the following chapter. It is the realization that the ideal can never be fully 
accessible in the romantic paradigm that leads the Romantics, and the Victorians after 
them, to argue for the necessity of symbols as the only possibility for an approximate 
expression of the ideal, as Bonaparte has shown. I argue that Browning's poetics are 
not based on negating the possibility of meaning; rather through the space of irony, or 
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the gap between the infinite and the finite that he sees as inherent in the symbol, 
Browning seeks a way of conceiving a relationship between the real and the ideal.  
Critics who see Browning as a poet who looks to both the relative and the 
absolute place his poetics within the context of his foundational religious beliefs, 
especially the concept of the Incarnation. Raymond Williams asserts that Browning's 
sense of “human experience as poised between the absolute and the relative is 
reinforced by his religious belief, the profound influence of the spirits and tenets of 
Christianity,” and thus, in the context of his religious faith, Williams argues that it is 
misguided to view Browning's humanism as a rejection of Shelley's transcendental 
idealism (196). Thomas J. Collins and William Whitla also view the incarnation as the 
religious foundation for the form of the dramatic monologue, which they see as 
various incarnations in space and time. Also like Williams, David Shaw finds the 
foundation of Browning’s rhetorical method in the dialectic between the real and the 
ideal, or the material and the divine, which is symbolized in the Incarnation.  
In his study of Browning's later poetry, Clyde De L. Ryals also perceives the 
Incarnation to be the basis for Browning's poetics: “Just as God makes plain the 
central truth of life by means of the Incarnation, so does the poet through his 
imaginative vision impart value to disordered phenomena by penetrating the illusions 
of existence and revealing the true nature of things” (19). Yet he sees this as a 
departure from the ironic method that defined his early plays and monologues, 
positing that it was the influence of Elizabeth Barrett’s Christian moral vision that 
changed Browning's early aesthetics and philosophy. I would argue, however, that 
Browning's identification with Barrett Browning's religious vision did not actually 
facilitate a fundamental change in his poetics because, as a keen reader of German 
Romantic works, she also declared throughout her letters there to be a striking affinity 
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between her own ideas and German Romantic idealism. I propose in this study that it 
is not only in the idea of the Incarnation that Browning embraces both realism and 
idealism, the facts of the material world and the existence of Platonic truths—“not 
what man sees, but God sees”—but also in romantic symbolism, and that this notion 
of symbolism is the foundation for his development of dramatic form. 
To understand how drama relates to Browning’s concept of symbolism and the 
irony of embodiment, I would like to refer back to the foundational symbolic 
language that Browning uses throughout his poetry to denote the two sides of the 
world: the inward essence of reality and its manifestation in the real. In the context of 
this vocabulary, Browning’s idea of lyric and drama can be seen as one pair in the 
series of dualities that express this relationship. Browning emphasizes this reciprocal 
dynamic in his explanation to André Victor Amédée de Ripert-Monclar regarding the 
form of Paracelsus, which he sees as the distinction between a poem and a drama: 
Now, select any Drama you please, which comprises the history of a Thought or 
a Passion, &, putting yourself in the position of the author, view it as a 
conception of your own & consider that, having rêvé this History, you are about 
to give it a permanent existence .. to reduce it to language. Do you desire that it 
shall be Read not Acted? Follow throughout the whole, only what Raleigh calls 
the “mind of the piece,” as a purple thread through a varied woof .. discarding as 
unnecessary, the external machinery which would develop it, & only preserving 
the Result which was to be traced, however dimly throughout– Then expand this 
simple mood—& you will have a Poem like my own: .. Shall it be Acted not 
Read—follow the contrary course .. make prominent & efficient the influencing 
incidents & persons .. make that inferred only, which in the Poem was detailed 
.. & you have a Drama again. (3, 125-128) 
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Using the same parallel that Elizabeth Barrett made between the subjective and 
objective poet—or between abstract thought and passion—and what she saw as 
Browning’s dual vision, Browning starts from the assumption that a drama either 
delineates soul, a “Thought,” or its manifestation, a “Passion.” In order to emphasize 
the inward transcendent, or the “mind of the piece,” the poet must discard the 
“external machinery” wherein soul is made manifest so as to trace “this simple 
mood.” This emphasis on the internal would make it a poem to be read, which 
Browning understood, like Shelley, as “the very image of life expressed in its eternal 
truth,” and this is how he defines the form of Paracelsus. However, in order to focus 
on manifestation, Browning explains that the poet would have to simply reinstate the 
incidents of persons and events in the real that comprise the objective framework of 
space and time through which the soul is embodied. For Browning, this would make 
the poem a drama to be acted rather than read, a reversal he attempted with his plays. 
Browning’s distinction between a poem and a drama reiterates the dialectical 
relationship that he sees between the subjective and objective poet and between the 
lyrical and dramatic mode. It also indicates Browning’s conviction that the enactment 
of theatrical performance, in contrast to the read drama, is integral to the work of 
symbolic embodiment. 
That Browning’s concept of drama is derived from idealism can be seen in its 
similarity to Richard Wagner's concept of music drama. Although Wagner would not 
be known to Browning until later in the poet’s career (he refers to him in “Charles 
Avison”), as another figure who was influenced by the ideas of German Romanticism, 
and particularly Schopenhauer, Wagner's ideas are strikingly similar to Browning's. 
Wagner agrees with Schopenhauer that music is the most immediate expression of the 
will; therefore he uses it, like Browning, as a symbol for the noumenal realm that is 
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made manifest in the real through the objectivity of drama. In his 1870 Essay on 
Beethoven, Wagner argues that: 
We consequently should not go far astray, if we defined Music as 
man's qualification a priori for fashioning the Drama. Just as we 
construct for ourselves the world of semblances through application of 
the laws of Time and Space existing a priori in our brain, so this 
conscious representment of the world's Idea in Drama would thus be 
foreordained by those inner laws of Music, operating in the dramatist 
equally unconsciously with the laws of Causality we bring into 
employment for apperception of the phenomenal world. (106-7) 
Wagner says that time and space are the framework upon which the phenomenal 
world is constructed and that this is expressed in drama; however, since phenomena 
manifests the internal essence of things, the dramatist also creates according to the 
inner laws of music through which the ineffable is expressed. For Wagner, music and 
drama should work together so that we can perceive how the external shapes of drama 
have come from the internal essence of things and also how the objectivity of drama 
shows the essence of things as they are projected in a concrete form. 
Thus in his Opera and Drama (1851) Wagner argues that it is drama that must 
be the artwork of the future because “the true Artwork can only be engendered by an 
advance from imagination into actuality, i.e. Physicality” (120). In speaking of 
Shakespeare, Wagner explains that: “The mastery of the outward stuff, so as to shew 
the inner view of the essence of that stuff, could only be brought to a successful issue 
by setting the subject itself before the senses in all the persuasiveness of actuality; and 
this was to be achieved in Drama and nothing else” (127). In his “Essay on 
Beethoven,” Wagner exclaims, “We have called Music the revelation of the inner 
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vision of the Essence of the world, and Shakespeare we might term a Beethoven who 
goes on dreaming though awake” (108). What Wagner means by this is that in drama 
Shakespeare embodies in the real world the transcendent realm of music accessed by 
Beethoven. Wagner’s comparison of Beethoven and Shakespeare as the relationship 
between the inward-noumenal and the outward-embodiment, music and drama, are 
the equivalent of Browning’s Shelley and Shakespeare, the subjective lyrical poet and 
the objective dramatist. Indeed, as we will see, Browning often uses the symbol of 
music to define Shelley’s subjective poetry in relation to his own objective, dramatic 
method. Therefore, it is the conviction of this study that Browning does not see 
himself in opposition to Shelley’s subjective poetry and idealism but rather as the 
objective poet, like Shakespeare, who embodies his idealism in the real. 
Coleridge also analyzes Shakespeare, as the objective poet, in terms of 
idealism. Although Coleridge denounces the modern theater for emphasizing the 
senses at the expense of imagination, he also acknowledges that, in its representation 
of visual reality, the drama has the most potential to realize the truths of the 
imagination. In his Biographia Literaria, Coleridge argues that the moralist and the 
metaphysician can find “the happiest illustrations of general truths and the 
subordinate laws of human thought and action” in Shakespeare's tragic and comic 
characters, yet he is quick to note that he is not “recommending abstractions: for these 
class-characteristics, which constitute the instructiveness of a character, are so 
modified and particularized in each person of the Shakespearian Drama, that life itself 
does not excite more distinctly that sense of individuality which belongs to real 
existence” (219). For Coleridge, Shakespeare's characters embody truths in the 
multiplicities of the material world:  
It was Shakespeare's prerogative to have the universal, which is 
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potentially in each particular, opened out to him, the homo generalis, 
not as an abstraction from observation of a variety of men, but as the 
substance capable of endless modifications, of which his own personal 
existence was but one, and to use this one as the eye that beheld the 
other, and as the tongue that could convey the discovery (Lectures on 
Shakespeare vol 2, 45) 
In comparison to Shakespeare, Coleridge says that because Beaumont and Fletcher do 
not perceive the particular to be an embodiment of the universal, their syntheses are 
constructed haphazardly through empirical observation. In his popular Lectures on 
Shakespeare, Coleridge compares Shakespeare's dramatic imagination to the 
symbolic view of the natural world, which unfolds and realizes the ideal: “But nature, 
who works from within by evolution and assimilation according to a law, cannot do it. 
Nor could Shakespeare, for he too worked in the spirit of nature, by evolving the germ 
within by the imaginative power according to an idea” (239). 
 Browning’s choice of Shakespeare as the archetypal objective poet is part of 
the larger Romantic discourse that views the dramatist as the objective iteration of 
romantic idealism. In his Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature, August Schlegel 
defines Shakespeare as the pinnacle of romantic art in England. Since soul is no 
longer perfectly embodied in the temporal world as it was in the classical age, in the 
romantic paradigm man turns inward to contemplate his transcendence. In romantic 
art, the poet seeks to embody the inward noumenal soul but this can only be bodied 
forth in approximate symbols in contrast to the consummate symbols of classical art. 
Coleridge states that in romantic art “even the human form, must, in order to satisfy 
the mind, be brought into connexion with, and be in fact symbolical of, the infinite; 
and must be considered in some enduring, how-ever shadowy and indistinct, point of 
 30 
view, as the vehicle or representative of moral truth” (273). Thus the external form of 
romantic art is comprised of symbols that body forth the inward soul. 
Influenced by August Schlegel’s distinction between classical and romantic 
art, Coleridge posits in his Lectures on Shakespeare that in contrast to classical art 
where character is embodied in the external action, the transcendent interiority of 
character creates action in romantic art: “the moderns revere the infinite, and affect 
the indefinite as a vehicle of the infinite;—hence their passions, their obscure hopes 
and fears, their wandering through the unknown, their grander moral feelings, their 
more august conception of man as man, their future rather than their past—in a word, 
their sublimity” (19). Coleridge argues that since form and action were paramount in 
classical art, as indicated by the strictures of time and place, it was addressed to the 
senses; whereas Shakespeare’s plays, as romantic dramas, are addressed to the reason, 
which “is independent of time and space; it has nothing to do with them: and hence 
the certainties of reason have been called eternal truths” (26).  
Critics have recognized the importance of Shakespeare for Browning's concept 
of drama and objectivity, but they have placed his engagement with Romantic 
Shakespearean criticism within the tradition of empiricism rather than idealism. In his 
seminal study of the development of the dramatic monologue, Robert Langbaum 
analyzes the influence of Romantic Shakespearean criticism and sees its influence on 
nineteenth-century drama as an important precursor to the dramatic monologue form. 
Yet, in not acknowledging the influence of German Romantic ideas to which these 
English writers declare themselves indebted, Langbaum places Romantic dramatic 
criticism within the empirical paradigm.  
Langbaum observes that English Romantic drama reverses the Aristotelian 
concept of action that creates character to one where character creates action; 
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however he does not examine this through the distinction of the classical and the 
romantic but rather in terms of psychology. In his analysis, Langbaum argues that this 
transition in drama came about through the Romantic preoccupation with character 
psychology in Shakespeare's plays at the expense of ideas, and that it is “in the 
isolation of character from plot that we can best see the psychological interpretation 
of Shakespeare as dissolving dramatic structure and leading us toward a dramatic 
monologue” (177). He suggests that the empirical approach of the monologue leads 
the reader to sympathize with the historically and psychologically realized persona, 
which then leads to the perception of the relativity of all judgment. 
Loy D. Martin also analyzes Browning’s dramatic form through psychology. 
Observing an ironic tension in the speaking subject of the dramatic persona between a 
Cartesian epistemology in which the self is ontologically unified and a postmodern 
epistemology in which the self is constructed through a network of reciprocal 
interactions, Loy perceives in Browning’s dramatic monologues a “radical de-
sublimation” whereby he moves from a Romantic emphasis on Being to what Derrida 
calls “The Written Being,” a subject which is constituted through speech and as such 
is always in process. As a result of this tension, Martin posits that: “The dramatic 
monologue has fairly well abandoned the project of 'presenting' an underlying 
wholeness. It recognizes the self-destroying quality of the idea of wholeness, an idea 
that can only be realized in discourse. The idea of wholeness is self-destroying in 
Browning because the subject of its discourse—the discourse of the dramatic 
monologue—can never be a discrete entity” (109). For Loys the discrepancy he 
observes between the ostensible totality and modern fragmentation in the monologue 
implies a rejection of Romantic epistemology.  
 Similarly in her analysis of Browning and his Romantic inheritance, Britta 
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Martens contends that Browning's dramatic, impersonal poetics reveals his affinity 
with twentieth-century and twenty-first-century challenges to the notion of a stable 
and unified authorial self. She claims that even in the later poetry where we often find 
Browning speaking in propria persona, his voice is presented as a dramatic utterance 
so as to deliberately undermine the possibility of an absolute authorial expression, 
which in turn undermines the identification of his voice with Romantic poetics. 
Martens posits that Browning's dramatic poetics shares in “our suspicion of Romantic 
aesthetics,” and anticipates postmodern theories of identity and also the subjective 
construction of meaning (3). Therefore, in seeing an epistemological distinction 
between the subjective and the objective poet, Martens concludes that Browning's 
choice of dramatic form throughout his career negates the Romantic idea of 
transcendent truth and the ability of the visionary poet to impart visionary knowledge. 
In his study of Browning’s idea of action in character, E. Warwick Slinn posits 
that Shelley's conviction that poetry pierces through the veil of the material world to 
reveal its transcendent meaning serves to question the very objective nature of reality 
itself shifting the perspective in nineteenth-century poetry “from what is perceived to 
the processes of perception, from the structure of an external world to the structuring 
powers of individual minds” (1). In placing Browning’s concept of action in character 
within the empirical paradigm, Slinn argues that Browning's turn to drama reveals his 
break with Shelley and Romantic epistemology: his “legacy from his early mentor 
Shelley is not the authority of the imagination, but a skepticism which although 
seeming at times to return him to an Enlightenment dualism, anticipates the more 
modern view that perception and conceptualising are barely separable” (7). Making 
the connection between Browning’s notion of internal action and the inevitable 
solipsism that Pater found in sensory perception, Slinn argues that the objective again 
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becomes subjective for Browning as he turns to dramatic form to explore the 
postmodern “fictions of identity”—the subjective and relative construction of 
meaning. Reframing Browning’s Romantic conviction that all poetry is a “putting of 
the infinite in the finite” within the context of psychology, Slinn argues that: “If there 
is any sense of the infinite in the finite in Browning’s poetry, once a favourite 
description of his aims, it is not a transcendence of limits but an ever-continuing 
regress into the mechanisms of a single moment in consciousness” (18). Thus Slinn’s 
psychological approach to Browning’s concept of drama implies an outward-inward 
trajectory where character is created through its interaction with external forces, in 
contrast to idealism where the inward consciousness denotes the noumenal soul and 
the objective refers to its manifestation, which is figured as an inward-outward 
trajectory. As Browning says in Paracelsus:  
Truth is within ourselves; it takes no rise  
From outward things, whate'er you may believe.  
There is an inmost center in us all,  
Where truth abides in fullness; all around,  
Wall upon wall, the gross flesh hems it in,  
This perfect, clear perception, which is Truth. 
A baffling and perverting carnal mesh 
Binds it, and makes all error: and, to KNOW, 
Rather consists in opening out a way  
Whence the imprisoned splendour may escape  
Than in effecting entry for a light  
         Supposed to be without. (ll. 726-37) 
Yet Browning’s idealism does not negate the importance of psychology for his 
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dramatic poetry; nevertheless, the revelations of psychology and personality that are 
so important for his protagonists and the speakers of the dramatic monologue do not 
belong to the inward action, as it is seen, but rather to the difficulty of outward 
embodiment and the necessarily imperfect manifestation of the inward romantic soul, 
which becomes the site of productive irony for Browning’s plays and monologues. 
Although recent criticism of Browning’s concept of drama views it in terms of 
psychology, and although this was to become the prevailing paradigm of the 
nineteenth century, Romantic critics, and the Victorians after them, were emphatic in 
their distinction between empiricism and idealism. In his essay “On the Tragedies of 
Shakespeare,” Charles Lamb contrasts the corporeal with the intellectual in his 
discussion of King Lear to show that he intends by the intellect something that is not 
reducible to material definitions—by which he means that our highest intellectual 
thoughts are transcendent. Lamb believes that while actors can imitate the empirical 
passions and emotions, these are only the outward expression of “the inner structure 
and workings of mind in character,” or the ineffable thoughts, but if the Macbeth, 
Iago or Richard are read rather than presented visually on the stage: “we think not so 
much of the crimes which they commit, as of the ambition, the aspiring spirit, the 
intellectual activity which prompts them to overleap those moral fences” (230). He 
maintains that in reading the plays enable the perception of “the sublime images, the 
poetry alone” (231), which does not refer to textual imagery or verse but to the 
expression of the ideal that is fully present to the mind. 
 This becomes an epistemological issue for Lamb when he claims that the ideal 
level of Shakespeare's plays cannot be perceived through the senses but only through 
the imagination, the faculty that perceives eternal truths. Lamb criticizes the 
contemporary stage, especially in its emphasis on elaborate costume and stage design, 
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because it leads to sensory perception at the expense of the imagination. In his 
discussion of Othello, Lamb argues that reading the play leads to “the triumph of 
virtue over accidents, of the imagination over the senses.” Yet watching it upon the 
stage “when imagination is no longer the ruling faculty…we are left to our poor 
unassisted senses” (232). Juxtaposing “virtue” with “accidents,” Lamb refers to a 
transcendent sense of morality that is perceived by the imagination in contrast to the 
mutable physiological reactions that are perceived by the senses; therefore, he 
concludes that Shakespeare’s tragedies should be read rather than acted: “the reading 
of a tragedy is a fine abstraction. It presents to the fancy just so much of external 
appearances as to make us feel that we are among flesh and blood, while by far the 
greater and better part of our imagination is employed upon the thoughts and internal 
machinery of the character” (235). 
 The differing approaches to Shakespearean criticism and its relationship to 
Browning are inevitably complicated by the fact that distinct philosophical traditions 
shared vocabulary and terminology in common that often mean entirely different 
things, as Bonaparte has shown. Romantic dramatic criticism is one example of this 
where it has been interpreted through empirical philosophy rather than the philosophy 
of idealism, influencing the way in which Browning's concept of drama has been seen 
in relation to their works. For instance, while Donald Hair acknowledges that Lamb's 
sense of abstraction refers to the transcendent soul, he links it to Locke's empirical 
concept of a mental idea rather than to the German Romantic concept of a Platonic 
idea. Hair perceives a correlation between Lamb's notion of abstraction and Locke's 
understanding that language does not represent external signs but rather invisible 
ideas within the mind, which are derived from sensory experience: “first, our 
generalizations from experience (the sensations which come to us through our five 
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senses) and the names we attach to those generalizations, and secondly, the 
connections which the mind itself gives to generalizations, and the linking words 
which express those relations” (94).  
In observing an analogy between Lamb's vocabulary and Locke's, Hair 
concludes that Locke's concept of ideas paves the way for the unacted drama of 
Romanticism, which probing the inner mind through language leads to Browning's 
psychological concept of drama. However, the empirical understanding of an idea as a 
mental operation based on sensory perceptions is entirely different to the Romantic 
concept of the Platonic idea—the eternal forms emphasized by Shelley in his Defense 
of Poetry that are apprehended by the faculty of imagination. Lamb makes it clear that 
Shakespeare's characters are not reducible to physical phenomena; therefore, the 
internal workings of the mind are not apprehended by the understanding, the logical 
processes that interpret sensory perception. Thus Lamb exclaims that in Shakespeare's 
characters there is something “which appeals too exclusively to the imagination, to 
admit of their being made objects to the senses without suffering a change or a 
diminution” (233). Similarly, Hazlitt argues that the plays of Shakespeare could be 
successfully performed in his own period because it had not yet encountered what he 
felt was the reductive empirical philosophy of mind: “The modern philosophy, which 
reduces the whole theory of mind to habitual impressions, and leaves the natural 
impulses of passion and imagination out of the account, had not then been discovered; 
or if it had, would have been little calculated for the uses of poetry” (124).  
Thomas De Quincey's short essay on Shakespeare “on the Knocking at the 
Gate in Macbeth,” is also a discussion about the limitation of the understanding in the 
interpretation of Shakespeare. De Quincey also asserts that the transcendent level of 
Shakespeare's plays cannot be apprehended through the understanding but only 
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through intuition, or feeling, which both Schopenhauer and Browning contend is the 
only way to perceive the inner reality and meaning of the world that lies beyond the 
external constraints of cause and effect. As someone who had studied German 
philosophy at Oxford and who often declared his admiration of German works, De 
Quincey conceives of the understanding as the faculty which interacts with the 
phenomena of the material world in contrast to feeling or intuition which accesses the 
noumenal. In his essay De Quincey argues that “the mere understanding, however 
useful and indispensable, is the meanest faculty in the human mind, and the most to 
be distrusted; and yet the great majority of people trust to nothing else; which may do 
for ordinary life, but not for philosophical purposes” (192). To look at Shakespeare's 
plays philosophically, De Quincey maintains that we must turn to a different faculty 
than the understanding. This is why he could never explicate the meaning of the 
knocking at the gate scene in Macbeth through his understanding: it was only through 
his intuitive response that he finally comprehended its spiritual significance. 
 The Romantic conviction that held there were two ways of grasping 
Shakespeare’s work, whether through the imagination or the understanding, meant 
that the interpretation of Shakespeare’s plays became a philosophical endeavor. How 
this relates to Shakespeare’s significance as an objective poet can be seen in 
Schopenhauer’s conviction that there are two possible ways to grasp an actual object: 
either “purely objectively,” where the idea of the object—the will as it is manifested 
in phenomena—is perceived, or in its relations to other objects according to the 
principle of sufficient reason—the phenomena in its empirical relations—which is the 
very distinction that Coleridge makes between the romantic symbolic form of 
Shakespeare’s plays and the empirical dramas of Beaumont and Fletcher.  
 As the Romantics perceived two different ways of seeing the objective world, 
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it followed that they saw two types of drama, which as Browning says in his Essay on 
Shelley is the form that represents the world of manifestation and the doings of men. 
Drama was defined as either romantic or symbolic, where the action comprises the 
embodiment of ideas, or as empirical, where the action followed a plot that imitated 
the laws of space, time and causality. These distinct perspectives on drama and the 
theater entered into broader discussions about epistemology where the imagination 
was seen to be the faculty that perceived the world, and its representation in drama, as 
an embodiment of the ideal whereas it was the reason or understanding that saw it in 
only its external material form. This nineteenth-century dialogue between the 
philosophies of idealism and empiricism that was anchored in drama provides the 
intellectual context for Browning’s choice of Shakespeare as the archetypal objective 
poet and for his conception of his own plays and monologues. 
This distinction between symbolic and realistic drama, idealism and 
empiricism, was instigated by Schlegel's massively popular Lectures on Dramatic Art 
and Literature. In his Lectures, Schlegel defines symbolic drama as poetic, making it 
clear that he does not want the expression poetical to be misunderstood, exclaiming 
that he is “not now speaking of the versification of language and the ornaments of 
language; these, when not animated by some higher excellence, are the least effective 
on the stage” (19). He goes on to explain that he speaks of poetry “in the spirit and 
design of a piece; and this may exist in as high as a degree when the drama is written 
in prose as in verse” (19). In order for drama to be poetic, Schlegel asserts that “it is 
necessary that a composition should be a mirror of ideas, that is, thoughts and feelings 
which in their character are necessary and eternally true, and soar above this earthly 
life, and also that it should exhibit them embodied before us” (19). Schlegel makes it 
clear here that he takes poetry to mean the expression of ideal truths, which soar to the 
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divine realm but are also made manifest in physical forms. Thus poetic drama is 
symbolic: it partakes of both idealism and empiricism because it embodies ideas into 
the observable real world. Schlegel emphasizes that without the spiritual component, 
“a drama becomes altogether prosaic and empirical, that is to say, patched together by 
the understanding out of the observations that it has gathered from literal reality” (19).  
In his discussion of poetic drama and the theater, Schlegel asserts that it is 
necessary for the dramatic poet to “transport his hearers out of themselves, and as it 
were, take bodily possession of their attention.” He contends that “there is a species of 
poetry which gently stirs a mind attuned to solitary contemplation, as soft breezes 
elicit melody from the Aeolian harp,” which despite its excellent tones would be lost 
on the stage because “the grand requisite in a drama is to make this rhythm 
perceptible in the onward progress of the action” (20). Thus the key to drama for 
Schlegel is that it embodies or objectifies the lyricism of the subjective poet. Yet 
Schlegel makes it clear that the success of this endeavor “must always depend on the 
capacities and humours of the audience, and, consequently, on the national character 
in general, and the particular degree of mental culture” (20). Schlegel argues that the 
modern drama reflects a debased mental culture and that his inquiry into the ideas of 
drama from “the most distinguished nations in their most brilliant periods” is at the 
same time an attempt “to institute an inquiry into the means of ennobling and 
perfecting so important an art” (23).  
 In his Lectures on Shakespeare, Coleridge agrees with Schlegel that successful 
embodiment on the stage depends upon public taste. Coleridge's clarification of what 
he means by public taste also explains what Schlegel understands by mental culture: 
“I do not mean that taste which merely springs from caprice or fashionable imitation, 
and which, in fact, genius can, and by degrees will, create for itself; but that which 
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arises out of wide-grasping and heart enrooted causes, which is epidemic, and in the 
very air that we breathe” (34). Coleridge sees public taste as the foundational mental 
assumptions of the audience, and the modern “dead palsy” of mind is its inability to 
see past the empirical into the ideal within it. In his critique of Bertram, Coleridge 
argues that the modern stage appeals only to the senses: it is sentimental rather than 
tragic, and it only emphasizes sensory stimulation and self-gratification. Coleridge 
compares modern drama with the bygone days of symbolic drama, arguing that “their 
tragic scenes were meant to affect us indeed, but within the bounds of pleasure, and in 
union with the activity both of our understanding and imagination” (Biographia 
Literaria 618), which again emphasizes the importance of drama for discussions of 
epistemology in Romantic and Victorian discourse. 
It was the Romantic assumption that symbolic drama could not be rendered on 
the stage as it had become too empirical, which for Hazlitt was a reflection of the 
wider condition of mankind who tend to emphasize the senses at the expense of the 
imagination:  
Poetry and the stage do not agree well together...the IDEAL can have 
no place on the stage, which is a picture without perspective; 
everything there in the foreground. That which was merely an airy 
shape, a dream, a passing thought, immediately becomes an 
unmanagable reality. Where all is left to the imagination (in the case of 
reading) every circumstance, near or remote, has an equal chance of 
being kept in mind, and tells according to the mixed impression of all 
that has been suggested. But the imagination cannot sufficiently qualify 
the actual impressions of the senses (121). 
Hazlitt capitalizes ideal to emphasize that he means it in its philosophic sense, and 
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that his criticism of the stage is framed in specifically epistemological terms. Lamb 
also criticizes the modern day mind for its empirical outlook on the world and its 
necessarily detrimental effect on the theater and the comprehension of Shakespeare's 
plays. Where the purpose of symbolic art is to reveal embodiment, the theater only 
emphasizes the material form: “It seemed to embody and realize conceptions which 
had hitherto assumed no distinct shape. But dearly do we pay all our life afterwards 
for this juvenile pleasure, this sense of distinctness. When the novelty is passed, we 
find to our cost that, instead of realising an idea, we have only materialized and 
brought down a fine vision to the standard and flesh and blood. We have let go of a 
dream, in quest of an unattainable substance” (222). As Janet Ruth Heller has 
observed in “Coleridge, Lamb, Hazlitt, and the Reader of Drama,” Lamb did not 
argue that Shakespeare should be read rather than performed because he was 
interested in psychology, but because he felt that an increasingly empirical audience 
could no longer apprehend the symbolic ideas embodied within the plays. 
 In his Defence of Poetry, Shelley makes a similar correlation between the 
degradation of symbolic drama into the empirical drama and the philosophical 
condition of society. Shelley agrees with Schlegel that the true drama is poetic in that 
it embodies eternal truth, proclaiming that “the drama, so long as it continues to 
express poetry, is a prismatic and many-sided mirror, which collects the brightest rays 
of human nature and divides and reproduces them from the simplicity of these 
elementary forms, and touches them with majesty and beauty, and multiplies all that it 
reflects, and endows it with a power of propagating its like wherever it may fall” 
(318). Shelley uses the metaphor of the prismatic light and the mirror, the same 
metaphors that Browning will use to define his own conception of dramatic form, to 
visualize how symbolic drama perceives the elemental forms, the white light, which is 
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then reflected or refracted in the prismatic rays of the embodied world. Thus drama is 
poetic for Shelley because it comprises symbolic embodiment—it is “the very image 
of life expressed in its eternal truth” (313). 
 Shelley argues that “in periods of the decay of social life, the drama 
sympathises with that decay” (318), which he perceives in the loss of poetic drama. 
Like Schlegel, Shelley exclaims that “it is indisputable that the highest perfection of 
human society has ever corresponded with the highest dramatic excellence; and that 
the corruption or distinction of the drama in a nation where it has once flourished, is a 
mark of a corruption of manners, and an extinction of the energies which sustain the 
soul of social life” (319). According to Shelley, drama loses its poetry because of “the 
calculating principle,” which reduces the ideal truths of poetic drama into the mere 
particulars of sensory stimulation and self-gratification. Shelley echoes Schlegel in his 
argument that “life may be preserved and renewed, if men should arise capable of 
bringing back the drama to its principles,” and he declares that “the office and 
character of a poet participates in the divine nature as regards providence, no less than 
regards creation” (319), which is a call that Browning saw himself responding to.  
 The Victorians followed the Romantics in their concern that the stage was too 
empirical for poetic or symbolic drama. In his essay “Plays and Puritans,” Charles 
Kingsley refers to the prominent influence of German theories of art on the Victorian 
period when he declares that “the British Isles have been ringing for the last few years 
with the word 'Art' in its German sense; with 'High Art,' Symbolic Art, 'Ecclesiastical 
Art,' 'Dramatic Art,' 'Tragic Art,' and so forth.” However, he exclaims that despite all 
of these translations of German works, the English public do not appear to care that 
the stage is dead. In his condemnation of the contemporary stage, Kingsley rails 
against the common notion that the Puritans shut down the theaters because they 
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disliked art; rather he argues that the Puritans perceived the fact that drama was no 
longer poetic, poetic in the Romantic sense of an ideal truth, and that it was this 
empirical degradation of the stage that prompted them to put an end to dramatic art. 
He states that rather than destroying the trajectory of drama, it was actually the 
Puritans who were truly “dramatic” and “poetic” because, unlike the stage, their 
actions bodied forth an ideal. 
 In his essay “On Certain Principles of Art in Works of Imagination,” Edward 
Bulwer-Lytton agrees with Kingsley that the drama in England had become extinct: 
“in our country, at present, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that there is no tragic 
drama—scarcely any living drama at all...but the fact itself is so clear, that the Drama, 
though in reality it is the highest order of poem with the exception of the Epic, seems 
to have wholly dropped out of our consideration as belonging to any form of poetry 
whatsoever” (310). Here Lytton follows the German Romantics, and quotes Hegel 
specifically, arguing that artists should not seek a “servile copy of particulars” but 
rather the 'idealized image of a truth” (312). In explaining that all art should “manifest 
the general,” or embody the ideal, he argues that the symbolic art form of the 
nineteenth century is the novel, as Bonaparte has shown. However, he also links the 
goals of symbolic art to drama when he looks back briefly to Macready's attempts to 
reform the theater and the subsequent hope that playwrights would again be able to 
embody their conceptions on the stage, which is the time period that Browning 
himself started to write plays.  
 Barrett Browning's close friend Richard Hengist Horne, who spoke of August 
Schlegel in his letters to her, also applied German Romantic ideas about drama in his 
“An Essay on Tragic Influence,” which he included as a preface to his verse drama 
Gregory VII. Horne argues that the modern times, by reducing everything to tangible 
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reality, have damaged symbolic art. Similarly to Bulwer-Lytton, Horne contends that 
one problem that has arisen out of the modern frame of mind is the emphasis on 
imitating reality. Horne argues that the dramatic poet should not merely imitate the 
particulars of the natural world; rather he should “render the poetry of nature, the 
essential effects, individualised and generalised at the same time” (xvii). Thus, “we 
should not make the thing real, but a vivid illusion, embodying only the higher 
qualities of the reality” (xvii). Horne explains that the dramatic poet can manifest the 
poetry of nature through the passions, which are not sensory but an expression of the 
ideal: “Out of the heart's passionate exaltation, its anguish and despair, its desolate 
oblivion of time and the world's life, the essential truth of things cries with a loud 
voice, infallible as lasting, springing as they do from the fountain-head of enduring 
nature” (viii). Horne echoes the German and British Romantics in their 
epistemological analysis when he declares: “ideal art appeals to the heart and 
imagination, not to the measurements of the understanding; and this is why their fine 
essence is very apt to float off and escape at the material touch of analysis, discussion, 
and criticism” (xii). Using the same language as Elizabeth Barrett in her praise for 
Browning, Horne sees a double vision in symbolic drama that appeals to both 
“abstract and imaginative passions,” which “has its foundation in elementary truths, 
and high-wrought mental incitements and purposes, with which we are made 
intimate” (xv). 
 In a letter to Horne, Elizabeth Barrett wrote that she greatly admired his 
“Essay on Tragic Influence,” and praised it for its “noble philosophy & poetry;” 
however, she also accused Horne of giving too much honor to the stage and actors, 
exclaiming, “what Macready can touch Lear?” (4, 272-3). Elizabeth Barrett reiterates 
this distaste for the theater in a letter to Mary Russell Mitford, but at the same time in 
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italicizing “poetry” she clarifies her admiration for symbolic drama: “You must not 
ask any questions about my love for the drama. Is not the drama, a form, & a very 
noble one, of poetry?” (3, 207-9).  Inquiring about the actor Mr. Forrest who was in 
talks about appearing in a play of Mitford's, Elizabeth Barrett echoes Lamb’s 
distinction between symbolic and empirical drama: “I shall like to hear from you 
whether he is or is not rather melodramatic than tragic,—and whether his physical 
does not obtrude itself into his intellectual” (3, 222-5). Similarly to Lamb, Elizabeth 
Barrett emphasizes her conviction that the modern stage cannot perform symbolic, 
poetic drama because the sensory emphasis of the stage precludes the faculty of 
imagination; therefore, she declared: “I shall read Otto” (3, 222-5). 
  Elizabeth Barrett explained to Horne that she would not sign the petition to 
end the licenses because theaters “at their best, take the ideal of them, & the soul of 
the Drama is far above the stage—& according to present and perhaps all past 
regulations in this country, dramatic poetry has been desecrated & drawn down into 
the dust of our treading” (5, 4-6). She echoes these objections to Browning in his own 
attempt at writing symbolic drama: “And the 'soul's tragedy,' which sounds to me like 
the step of a ghost of an old Drama! & you are not to think that I blaspheme the 
Drama, dear Mr Browning,—or that I ever thought of exhorting you to give up the 
'solemn robes' and tread of the buskin. It is the modern theatre which vulgarizes these 
things,—the modern theatre in which we see no altar!—where the thymele is replaced 
by the popular caprice of the actor” (10, 101-4). 
 In his essay “The Past and Present State of Dramatic Art and Literature”—a 
copy of which Hair notes was sent to Browning—Frederick Guest Tomlins argues, 
along with Horne, that the degradation of drama has come about through the theaters' 
monopoly of the performance of intellectual drama. He asserts that unlike 
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Shakespeare’s time, there is not enough space and incentive for dramatists to pursue 
the symbolic drama in the modern age. Tomlins maintains that even the theaters that 
did hold the monopoly had rendered poetic drama impossible on the stage because of 
their empirical emphasis on scenery and costume: “The imagination is disturbed by 
such close approximation to facts; and it is an endless and hopeless task to endeavour 
to dupe the senses and the understanding by a direct appeal to them” (25). Similarly to 
Romantic dramatic criticism, Tomlins emphasizes the role of imagination in 
perceiving the drama of symbolic embodiment: “the drama, in its true existence, 
appeals to the imagination: it should be poetry put into action: both must be there—if 
not, no drama” (24), which leads him to declare that “as a species the true drama is 
extinct” (20). Tomlins closes his essay with an imploring message for dramatists in 
the hope that the symbolic drama can be revived: “To Mr. Sheridan Knowles and the 
dramatists—to Mr Macready and the actors, will the lovers of the intellectual 
drama...be able to guide all that feel an interest in the matter, to such a course as may 
again revive and give permanence to the National Drama of England” (30). 
 Although Elizabeth Barrett would not sign the petition to end the theater 
monopoly, she did recognize, like Tomlins, that there were writers who wished to 
bring the symbolic drama back upon the stage. Indeed, after reading Thomas Noon 
Talfourd's Ion, she wrote to praise him for its poetry, which, as a keen reader of 
German Romantic works, she understood to mean symbolism: 
Surely English voices should thank you for not sitting in the seat of the 
Utilitarians,—for providing to your countrymen, by the Greek water in 
your chalice, how the old Greek fountains, tho hewn out of the natural 
rock by unclean hands, bore waters more like in taste & colour to the 
pure ones of the Edenic rivers, than an English Benthamite can show in 
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all his cisterns of lead;—for providing that poetry has one face with 
ideal virtue—the shadow and similitude of the virtue lost in Eden, 
which visits the souls of fallen men “in thoughts from the visions of the 
night (3, 170-1) 
Elizabeth Barrett lauds Talfourd for his poetic power that serves to brings back “ideal 
virtue” in the face of the philosophy of utilitarianism, which defines morality as 
merely the result of observable causes and effects. She exclaims that in his quest for 
ideal truth on the stage, Talfourd's drama looks back to the poetic drama: “So did the 
Greeks! So did the ancient English—the old dramatists! (3, 170-1). It is useful to keep 
Elizabeth Barrett’s praise in mind because it gives us insight into what Browning was 
attempting in his plays and why it is that he dedicated Pippa Passes to Talfourd— a 
play that I argue in chapter two is a manifesto for his symbolic dramas. 
 It is within this epistemological context of dramatic criticism that Browning 
decided to turn his dramatic vision to the Victorian stage. Browning was already an 
avid patron of the theater, attending regularly performances with John Forster, 
Dickens, Talfourd, Horne and Bryan Proctor (the playwright Barry Cornwall) and 
Browning was intimately involved with those poets who wished to bring symbolic 
drama back upon the stage. Browning was invited to a supper in celebration of 
Talfourd's Ion with many of these men and it was here that Macready famously 
declared to him: “Write a play, Browning, and keep me from going to America!” 
(Orr, 88). When Talfourd wished Browning well in his own dramatic endeavors 
“whether he shall present those works his imagination may vivify, upon the actual 
scene, to touch our hearts and senses with noble electricity, or only on that ideal stage 
which all men erect in their own minds” (nt 2: 12, 324-6), he used Romantic 
terminology to wish Browning success whether he decided to write for the stage, 
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whereby his imagination would embody into actuality the noble ideas that would 
touch the heart and the senses, or whether it was for the ideal stage of unacted drama 
that appealed through the imagination to the ineffable ideas in all of the minds of 
men. Writing to Macready to accept his invitation, Browning exclaimed passionately, 
“I will give you my whole heart and soul to the writing a Tragedy on it to be ready by 
the first of November next: should I be unequal to the task, the excitement and 
extreme effort will have their own reward:—should I succeed, my way of life will be 
very certain, and my name pronounced along with yours” (3, 173-4). In saying that he 
will give his “heart and soul” to writing drama, Browning emphasizes the 
epistemological nature of this future work and the fact that he was responding to the 
prophetic call to reform the symbolic drama, which, along with the Romantics before 
him, he perceived as a crucial philosophic endeavor.  
 Browning would go on to write both acted and closet dramas, yet his 
conviction that the material world is a symbolic embodiment of transcendent soul, and 
his emphasis on perceiving the ideal in the phenomena of the material world, led him 
to first set his sights on the stage. Although the stage was criticized for its tendency to 
privilege the senses at the expense of the imagination, it was also its proximity to 
reality that meant it had the potential to most fully embody the ideal. It was this 
philosophical understanding of the stage as a site of embodiment that appealed to 
Browning, and in this I agree with Lynn M. Fulton, who argues that Browning chose 
to go onto the stage because he was interested in the “concreteness and immediacy 
which Lamb dismisses as vulgar” (159-60.) Indeed, Browning turned to the theater 
and the objectivity of dramatic form, not to repudiate Shelley’s idealism, but to show 
that his poetry is its next objective expression. The foundational premise of my study 
is that in resituating Browning’s concept of the subjective and the objective within 
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idealism, it is possible to see that the objectivity of drama is not antithetical to 
idealism but enables the viewer to perceive soul in its material form. Indeed, 
Schopenhauer uses the theater as a metaphor to express how material reality is the 
objective representation of will and how art is a further symbolic representation that 
allows us to see how will is embodied in the world: “If the whole world as 
representation is only the visibility of the will, then art is the elucidation of this 
visibility, the camera obscura which shows the objects more purely, and enables us to 
survey and comprehend them better. It is the play within the play, the stage on the 
stage in Hamlet” (267). Indeed, drama has a wider epistemological significance for 
Browning because in representing the external machinery of manifestation it reveals 
the soul that is made manifest. 
Yet Browning was sensitive to the Romantic argument that it was difficult to 
embody the ideal in the real on stage because it was likely that the “vulgar eye” would 
miss the spiritual import, as he observed about symbolic art in “With Francis Furini.” 
This idea of spiritual and empirical sight is crucial to Sordello’s move to objectivity in 
Sordello and to his prediction that Browning’s symbolic art will reveal the realm of 
soul through the romantic irony of embodiment. Browning uses the same technique 
that Bonaparte identifies in the fiction of the Victorians when he mirrors the dual 
aspect that he sees in the world through two co-existing and interpenetrating plots, the 
temporal plot that governs the actions and incidents of the characters in empirical 
reality within which is embodied the symbolic plot of ideas, and Browning 
emphasizes the irony inherent in romantic symbolism through a central irony in each 
play intended to facilitate spiritual sight in his audience/readers. Indeed the 
significance of epistemology for Browning’s plays is clear from the fact that he 
designs the interaction of his protagonists in the temporal plot by means of how they 
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either view the facts of the material world through the faculty of reason, which 
apprehends sensory information, or through the faculty of imagination and its 
correlative in feeling, which perceives the material as a manifestation of the ideal.  
In chapter three, I discuss how Browning’s history and political tragedies 
Stafford, King Victor and King Charles, A Soul’s Tragedy and Luria all focus on the 
irony inherent in embodiment with his protagonists caught in the tragic discrepancy 
that exists between soul and its manifestation in moments of paradigmatic historical 
change. In chapter four, I discuss how love becomes a site of irony in The Return of 
the Druses, A Blot in the ’Scutcheon and Colome’s Birthday where different concepts 
of love correspond to different forms of knowledge. In chapter five, I argue that 
resituating Browning’s plays within the tradition of idealism also has different 
implications for Browning’s development of the monologue. As the objectivity of 
drama is the embodiment of the ideal in empirical forms, Browning bodies forth soul 
into space and time by situating his dramatic personas concretely in their own 
historical, cultural and linguistic milieus. Thus grounded in both the ideal and the real, 
it is the conviction of this study that the dramatic monologue is a symbolic form. I 
demonstrate how Browning’s arrangement of his monologues in the revised edition of 
Men and Women presents different degrees of ironic distance through the various 
ways in which the speakers and the paradigms of their respective time periods 
perceive material forms in both art and religion. Thus Men and Women becomes 
Browning’s next romantic drama and, as the Maker-See, Browning represents the 
different iterations of the central irony between spiritual sight and empirical sight to 
precipitate the same realization of soul that he had hoped to bring about in the 
audience/reader of his plays. 
In my analysis of Browning’s romantic dramas I pay close attention to the 
 51 
contemporary critical reception of his plays where some critics recognized that he was 
writing symbolic drama while others analyzed his work within the expectations of 
dramatic realism, with both perspectives raising the question of whether symbolic 
drama could be rendered successfully on the contemporary stage, and illuminating the 
problems that Browning encountered which led him to the unacted drama and the 
monologue form. I also explore how these contemporary reviews are echoed in much 
recent criticism of Browning’s plays, which has tended to see these works as realistic 
empirical studies rather than symbolic dramas, leading to the psychological 
interpretation of the dramatic monologue and the consensus that Browning’s objective 
dramatic poetics implies a rejection of Romantic epistemology. 
The tradition in which we place Browning’s plays has important implications 
for Browning’s poetics especially as it pertains to the role of irony. Reading his plays 
as psychological studies has led to the critical assumption that Browning’s irony 
reflects his skepticism. Although Ryals claims that the endeavor of his study will be 
to examine the influence of Friedrich's Schlegel’s irony on Browning's early plays and 
monologues irony, since he analyzes the success and failure of the plays through the 
expectations of realism, it leads him to assert, like Poston and DuBois, that it is 
Browning's political and intellectual skepticism that is the driving force of the plays. 
Ryals concludes that Browning's plays ultimately fail because he was writing in the 
wrong genre—that of tragedy—when his ironic conception of the world meant that he 
should have been writing comedies instead. However, an examination of the influence 
of the Schlegelian distinction between the classical and the romantic reveals the 
relationship that Ryals has missed between August's concept of tragedy and 
Friedrich's theory of philosophical irony. If we look at the influence of August 
Schlegel's Lectures, it is apparent that rather than working in the wrong genre, 
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Browning is locating himself within the tradition of romantic drama. I argue that it is 
August Schlegel's concept of romantic drama that explains Browning's understanding 
of irony and how it relates to tragedy. I argue that it is through the perception of irony 
in romantic drama that Browning, as a romantic symbolist, hopes to facilitate a 
change of perception in his readers.  
Megan Painter and David Shaw also see irony as a key component of 
Browning's dramatic form, recognizing that it provides a space to facilitate the 
transition from sympathy to judgment. Painter asserts that irony does not point to an 
empirical epistemology because the ability to perceive the discrepancy between what 
is and what should be in a monologue necessarily implies a shared moral universe. 
Similarly, Shaw maintains that Browning's monologues set up a rhetorical dialectic 
whereby the reader is encouraged to embrace or reject different ideas in order to find 
Browning's own “truths,” and thus he says that “the 'philosophy' can be understood 
only as the outgrowth of joint creative acts” (4). Both critics identify an epiphanic 
response on the part of the reader whereby we move from a historicized, relative 
stance to a perception of enduring truth amidst the chaos of the modern world. 
Similarly to Painter and Shaw, Lee Erikson and John Woolford discuss Browning's 
desire to enlist the sympathetic imagination, or in Browning's own phrase the “co-
operarating fancy,” of his audience in drawing their own moral conclusions rather 
than merely imposing his own vision upon them.  
 Although this reading of Browning's irony emphasizes his role as the Maker-
See, it still analyzes Browning's use of irony mainly as a stylistic and rhetorical 
device whereas in my analysis of Browning’s objective poetics and his use of 
dramatic form I will focus on the relationship of realism and irony to idealism. While 
rhetorical irony is a key component of Browning’s plays and monologues, the full 
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implications for Browning’s poetics can only be seen when it is recognized as the 
expression of his philosophical irony. In analysing Browning’s often neglected plays, 
I argue that the irony of Browning’s symbolic method does not present judgment, or 
even a moral stance, but rather seeks to promote a deepened awareness of how the 
noumenal substrate of reality takes different forms in the real and exists in even the 
lowest material manifestation. I argue that although irony is inherent in symbolic 
embodiment, this does not entail relativity or skepticism for Browning; rather it is by 
means of this space between the ideal and its manifestation in the real, and its formal 
representation in the tension between the symbolic and the temporal plot in his plays 
and monologues, that Browning endeavors to reveal another aspect of reality, which 




Romantic Epistemology, Symbolism and Browning’s “Infinite Realism” 
 
In his Dialogue on Poetry, Friedrich Schlegel maintains that a theory of 
modern poetry cannot be established without recognizing the epistemological shift 
that took place as a result of the transition from the classical to the romantic 
paradigm, a transition that he sees as forming the foundation of the modern mind. In 
the Course of Lectures on the History of Literature, Schlegel exclaims that the 
separation between the classical and the romantic: “is the most remarkable intellectual 
contest which has ever been exhibited and determined among the human race. It 
forms not only the wall of partition between the two worlds—the ages of antiquity 
which terminated in it, and these of modern times which spring out of it; is the 
keystone upon which everything hangs; in the history of the development of the 
human intellect it is the central point from which all illumination must be derived” 
(67). As both Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel argue that the romantic 
paradigm arises from and is informed by the widespread acceptance of the Christian 
faith, the transition from paganism to Christianity that marks the point of separation 
between the classical and the romantic takes the inception of modernity back to a 
surprisingly early date; however, they argue in their respective lectures that it is not 
until the late Middle Ages that the romantic spirit manifests itself in art. Thus it is 
paramount for the modern poet to formulate his poetics in relation to the historical 
development of romantic art. 
In their analyses of classical and romantic ontology, Friedrich and August 
Wilhelm Schlegel, and Schelling and Hegel after them, observe that where the 
classical era comprised a perfect fusion of the subjective and the objective in the 
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temporal world, the Christian paradigm turns inward to contemplate the 
transcendence of the soul; therefore, while classical art represents the unity of the 
ideal and the real, romantic poetry endeavors to reunite the infinite with the finite, or 
the internal with the external, even though it can only ever be an approximation. In 
the Dialogue on Poetry, Friedrich Schlegel makes the connection between romantic 
interiority and his own modern age when he exclaims that modern subjectivity is the 
culmination of the Christian self-consciousness of soul and that the next transition to 
objectivity can be found in their very own era through the philosophical system of 
idealism. Schlegel asserts that because idealism recognizes the subjective nature of 
identity it necessarily presages its opposite—a fresh discovery of nature and a new 
objectivity from which will emerge “a new and equally infinite realism.” As this new 
realism will still have an ideal foundation, Schlegel says that it will “emerge as poetry 
that is based on the harmony of the ideal and the real,” and therefore modern poetry 
will only be different in degree and not in kind from its romantic predecessors.  
This philosophical distinction between the classical and the romantic 
paradigms and its importance for the interpretation of both modern intellectual history 
and the progression of art is crucial to Browning's conceptualization of his own 
poetry. Browning saw his own poetic development as part of a larger progressive 
historical narrative, and he reveals the influence of the Schlegel brothers on his 
poetics when he places the development of his poetic theory in Sordello within the 
epistemological transition from the classical to the romantic mind. Indeed, Browning's 
Sordello, a work that is famously known as one of the most incomprehensible poems 
written in the English language, is immediately rendered far more comprehensible 
when its historical foundation is understood to be symbolic. If we re-situate 
Browning’s epic within the Romantic philosophy of history, it is revealed that the 
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crucial symbolic center of Sordello lies in Browning's conception of Sordello as a 
poet on the cusp of the new romantic paradigm. Browning situates Sordello at this 
symbolic point of transition, and traces his conversion from the subjective to the 
objective poet in order to place his own poetics in relation to Shelley’s idealism and 
the evolution that he sees embodied in the progressive forms of romantic art. In 
tracing “the incidents in the development of a soul,” Browning explores the stages of 
Sordello’s spiritual life as he transitions from classical totality to a unity in spirit that 
seeks a new objective embodiment, and with the implicit connection of the romantic 
paradigm to the contemporary movement of transcendental idealism, Browning 
mirrors Sordello’s development in his own modern poetic trajectory to show that his 
own poetry marks the next step in the objective expression of idealism or infinite 
realism that for Browning will take the form of romantic drama. 
The epistemological transformation from the ancient to the romantic 
paradigms provided the foundation for the philosophical theories of art in the works 
of the Schlegel brothers, Schelling and Hegel in Germany and Coleridge and Hazlitt 
in Britain, among many others, but I will turn first to August Wilhelm Schlegel for an 
explication of this progression as his was the most well-known and popular 
application. In the opening segment of his Lectures, Schlegel describes what he sees 
as the essential spirit of the Greek age and how it takes a form that is opposite in 
temperament to its Christian counterpart. Crucially for the early classical period: “The 
mental culture of the Greeks was a finished education in the school of Nature” (7). As 
such they were “a beautiful and noble race, endowed with susceptible senses and a 
cheerful spirit under a mild sky, they lived and bloomed in the full health of 
existence; and favoured by a rare combination of circumstances, accomplished all that 
the finite nature of man is capable of” (7). Schlegel observes a spontaneous and 
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unconscious unity between form and content in their art, which reflects the natural 
harmony they experienced between themselves and the external world. Living in the 
joy of the present “human nature was all-sufficient; it was conscious of no defects, 
and aspired to no other higher perfection than which it could attain by the exercise of 
its own energies” (9). 
        In contrast to the Greeks who found unity and fulfillment in the natural world, 
Schlegel argues that the Christian belief that mankind lost its original home with God 
shapes the goal of their lives into a struggle to regain this lost transcendent home; yet 
at the same time they possess the knowledge that this endeavor will always be 
unfulfilled in the material world. Therefore, Schlegel says that where “the old religion 
of the senses sought no higher possession than outward and perishable blessings” in 
the Christian view “every thing finite and mortal is lost in the contemplation of 
infinity” (9). While the Greeks lived in a state of natural harmony, the Christian soul 
longs for the happiness that is promised in the next world. This leads Schlegel to 
conclude that “the poetry of the ancients was the poetry of enjoyment, and ours is that 
of desire” (9), by which he means not sexual desires but the desire for the infinite that 
is perceived by the individual soul. Schlegel explains that the Christian consciousness 
has been expanded through the loss of its transcendent home leading to an increased 
introspection. Thus he concludes that “the feeling of the moderns is, upon the whole, 
more inward, their fancy more incorporeal, and their thoughts more contemplative” 
(10).  
Both August Wilhelm Schlegel and Friedrich Schlegel see the inward 
romantic spirit as arising in the Middle Ages through the influence of the Northern 
Teutonic tribes who converted to Christianity. In his “Epochs of Literature” in the 
Dialogue on Poetry, Friedrich asserts that in contrast to the Romans who merely 
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imitated Greek forms, in the Middle Ages “religious invention and inspiration was all 
the more lively: in the creation of the a new religion, in the attempts at transforming 
the old, in mystical philosophy must we seek the energy of that time which in this 
respect was great: it was a border area of culture, a fertile chaos leading to a new 
order of things, the true Middle Ages” (67). Infusing their ideas of heroism into the 
sentiments of Christianity, the chivalric ideal of the Northern conquerors no longer 
focused on external heroic acts as it had done before but rather upon the inward 
movements of the soul, and this inward emphasis was then manifested in a code of 
honor that dictated outward action. In his Lectures, August Wilhelm Schlegel notes 
that out of this vital combination arose a “new and purer spirit of love” that held 
woman to be the center of spirituality and the object of divine devotion (8). This new 
romantic spirit was first embodied in the poetry of the troubadours who mark a crucial 
turning point in the history of ideas.  
It is precisely within this unsettled moment of transition that Browning places 
Sordello and his discussion of romantic poetic theory, which refers to the 
epistemological distinction between the classical world and Christianity and not to the 
artistic and philosophical movement. To explore this shifting paradigm, Browning 
picks the historical Sordello for his protagonist, a late twelfth century troubadour 
whose crucial symbolic position is derived from the fact that he is: 
                                   Born just now, 
With the new century, beside the glow 
And efflorescence out of barbarism; 
Witness a Greek or two from the abysm 
That stray through Florence-town with studious air, 
Calming the chisel of that Pisan pair: 
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If Nicolo should carve a Christus yet! 
While at Siena is Guidone set, 
Forehead on hand; a painful birth must be 
Matured ere Saint Eufemia's sacristy 
Or transept gather fruits of one great gaze 
At the moon: look you!   The same orange haze,— 
The same blue stripe round that—and, in the midst, 
Thy spectral whiteness, Mother-maid, who didst 
Pursue the dizzy painter! (1. ll. 569-83) 
He is born in the unsettled border of the new age as it transitions from the classical 
worldview to the romantic paradigm of the Middle Ages. Sordello is not fully within 
either paradigm, since he is situated at the threshold of the “painful birth” of the 
romantic; therefore, there still may be seen occasional vestigial representatives of the 
classical age, as in the “Greek or two from the abysm” whose presence serves to hold 
back the romantic fervor that has yet to find an embodiment in the new Christian art.  
According to Friedrich Schlegel “The great Dante, sacred founder and father 
of modern poetry, entered this path, uniting religion and poetry” (Dialogue 67), and 
Browning’s own epithet for Dante as the “Gate-vein of this heart's blood of 
Lombardy” (1. l. 346) attests that he is the figure through which the new blood of 
Europe will be ushered in. Although Dante’s “consummate orb” absorbed Sordello’s 
contribution, Browning declares that his purpose will be to “disentwine / That under-
current soft and argentine / From its fierce mate in the majestic mass / Leavened as 
the sea whose fire was mixt with glass / In John’s transcendent vision” (2. ll. 361-65). 
Yet Browning does not merely want to separate Sordello from Dante but to “launch 
once more / That lustre” (ll. 365-6) and bring to life that incandescent, inarticulate 
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moment before the inward soul found its first expression in romantic art, before the 
“painful birth” that he sees as the precursor to his own modern poetic development. 
That Sordello’s symbolic importance is derived from his position on the cusp 
of the romantic paradigm is also seen in his attempt to construct a new poetic 
language out of vulgar Latin into vernacular Italian: he “rewrought / That language, 
welding words into the crude / Mass from the new speech around him, till a rude / 
Armor was hammered out, in time to be / Approved beyond the Roman panoply / 
Melted to make it” (2. ll. 574-8). August Wilhelm Schlegel explains in his Lectures 
that the name “romantic,” given to this new spirit that arose from the fusion of 
Northern heroism and Christianity, is apt because it is derived from romance, which is 
“the name originally given to the languages which were formed from the mixture of 
the Latin and the old Teutonic dialects, in the same manner as modern civilization is 
the fruit of the heterogeneous union of the peculiarities of the northern nations and the 
fragments of antiquity; whereas the civilization of the ancients was much more of a 
piece” (5). Thus Browning focuses on Sordello’s attempt to weld a new poetic idiom 
from the nascent vernacular romance languages in order to symbolize the larger shift 
from the classical to the romantic paradigm.  
In Browning’s epic, the narrative goes back to Sordello's childhood to show 
how his poetic development symbolically transverses the classical worldview and the 
birth of the modern romantic mind. In Sordello's childhood surroundings and in his 
early experiences, the narrator shows how Sordello is molded by, and is the last 
vestige of, the classical world. Architecture has symbolic significance for Browning 
and thus it is important that Sordello's castle is embellished with symbols of the 
classical age, such as carved columns of bacchanals and Caryatids. In the 
ornamentation of the castle the “Arab's wisdom” is everywhere to be seen, which is 
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an important historical detail in Browning's symbolic design because it was the Arabs 
who preserved the ideals of the classical period and transmitted them to Europe; 
therefore, they serve to mark the terminus of the influence of classical thought. 
 The narrator explains that Sordello has “a soul fit to receive / Delight at every 
sense” and that he belongs “foremost in the regal class / Nature has broadly severed 
from her mass / Of men, and framed for pleasure, as she frames / Some happy lands, 
that have luxurious names, / For loose fertility” (1. ll. 465-71). Endowed with a 
heightened perception of the beauties of the world, this class of people experience 
preternatural enjoyment in the corporeal forms that are apprehended by means of the 
senses: 
You recognize at once the finer dress 
Of flesh that amply lets in loveliness 
At eye and ear, while round the rest is furled 
(As though she would not trust them with her world) 
A veil that shows a sky not near so blue, 
And lets but half the sun look fervid through. (1. ll. 477-12) 
In brooding on this temporal beauty, the narrator asks how it is that they can love—a 
question that is explained by the fact that love for Browning transcends the corporeal 
world so as to connect the individual with a higher power. The narrator concedes that 
while this worship of the temporal is “blind at first to aught / Beyond its beauty,” this 
“exceeding love / Becomes an aching weight; and, to remove / A curse that haunts 
such natures,” the classical man “invest[s] / The lifeless thing with life from their own 
soul” (483-91). Therefore love in the classical paradigm is expressed through the 
fusion of the individual soul into corporeal forms so that it lives in harmony with the 
external world. These continuing “fresh births of beauty wake / Fresh homage” to the 
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world, such that “Up and down / Runs arrowy fire, while earthly forms combine / To 
throb the secret forth; a touch divine— / And the scaled eyeball owns the mystic rod: / 
Visibly through His garden walketh God” (2. 496-504). The perfect instinctive union 
of the subjective soul in the external realm means that the divine is fully embodied in 
the natural world. 
 It is at this point that the narrator explains that there is another class of people 
who do not merely experience nature when they look upon beauty but who moreover 
recognize its qualities in themselves: “For there’s a class that eagerly looks, too, / On 
beauty, but, unlike the gentler crew, / Proclaims each new revealment born a twin / 
With a distinctist consciousness within / Referring still the quality, now first / 
Revealed, to their own soul” (1. ll. 523-8). In the compressed syntax that characterizes 
the poem, the narrator says that “homage, other souls direct / Without, turns inward” 
(ll. 535-6); in other words, it is in their experience of this subjective connection to 
nature that this class of people are led to a realization of a higher order that 
encompasses all of creation. The narrator imagines that this class of people will feel a 
loss now that the material world is no longer imbued with soul, but he assures them 
that in perceiving the beauties of the outward world as a reflection of their inward 
natures, they are able to experience existence more powerfully and become attuned to 
the divine order: 
Laugh thou at envious fate, 
Who, from earth’s simplest combination stampt 
With individuality—uncrampt  
By living its faint elemental life, 
Dost soar to heaven’s complexest essence, rife 
With grandeurs, unaffronted to the last, 
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Equal to being all! (1. ll. 542-8) 
Although the soul impressed with individuality is not as engaged in the temporal 
world, its inward depth enables them to perceive their connection to the infinite. 
In his analysis of Sordello and German Romanticism, Ryals notes the 
similarity between Browning’s two types of poets and Schiller’s classification of the 
objective and subjective poet; however it is important to note that Schiller’s 
application of this distinction is not historical, which means that Ryals misses the 
crucial connection that Browning establishes between romantic and modern poetry 
and the implicit relationship that he draws between the inward Christian soul and the 
contemporary transition from subjective to objective idealism. That Browning’s sense 
of the distinction between classical and romantic being is part of a historical evolution 
is clear from his poem “Old Pictures in Florence” (1855) where he postures as an art 
critic to imagine the feelings of inadequacy experienced by the romantic, or modern 
mind as it looks upon the fruit of the classical age, which as the perfect fusion of soul 
in the temporal is expressed in art as a perfect harmony between content and form: 
“The Truth of Man, as by God first spoken, / Which the actual generations garble, / 
Was re-uttered, and Soul (which limbs betoken) / And Limbs (Soul informs) made 
new in marble” (ll. 85-88). In speaking to the modern mind he addresses what he 
perceives as its envy for the grace that is perfectly embodied in Greek forms: “So you 
saw yourself as you wished you were, / As you might have been, as you cannot be” 
(ll. 89-90). While Browning sympathizes with the insecurities of the modern mind 
when it looks to art of the classical age, he tells it that: 
Growth came when, looking your last on them all, 
     You turned your eyes inwardly one fine day 
And cried with a start—What if we so small 
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     Be greater and grander the while than they? 
Are they perfect of lineament, perfect of stature? 
     In both, of such lower types are we 
  Precisely because of our wider nature! 
    For time, theirs—ours, for eternity. (ll. 113-120) 
 In turning inward to the soul, the romantic consciousness perceives its 
connection to a power that transcends space and time. So while Browning concedes 
that the Greeks did indeed achieve perfection in their art, he explains that they were 
able to achieve this totality because their vision was grounded in the temporal world, 
whereas the art produced by the romantic mind will always appear incomplete 
because it is a vision that strives to embody its perceptions of the infinite realm. Thus 
while “Greek Art ran and reached the goal” (l. 83), modern art can only do justice to 
its pursuit of the ideal by approximation and therefore will always appear incomplete. 
Browning exclaims that he “has loved the season / Of Art's Spring-birth so dim and 
dewy” (ll. 178-9), which describes the time period when new art forms struggle to 
embody truth for their coming age. Indeed, when he proclaims that “My sculptor is 
Nicolo the Pisan, / My painter—who but Cimabue?” (ll. 179-80), Browning 
illuminates the symbolism of Sordello because Pisano is the sculptor who is invoked 
by the narrator when he explains that his protagonist is on the threshold of the 
“painful birth” that will bring forth the Christian art of the romantic age, which attests 
to the fact that Browning writes Sordello as a symbolic exploration of the romantic 
paradigm shift and its relevance for the development of his own emerging poetic 
forms. 
Browning symbolizes the transition from the unity of the classical age to the 
interiority of the romantic era through a comparison of Eglamor and Sordello. At first 
 65 
when Sordello wins the bardic competition against Eglamor to become Palma’s 
minstrel, he only offers a small refinement of an existing truth. On hearing Eglamor’s 
song, “Sordello’s brain / Swam; for he knew a sometime deed again; / So could 
supply each foolish gap and chasm / The minstrel left in his enthusiasm, / Mistaking 
its true version—was the tale / Not of Apollo?” (2. ll. 71-6). Yet as he begins to see 
more clearly the widened framework of the action — “this snatch or the other seemed 
to wind / Into a treasure, helped himself to find / A beauty in himself” (2. ll. 141-43) 
— Sordello finds that the finest concentration of beauty is found in the essence of his 
own soul; therefore, his self-consciousness is not a psychological interiority but rather 
the recognition of the transcendence of the inward soul: “So, range, free soul! —who, 
by self-consciousness, / The last drop of all beauty dost express— / The grace of 
seeing grace, a quintessence / For thee” (2. ll. 405-8). By having the poet look inward, 
Browning indicates that Sordello has begun his symbolic progression from the 
classical to the romantic poet. 
The difference between these two types of mind is conveyed symbolically in 
the difference between Sordello and Eglamor: “Eglamor, lived Sordello’s opposite” 
(2. l. 195). Sordello recognizes the classical fusion of the subjective and the objective 
in Eglamor’s poetry. Receiving inspiration from his worship of the external, his 
subjective life is fused with his object of devotion, and in fixing his soul in the 
temporal, the truth embodied in Eglamor’s art is complete and it will always 
constitute his answer: “The power responded, and some sound or sight / Grew up, his 
own forever, to be fixed in rhyme, the beautiful, forever!—mixed with his own life” 
(2. 204-7). Sordello’s poetry dissolves the unity that characterizes classical art; 
similarly, Eglamor’s death upon losing the bardic competition to Sordello symbolizes 
the demise of the classical paradigm. That this distinction is a crucial point is clear 
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from the fact that in his interlude, Browning’s narrator also recognizes in Eglamor's 
song a complete fusion of his life and art: “With heart and soul and strength, for he 
believed / Himself achieving all to be achieved / By singer—in such songs you find 
alone / Completeness, judge the song and singer one, / And either purpose answered, 
his in it / Or its in him” (3. ll. 618-22). In contrast, he sees in Sordello's poetry a 
yearning that is not fully satiated by its expression in his songs, such that “a passion 
and a knowledge far / Transcending these, majestic as they are, / Smouldered” (3. ll. 
627-629). The narrator perceives that Eglamor does not have Sordello’s romantic 
impulse “To note the undercurrent, the why and how, / Where, when, of the deeper 
life” (3. ll. 641-2)—the noumenal substrate of reality that Browning defined as soul. 
In his Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, Hegel asserts that since the 
romantic paradigm no longer experiences the unity of the human and divine in the 
material world but rather through the realm of spirit, then “It is this inner world that 
forms the content of the romantic, and therefore must find its representation as such 
inward feeling, and in the show or presentation of such feeling.” (87). Seeing 
everything as a reflection of his own soul, Sordello wants to express the unity that he 
perceives through spirit in his art. In looking to express soul, he chooses song (poetry) 
and not deed (the world of action) because only in poetry does he believe that he can 
convey the power of his will and  “receive men’s sense / Of its supremacy” (2. ll. 444-
5). He does not care about the song itself but only about the song’s effect, or the 
facilitation in his audience of a perception of the soul, which begins the distinction 
that Browning makes throughout the poem between men of action and men of 
perception, between the classical unity of being and the romantic consciousness of the 
infinity of the inward soul.  
Seeking to express romantic interiority, Sordello takes an elemental action and 
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traces backward to its source in soul to find the interior motivation. Although he 
strives to realize the internal life of his characters in a way that the Greeks could not, 
Sordello perceives men and women through a spiritual lens, producing only 
abstracted ethereal forms. Sordello soon longs to further embody his characters, but 
he fears that if he follows this it will stop him “From tasting their quintessence,” 
which would surely frustrate “His prime design” of expressing soul (ll. 553-4). This 
limited vision ironically foreshadows Sordello’s later discussion of the work of Dante 
and Browning when he realizes that realism is the objective development of romantic 
subjectivity, which reveals the ideal by reproducing it in its material manifestation. 
Sordello asks himself whether his poetry can go “A pitch beyond this unreal 
pageantry / Of essences,” since “the period has ceased / For Such: present us with 
ourselves, at least, / Not portions of ourselves, mere loves and hates / Made flesh: 
wait not” (ll. 564-8). Yet Sordello is not ready or able to pioneer what Browning will 
show to be the future progressive iterations of romantic art.  
In his endeavour to present the totality of his spiritual perception, Sordello 
experiences the epistemological crisis, or the “painful birth,” of the romantic 
paradigm: an inability to fully embody soul in the world of manifestation. What 
follows as a result of this inability is a series of dualities that express the space 
between the noumenal and the phenomenal, the imaginative perception and its 
embodiment in the world of cause and effect. When Sordello tries to forge a new 
language to express his transcendent perception— “the simultaneous and the sole”— 
it becomes hindered by the logical construction of language that belongs to space and 
time— “the successive and the many” (ll. 589-95). The narrator tells us that the 
totality of the classical poet has been “Sundered in twain; each spectral part at strife / 
With each; one jarred against another life; / The Poet thwarting hopelessly the Man” 
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(ll. 557-559). The poet accesses the noumena of dreams at night while the man is the 
fashioner who must give form to these perceptions, which is the work of the day. It is 
important to note that by the terms “out of dream” and “day’s work” (l. 685), 
Browning does not intend to describe the dreams of poetry as unattainable and the 
fashioning of poetry as attainable but rather uses common German Romantic 
metaphors for the side of consciousness that looks to the noumenal realm and the side 
of consciousness that looks to the ideal in its phenomenal existence. In trying to 
poetically conceptualize mankind for the expression of this inward dream, Sordello 
becomes increasingly imprisoned in his subjectivity. It is important to note here that 
Browning is not referring to psychological subjectivity but to the subjectivity of soul, 
which is an emphatic distinction that Browning makes earlier in the poem when he 
correlates the self-consciousness of the romantic paradigm with the interiority of soul: 
Of Men, of that machine supplied by thought 
To compass self-perception with, he sought 
By forcing half himself—an insane pulse 
Of a god’s blood, on a clay it could convulse, 
Never transmute—on human sights and sounds, 
To watch the other half with; irksome bounds 
It ebbs from to its source, a fountain sealed 
 Forever. (3. ll. 25-32) 
Browning uses the metaphor of the fountain to show that up until this point in 
Sordello’s spiritual development, he has seen himself as the prime agent in the world; 
yet when the fountain water shoots out, it only reaches the edge of the fountain’s 
pool: therefore, the water that is sent out in ripples can only go so far before it reaches 
the limit of its progress and redounds back upon itself. For Sordello, the realm of 
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men, or the objective world that lies outside of Sordello’s self, is only a “machine 
supplied by thought,” created by his mind to analyze his own soul “the other half.” In 
an act of solipsistic one-sided transcendentalism, the subjective soul can “convulse” 
in that it is able to force the material to life, but it can never “transmute” as it cannot 
transfer one thing to another, or make the soul real.  
Sordello realizes that his own predicament is also the spiritual condition of the 
age: “The common sort, the crowd, / Exist, perceive; with Being are endowed, / 
However slight, distinct from what they See. / However bounded” (3. ll. 159-62). He 
sees that happiness must be to feed being (body) with perception (soul), thus turning 
what is alien native to the body or soul. Sordello has already turned the external 
native to his soul because he has perceived the objective world through his 
subjectivity— although the means were always imperfect to convey his perceptions: 
“Naught is Alien in the world— my will / Owns all already; yet can turn it still less 
native, since my means to correspond / With will are so unworthy” (ll. 175-7). Yet if 
happiness is derived from turning what is alien native to both the body or the soul, 
Sordello realizes that happiness would also derive from perceiving in flesh what he 
has seen through his spirit: “I am whole / There and demand a Palma; had the world / 
Been from my soul to a like distance hurled, / ’T were Happiness to make it one with 
me: / Whereas I must, ere I begin to Be, / Include a world, in flesh, I comprehend / In 
spirit now” (3, ll. 172-74). The objective has turned native to his spirit and now the 
spirit needs to turn native to the objective by recognizing that it already exists in the 
external. Sordello asks himself why he had “complained / So much my Will was 
fettered, yet remained / Content within a tether half the range / I could assign it?” Up 
until now he has only looked at the external through the internal rather than looking 
for the internal in the external.  
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Sordello remembers Naddo’s assertion that the work of the minstrel is to 
behold mankind, but up until now he has only studied mankind as a manifestation of 
his own soul rather than seeking to find soul as it already exists within mankind. 
Looking again upon humanity, Sordello muses to himself that: “Already you include 
the multitude,” realizing that the world is already native to his self because he has 
perceived the external through his own soul; therefore, he recognizes that the next 
step must be to “let the multitude / Include yourself; and the result were new: / 
Themselves before, the multitude turn you” (5. ll. 533-36). Externals can indeed 
satisfy his soul if he seeks to find in everyone else the soul he first saw in himself; this 
would be to find unity in the external and to make the subjective turn objective.  
In turning to mankind as the body (or expression of) his soul, Sordello 
experiences an increasing awareness of social inequality that leads him to recognize 
the plight of the people who then inspire his desire to become a man of action. 
Recognizing that both divided sides are intent on making Rome Guelf or Ghibilline, 
and after having heard a song that hearkens back to the glories of Rome, Sordello has 
the momentary epiphany that “Rome typifies the scheme to put mankind / Once more 
in full possession of their rights,” leading him to propose a return to the past: “Let us 
have Rome again! On me it lights / To build up Rome—on me, the first and last: / For 
such a Future was endured the Past” (4. ll. 1023-27). However, in seeking to reform 
the present through a revival of the classical mind and aesthetic—the archetype of a 
passing paradigm—Sordello soon perceives the disappointing discrepancy between 
the perfection of Rome and what he sees as the degradation of his own age.  
An inner voice that Sordello hears illuminates the significance of an organic, 
symbolic view of history for understanding the role of the poet in relation to the man 
of action. Sordello must first embrace the concept of history that views the forms of 
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each epoch as the manifestation of God's truths for each particular age before he can 
establish his role: he must recognize that the absolute embodies itself forth in the 
external world and not just through his own soul. The voice outlines a teleological and 
historical embodiment of spirit, which relates to Browning’s notion of the three souls: 
Charlemagne as the Holy Roman Emperor exhibits strength in power, which the first 
soul of “what does;” Hildebrand (later Pope Saint Gregory VII), who made the 
Empire dependent on the Church, matches feeling with strength to produce 
knowledge, which is Browning’s second soul of “what knows,” and with this 
progression comes an increasing democratic spirit as the league against Frederick 
seeks to check autocratic power in the general interest of Italy; the third step is taken 
by St Francis, who declared love to be the essence of Christianity, dedicating his life 
to helping the common people of Italy, which is the third soul of “what is” that 
transforms through love the two lower souls so that they are connected to the ideal. 
Thus Browning sees the Truce of God, where fighting was suspended during mass 
and on religious festivals, as the gradual evolution of action that is based on the 
increasing perception of soul that underlies material reality. 
Acknowledging his place in this historical progression, Sordello comes to the 
conclusion that if the Gibellines, who support Frederick Barbarossa, the Holy Roman 
Emperor, represent power that is separate from soul, then the Guelfs, who support the 
Pope, would best serve the interests of the people; therefore, he decides that his 
definitive action should be to convince Taurello to support the Guelf cause. The 
interaction between Taurello and Sordello is yet another symbolic exploration of the 
transition from the classical to the romantic mind with Taurello as the last flowering 
of the classical hero, just as Eglamor is the last vestige of the classical bard. As a 
warrior-hero, Taurello enacts art and war through his doings rather than passively 
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reflecting upon them; thus he sees himself as immersed in a cyclic pattern of 
vacillating fortunes and conquests rather than as part of a teleological process of 
progressive improvement. Taurello dismisses the notion of taking advice from a poet, 
which prompts Sordello to consider whether the poet really has a role that could 
influence men of action in the world.  
Sordello maintains that “I, with my words, hailed brother of the train / Deeds 
once sufficed” was indeed a man of action like Taurello albeit only in the realm of 
word, and now that these actions no longer embody soul, he asks himself “Who fails, 
through deeds howe’er diverse, retrack / My purpose still. My task?” (5. ll. 548-51). 
No longer can Sordello imitate these fixed forms, but rather he must seek to express 
the inward essence of soul that he finds in himself and within the world: “Those 
forms, unalterable first as last, / Proved him her copier, not the protoplast / Of nature” 
(ll. 525-27). Consequently, Sordello realizes that he needs a new mythology to 
express the connection between soul and act that was once a unified whole, and he 
utilizes a metaphor derived from Greek mythological cosmology to show this 
transition from classical to romantic symbolism: Chaos, now the primordial essence 
of world-soul, is fashioned anew with each successive god, forming symbols that are 
“like a pact / And protest against Chaos, some first fact / I’ the faint of time” (ll. 555-
57). Although these new romantic symbols agree to body forth essence, at the same 
time it is the very nature of symbolic embodiment to constrict the divine source: as 
Sordello notes, “My deep of life, I know, / Is unavailing to show” (ll. 557-8).   
There is a striking correlation here between Browning and Friedrich Schlegel, 
who proclaimed in his “Talk on Mythology” that to recreate the unity of the classical 
world, the modern poet (as the romantic poet did before him) needs a new mythology 
that will unify the subjective soul with the external world. Bonaparte explains how 
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mythology for the German Romantics was not viewed empirically as a psychological 
or anthropological expression of comparative cultures, but rather as a language for the 
ineffable. The importance of mythology for Schlegel is that it comprises a symbolic 
language wherein we can discern the relationship between the ideal and the real: 
“What usually escapes our consciousness can here be perceived and held fast through 
the senses and spirit like the soul in the body surrounding it, through which it shines 
into our eye and speaks to our ear” (85), and he uses the very same metaphor as 
Browning to depict this purpose: “For this is the beginning of all poetry, to cancel the 
progression and laws of rationally thinking reason, and to transplant us once again 
into the beautiful confusion of the imagination, into the original chaos of human 
nature, for which I know as yet no more beautiful symbol than the motley throng of 
the ancient gods” (86). Behler explains that for Schlegel chaos does not have a 
pejorative meaning but rather means the “primordial fusion of the original elements of 
the world” (11), which denotes the divine substrate of the noumenal world-soul.   
This correlation between symbolism and mythology can also be seen in 
Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus, where the often skeptical narrator-editor shapes and 
explicates the dense transcendental idealism of Herr Teufelsdröckh for the spiritual 
edification of what Carlyle perceives to be a more empirically minded English 
audience. For Carlyle the symbol is the way in which the divine essence of the world 
is bodied forth in the phenomenal, and his idealist philosopher, Teufelsdröckh, 
implores the reader to consider that if the myths of the Christian religion are no longer 
a viable manifestation of the ideal: “what next?  Wilt thou help us to embody the 
divine Spirit of that Religion in a new Mythus, in a new vehicle and vesture, that our 
Souls, otherwise too like perishing, may live?” (147). Similarly to Schlegel and 
Browning, Carlyle uses the metaphor of Chaos and the fashioning of form to express 
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this new symbolic embodiment. Referring to biblical chaos and creation, Carlyle 
argues that to recognize and produce the ideal in the actual is analogous to the work 
of God, which means that, “instead of a dark wasteful chaos, we have a blooming, 
fertile, heaven encompassed world” (149).  
Schlegel reminds the reader that the new symbolism will be forged from 
within and not by means of the intuitive fusion of the spiritual and the sensuous as it 
was for the classical world, and Browning makes this same distinction when he tells 
the classicizing Gerard de Lairesse that although the perfect mythical fusion between 
the senses and the soul no longer exists: “Oh, we can fancy too! But somehow fact / 
Has got to—say, not so much push aside / Fancy, as to declare its place supplied / By 
fact unseen but no less fact the same, / Which mind bids sense accept” (ll. 149-53). 
Browning explains that for the moderns, fact (the objective world and body) is 
supplied by fancy, which means that it is endowed and formed from the ideal, the 
existence of which for Browning is itself fact.  
Sordello expresses this distinction between classical and romantic symbolism 
as: “Deeds in their due gradation till Song dawned” (5. l. 560). What Browning means 
here can be explained again by the affinity that he found between himself and 
Schopenhauer who argued that music is the most immediate expression of the 
noumenal will, which Browning likened to his own concept of soul. As the spiritual 
condition of the age is the desire to body forth the self-consciousness of soul in the 
outer world — “All in degree, no way diverse in kind / From minds about it, minds 
which, more or less, / Lofty or low, move seeking to impress /Themselves on 
somewhat” (ll. 562-5) — the romantic artist represents the “fullest effluence of this 
collective mind” (l. 561). In the romantic paradigm, thoughts are acts of the mind in 
the same way that deeds are acts of the body in the classical world; therefore, thought 
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is now informed by soul in the same way that deeds were once informed by the soul. 
Sordello traces this transition from the classical embodiment to romantic self-
consciousness: 
Thought is the soul of act, and, stage by stage, 
Soul from body still to disengage 
As tending to a freedom which rejects  
Such help and incorporeally affects 
The world, producing deeds, but not by deeds,  
Swaying, in others, frames itself exceeds, 
Assigning them the simpler tasks it used 
To patiently perform till Song produced 
Acts, by thoughts only, for the mind (ll. 567-5)  
The soul disengages from the body, “tending to a freedom,” thereby rejecting help 
from the body so that it becomes itself the source of inspiration. The soul separates 
from body so that the soul is no longer embodied in the action but precedes it; 
therefore “producing deeds, but not by deeds.” Although these actions come from the 
inward spirit, they act and affect people in the real world— “swaying in others.” Thus 
the soul gives thought the same task of symbolic embodiment that existed in classical 
action, but as thought derives from beyond the temporal it can never be fully bodied 
forth the same way that soul is embodied in the great symbolic deeds of the Greek 
world—the “frames itself exceeds.” Yet the transcendental framework of Browning’s 
symbolism is clear: as soul precedes thought, to “divest / Mind of e'en Thought, and, 
lo, God's unexpressed / Will dawns above us!” –the noumenal substrate from which 
the soul arises, and Sordello proclaims that “All then is to win / Save that” (ll. 575-8).  
Sordello recognizes that “my art intends new structure from the ancient” (5. ll. 
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642-3) and that the new symbolism can only ever be an approximation: “he must 
stoop contented to express / No tithe of what’s to say—the vehicle / Never sufficient” 
(5. ll. 652-4). August Wilhelm Schlegel makes this same distinction between classical 
and romantic symbolism in his Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature when he 
discerns that “In Grecian art and poetry we find an original and unconscious unity of 
form and matter; in the modern…we observe a keen struggle to unite the two, as 
being naturally in opposition to each other.” Schlegel explains that while “the Grecian 
executed what it proposed in the utmost perfection” the modern “can only do justice 
to its endeavours after what is infinite by approximation; and, from a certain 
appearance of imperfection, is in greater danger of not being appreciated” (10), which 
is the very same argument that Browning makes in his “Old Pictures in Florence.” 
Schlegel discerns that it is precisely because of this tension between the infinite and 
the finite in the romantic paradigm that the romantic artist strives “ to reconcile these 
two worlds between which we find ourselves divided, and to blend them indissolubly 
together. The impressions of the senses are to be hallowed, as it were, by a mysterious 
connexion with higher feelings; and the soul, on the other hand, embodies its 
forebodings, or indescribable intuitions of infinity, in types and symbols borrowed 
from the visible world” (10).  
Browning shows in “Gerard de Lairesse” and in Sordello that his call for a 
new symbolism, similar to those of Schlegel and Carlyle, is based on his conviction 
that the objective world is fashioned from the ideal realm. This foundational premise 
has important implications for the way in which Browning uses Sordello’s progress to 
explore his own relationship with Shelley’s philosophical idealism. Again the broader 
influence of the Schlegel brothers is significant here in that Friedrich Schlegel’s 
discussion of the relationship between romantic subjectivity, modern poetry and the 
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contemporary movement of idealism illuminates the crucial analogy that Browning 
makes between Sordello’s transition from the subjective to the objective poet and his 
own transition from subjective idealism to objective idealism.  
Schlegel sees Fichte’s subjective idealism as a culmination of the inward 
romantic mind, a point that is corroborated structurally by the fact that he places his 
discussion of idealism and modern poetry directly after his “Epochs of Literature,” 
which is an exploration of the transition of the classical to romantic art. Observing 
that idealism originates from internal reflection by the same process as the romantic 
spirit, Schlegel asserts that: “Just as it is the nature of spirit to determine itself and in 
perennial alternation to expand and return to itself, and as every thought is nothing but 
the result of such an activity; so is the same process generally discernible in every 
form of idealism, which itself is but the recognition of this law” (83). Sordello’s first 
symbolic transition from classical externalization to the interiority of the romantic 
soul mirrors the inward trajectory of subjective idealism wherein the transcendent is 
no longer found in the material world but is rather found in man’s own self, and 
Sordello’s recognition that mankind existed for him only as it was supplied by 
thought for self-perception reflects how for the first phase of idealism the objective 
world is a concept of the mind, or a limitation of the infinite ego, which acts as a 
vehicle for self-analysis and spiritual and moral growth. 
For Schlegel, the subjectivism of Fichte’s philosophy can also be seen in the 
self-consciousness of the modern poet: the modern poet is always aware of the ironic 
disparity between his desire to embody the infinite and the impossibility of its 
complete realization, the enthusiasm of divine inspiration (his self-creation) and his 
skeptical inability to completely communicate these intuitions (his self-destruction). 
Browning makes the connection between Sordello’s subjectivity and the self-
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consciousness of his narrator, whom Martens rightly sees as representing an earlier 
stage of Browning’s own modern poetic development. Indeed, the meta-narrator 
reveals his complete subjectivity by transcending the boundaries of objectivity to 
reflect upon the very act of shaping his work. Schlegel recognizes this aspect of the 
subjective modern poet in the wit of earlier romantic poetry, particularly in the 
metafictional persona of Cervantes, whose Arabesque is an “artfully ordered 
confusion,” “charming symmetry of contradictions” and a “wonderfully perennial 
alternation of enthusiasm and irony” that “seem to me an indirect mythology 
themselves” (86). In the explanatory title that Browning included in 1863, he entitled 
the first book a “Quixotic attempt” to highlight the parallel that Browning makes 
between Sordello’s early romantic subjectivity and the predicament of the modern 
poet, which he represents in the early narrative voice. 
Ryals analyzes the relationship between the parabasis of Browning’s narrator, 
German idealism and Schegel’s concept of irony, but he does not observe how 
Sordello’s own transition from subjectivity to objectivity equally implies the turn 
from subjective idealism to objective idealism on the part of the modern poet, from 
the self-expression of the subjective poet to the symbolism of the objective poet. 
Indeed, Schlegel argues that the culmination of subjective idealism necessitates a 
renewed emphasis on nature and objectivity, presaging that: “There will “arise from 
the matrix of idealism a new and equally infinite realism, and idealism will not only 
by analogy of its genesis be an example of the new mythology, but it will indirectly 
become its very source” (83-4). Schlegel makes the same argument as Browning in 
“Gerard de Lairesse” when he asserts that the new mythology must be derived from 
the real but with the recognition that this, in turn, is itself an embodiment of the ideal; 
therefore, “this new realism, since it must be of idealistic origin and must hover as it 
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were over an idealistic ground, will emerge as poetry which indeed is to be based on 
the harmony of the ideal and the real (84). Schlegel sees this movement of idealism in 
Schelling’s symbolic view of nature, which places its emphasis on the objective as the 
manifestation of the absolute. Indeed, this recognition that the subjective divine mind 
also evolves in the objective material world is the very realization that Sordello comes 
to when he perceives the soul he found in himself to also reside in mankind and in the 
progress of history as well. 
In discussing the two phases on idealism, from the subjective to the objective, 
Schlegel uses Spinoza as an example of the new infinite realism because his 
imagination and feeling enabled him to see the objective world as a symbol of the 
divine, from which “you are granted a profound view into the innermost workshop of 
poetry” (85). Schlegel makes it clear that this new mythology cannot be produced by 
systematic philosophy but only in poetry where the imagination seizes the 
transcendent meaning of reality; therefore, he has only used Spinoza as an example of 
how mysticism relates to poetry. Indeed, Ludovico, who is the speaker of each 
segment of Schlegel’s Dialogue on Poetry, explains in conversation with Antonio that 
“I said myself in the talk that I brought in Spinoza only as a representative. Had I 
wanted to deal with it more extensively, I would also have talked about the great 
Jakob Böhme” (91). It is interesting for an analysis of Browning and idealism that 
Schlegel refers to Boehme here as it is to this German mystic that Browning turns in 
“Transcendentalism in Twelve Books” (1855), which he placed first in his revised 
edition of Men and Women, to reveal the importance of idealism to his realism and to 
the development of his concept of romantic drama. 
 Speaking to a fellow poet, Browning calls for song rather than thought in 
poetry: “Song’s our art: / Whereas you please to speak these naked thoughts / Instead 
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of draping them in sights and sounds” (ll. 2-4). In calling for song, Browning does not 
mean to suggest lyrical poetry but rather conveys his conviction that music is the 
expression of the transcendent, and as such he uses it here to symbolize the faculty of 
imagination in contrast to the conceptual prose of philosophy that belongs to the 
world of cause and effect. Carlyle elucidates this idea in his Lectures on Hero-
Worship, lectures that Browning attended, when he refers to the German idealist view 
that “the poet has an infinitude in him; communicates an Unendlichkeit, a certain 
character of ‘infinitude,’ to whatsoever he delineates” (53). Carlyle maintains that 
song is “musical thought,” which does not refer to lyrical poetry but to the poet “who 
thinks in that manner” (54). For Carlyle, as it is for Browning, song is “the Heroic of 
Speech” (55) because the poet who thinks musically sees into the noumenal essence 
of reality: it is the “seeing eye” of the poet who “discloses the inner harmony of 
things; what Nature meant, what musical idea nature has wrapped up in these often 
rough embodiments” (67). Yet Browning asserts that the inner musical essence of the 
real world can only be conveyed in symbolism: in declaring that the poet should 
suffuse his poetry with “sights and sounds,” he echoes Schlegel’s exclamation that 
through sight and sound mythology, or symbolism, reveals the divine to the senses 
and the soul. 
For Browning the true transcendentalism is not Boehme’s difficult conceptual 
prose—the systematic thought of his philosophy—but his early intimation that the 
material world is a symbol of the infinite, and he compares Boehme’s prose to the 
magic of John of Halberstadt to show that in conjuring up and recreating the concrete 
world of phenomena, John’s magic leads to a perception of the spiritual within it. It is 
important to note that Browning does not see himself as a mage or a pantheistic 
philosopher—the type of prophet that he criticized in the narrative interlude—but like 
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Schlegel uses them as representative examples of the symbolic method. Indeed, 
Browning asserts in “Transcendentalism” that the central question to be answered by 
idealism as it is expressed in poetry is the meaning of the objective: “Objects throng 
our youth, ’t is true; / We see and hear and do not wonder much: / If you could tell us 
what they mean, indeed!” (19-21). 
As Browning’s desire for song is not mirrored in the prosaic form of his 
dramatic utterance, Martens contends that Browning separates himself from the poet-
seer’s vision and the transcendent truths that the subjective poet seeks, but I would 
argue that in the dramatic form of the poem and by asking “May a brother speak?” at 
the same time as he calls for song (l.1), Browning emphasizes his conviction that we 
can only know music, or the ideal, in its objective realization—that to recreate the 
ideal in its adulterated phenomenal form will be the infinite realism of his symbolism. 
We can see Browning’s increasing objectivism in Sordello as Sordello’s 
transition from the subjective to the objective poet is mirrored in the transition from 
the subjective idealism of the self-conscious narrator to Browning, the author of 
Sordello, who is heralded by his protagonist as the next step of realism in the idealism 
of romantic poetry. This change is first traced in the narrator’s interlude when he 
interrupts the story to signal the evolution of his poetics. In making the distinction 
between the classical totality of Eglamor and the romantic interiority of Sordello, the 
narrator reveals that as the inheritor of romantic subjectivity, he too is thwarted by the 
ironic space between his enthusiasm and his inability to communicate this enthusiasm 
in his art. Wondering whether he should continue with his poem, the narrator sees a 
group of market girls who lead him to the realization that he now only asks for this 
same kind of health and opportunity for the rest of mankind, not the physical and 
spiritual perfection that Shelley had once called for. The narrator wants to see 
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Shelley’s ideal forms in their embodiment and Browning uses the image of Venice as 
“a type / Of Life” to express this recognition: “’twixt blue and blue extends, a stripe, / 
As Life, the somewhat, hangs ’twixt naught and naught / ’T is Venice, and ’t is Life” 
(3. ll. 723-5). Venice, as a strip of physical land between sky and water, reveals that 
the material is girded by the infinite; it lies between naught and naught because zero 
and infinity are metaphysically equitable terms. As Carlyle’s Teufelsdröckh says:  
“Nay, unless my Algebra deceive me. Unity itself divided by zero will give Infinity” 
(145). The narrator, and by implication Browning, will now find his symbolism in 
embodiment. Irony lies in this space between the ideal and the real, but it is the irony 
of the material world rather than the subjective irony of the solipsistic poet. 
This leads to a change in the narrator’s muse, or his mythological source of 
inspiration, which up until the present moment of digression has figured as a goddess 
but now transforms into a bedraggled beggar girl, reaffirming that the new mythology 
for romantic poetry will be found in the real world. The role of the objective poet will 
be to reveal the relationship between the ideal and the real; thus, the narrator will be 
like Moses who struck the rock at Meribah to show the Israelites an act of God in the 
world. In relinquishing the Promised Land, Browning refers to the second narrative of 
this action that is recounted in Numbers 20: 10-13 wherein Moses goes against God’s 
order to speak to the rock, striking it instead. The key here for Browning is that in the 
second narrative, which will indeed inform the second part of his own narrative, 
Moses first turns to speak with the crowd before revealing the divine, thereby 
relinquishing his position as the mouthpiece of God, the prophet, to turn to mankind 
as the poet. This new trajectory symbolizes Browning’s decision that the symbols for 
his poetry will not be derived from the internal, divine space of the subjective soul but 
from the objective manifestation of real life, and he will strike it “awkwardly” since 
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the new symbolism can only be an approximation of the divine. Satan will “claim his 
carcass” in that he will be at a remove from God, but it is precisely within this ironic 
space between the ideal and the real that he will “Figure as a Metaphysic Poet” (3. l. 
829). 
With his new role in mind, the narrator outlines three types of objective poets: 
the worst kind of poet who merely says that they have seen, the next best kind of poet 
who describes what they saw, and the highest kind of poet who “Impart[s] the gift of 
seeing to the rest” (3. l. 868). What Browning means here by the gift of seeing is 
explicated through his subsequent comparison of the classical man of action and the 
romantic man of insight, which as Browning has shown throughout his epic poem is 
an ontological and epistemological distinction. The narrator’s transition to the 
objective poet mirrors Sordello’s own desire to help mankind act in the real world 
upon a perception of soul rather than merely using them as a vehicle for his own self-
conception. The narrator concedes that he can understand why people prefer men of 
action like Taurello, who see little but turn what little they see to account in the world, 
over men of insight like Sordello; they make the assumption that because the man of 
insight does not act much in the world, the ideal realm is equally unable to affect the 
material realm. Yet the narrator maintains that the world should keep the “Makers-
see” on the alert because through their own perception of soul they may indeed help 
others act upon a perception of the ideal. Thus Browning and the narrator of the first 
half of Sordello move closer together as the narrator, like Sordello, moves from the 
potential solipsistic irony of the subjective poet to the productive irony of the 
objective poet; this explains why the voice of the narrator recedes after his reflective 
interlude. Browning and the narrator will no longer use the figure of Sordello as a 
mirror of his own modern predicament but as a symbol to reveal the relationship 
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between seeing and being, soul and body, which without the guidance of the narrator 
will require the “cooperating fancy” of the reader: “And therefore have I moulded, 
made anew / A Man, and give him to be turned and tried, / Be angry at or pleased at” 
(3. ll. 934-6). 
The narrator concludes that the best form for showing the relationship between 
soul and act, the nouemenal and the phenomenal, will be the dramatic mode. Here the 
self-consciousness of the narrator necessarily recedes and, more importantly, comes 
to represent the world of external embodiment: as Browning says in the Essay on 
Shelley, “whether the phenomena of the scenic universe, or the manifested action of 
the human heart and brain” (my italics; 281). In the dramatic works that follow 
Sordello, Browning reverses the interior form of Paracelsus, which discarded with the 
external machinery of persons and events to trace the movements of the soul, to 
reinstate the objective framework of space and time wherein the soul is made 
manifest.   
The correlation between Sordello’s development from the subjective to the 
objective poet and the narrator’s transition from Browning’s representation of his 
early poetic development to his current stance of infinite realism is made clear when 
Sordello foresees Browning’s own work as part of the historical progression of 
romantic poetry. After Sordello has realized that he needs to find fresh forms to 
embody soul, he declares that the new symbolism for the romantic poet will be 
derived from “Life’s elemental masque” (5. l. 584), or the empirical reality that is the 
semblance of the inner meaning of the world, and his first person pronoun becomes 
the universal “I” as he traces the progression of romantic poetry.  
Sordello at first sees the next movement of romantic poetry in the work of 
Dante who, perceiving the world through the inward spirit, represents his souls in 
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abstract form as either sinners or saints. Moving ahead to a later age, Sordello 
presages Browning’s work as the next stage of romantic idealism that will be more 
objective; therefore, he will delineate these abstractions of good and evil, light and 
shadow, in their material embodiments; yet Sordello acknowledges that they are still 
supplied by the ideal in that they are refractions from the divine white light. Sordello 
explains that this next poet will put Dante’s abstract forms in situations that “conduct 
/ Each nature to its farthest, or obstruct / at soonest, in the world” (5. ll. 603-5). 
Placing Dante’s essences in the real world, in the same way that the narrator finds 
Shelley’s ideal humanity in the embodied imperfections of mankind, the objective 
poet will “disengage / Their forms, love, hate, hope, fear, peace make, war wage, / In 
presence of you all! (ll. 609-10). In seeing both the ideal and the real, Browning will 
reveal the space between them as a means to “unveil the last of mysteries,” if not to 
the world then at least to a few, and “Man’s inmost life shall have yet freer play” (ll. 
616-17). Thus Sordello discerns that the next objective poet will actually “cast 
external things away, / And nature’s composite, so decompose” (l. 619). It is at this 
point that Browning the over-poet interjects himself into the text to exclaim: “Why, 
he writes Sordello!” (l. 620), powerfully demonstrating that, as the next objective 
iteration of romantic poetry, Browning himself will be the Maker-See—the symbolist 
who reveals the relationship between soul and its embodiment. 
Browning enacts this revelation throughout the denouement of his epic poem. 
As the Maker-See who reveals the gap between soul and embodiment, Browning puts 
Sordello in a situation that serves to reveal his inward life: when Sordello finds out 
that he is Taurello’s son, his father cedes control over the city and its future by giving 
him the imperial badge. Yet as a man of insight and not of action—the two not having 
yet been reconciled—when he is faced with the potential of action Sordello is unable 
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to accept only the partial realization of his soul. Utterly overcome by his metaphysical 
crisis, the next morning Taurello and Palma find the bard dead. In his discussion of 
romantic drama August Schlegel finds a correlation between romantic irony and 
tragedy, which he sees as deriving from the ironic space between the eternal and the 
relative. Indeed, Sordello’s tragedy lies in the discrepancy that he perceives between 
his infinity and his finity, or between his soul and his body. The narrator also 
experienced this irony in his early attempt to shape his work; however, he does not 
show Sordello’s final failure in order to mirror his own modern self-consciousness, 
but rather as a way to facilitate in his reader a perception of the real and the ideal and 
of his own part in the progress of mankind in the historical embodiment of soul.  
Browning presents the dialectic between Dante and his own poetry as the 
progress of romantic idealism, but it also functions as a subtle parallel of the dialectic 
between Browning and Shelley, one of the literary ghosts to whom the poem is 
addressed. Michael G. Yetman argues that Sordello is a symbolic exorcism of 
Shelley’s Romantic poetics, and the critical consensus has been that in turning to 
objective poetry, Browning rejects Shelley’s philosophical idealism and Romantic 
epistemology. However, I would argue that in placing his poetics within the symbolic 
transition from the classical to the romantic mind, Browning does not conceive of his 
poetic development as distinct from Shelley’s philosophical idealism and the 
subjective poet but rather as its next objective iteration, which is the recognition and 
representation of soul through its imperfect material expression. As part of the 
progression of romantic poetry, Browning sees the distinction between himself and 
Shelley as one of degree rather than kind. Martens argues that although Browning 
turns away from philosophical idealism he retains Shelley’s humanitarianism and 
republicanism, and while this is true, I would add that even Browning’s politics arise 
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from the recognition, as Sordello himself realizes, that soul exists in humanity and is 
embodied in the empirical history of mankind—a point to which I will return in the 
discussion of Browning’s history plays. 
The fact that Browning found a correlation between the romantic paradigm, 
philosophical idealism and his relationship to Shelley can be discerned even in his 
first published poem, Pauline (1833). When the poet-narrator reflects upon his first 
discovery of the intensity of his own soul, in other words the romantic predicament, 
he relays his search in the history of thought for a correlative to the spiritual and 
creative expansion of this potentiality: “I dreamed not of restraint, but gazed / On all 
things: schemes and systems went and came, / And I was proud (being vainest of the 
weak) / In wandering o’er thought’s world to seek some one / To be my prize, as if 
you wandered o’er / The White Way for a star” (ll. 398-403). Yet the poet-narrator 
asserts that “my choice fell / Not so much on a system as a man” (ll. 403-4), which 
suggests that Browning found the fullest iteration of idealism, as the modern 
correlation of romantic interiority, not in a systematic philosophy but in the poetry of 
Shelley, which is the same point that he makes in “Transcendentalism.” 
In the Essay on Shelley, Browning defines Shelley as the archetypal 
“subjective poet, of the modern classification,” referring, as Elizabeth Barrett noted, 
to the well-known German usage of the term. That this is a continuation of the 
romantic paradigm is clear from the fact that Browning felt that if Shelley had not 
died young he would have come to have seen himself as a Christian poet, which 
Browning means in a spiritual rather than theological sense—a distinction that Carlyle 
commended upon reading Browning's Essay. Browning asserts that, similarly to 
Dante, Shelley saw the external through his subjective soul, which as a reflection of 
the absolute mind led to abstraction: he perceived in “the universe, nature and man, 
 88 
their actual state of perfection in imperfection” (288-9). Looking higher than any 
manifestation of both beauty and good in the real, Shelley was not willing to accept 
“the manifold partial developments of beauty and good on every side,” leaving “them 
the ultimates he found them” (289). It is Shelley’s vision of the abstract ideal forms 
that leads Browning to pronounce that Shelley was “moved by and suffused with a 
music at once of the soul and the sense” (p. 289). Indeed all of his poetry is a 
mythology: “a sublime fragmentary essay towards a presentment of the 
correspondency of the universe to Deity, of the natural to the spiritual, and of the 
actual to the ideal” (299). 
The mature narrator of Pauline explains how he lived in the realm of the 
noumenal with Shelley, whose idealism set him the task: “To disentangle, gather 
sense from song: / Since, song-inwoven, lurked there words which seemed / A key to 
a new world, the muttering / Of angels, something yet unguessed by man” (ll. 413-
416). He describes to his lover how, “I was full of bliss, who lived / With Plato and 
who had the key to life” (ll. 435-6). Yet to “gather sense from song,” the young poet 
felt the urge to find the ideal perceptions of Shelley’s soul in their material 
embodiments: “’T was in my plan to look on real life, / The life all new to me; my 
theories / Were firm, so I left, to look and learn” (ll. 441-3). However, when the 
aspiring poet realized that the ideal forms could never fully exist in the real, he 
recounts how it led to his disillusion and despair. Nevertheless even in this despair his 
idealism persists, such that when he does look upon the real it is still through the 
potentiality and self-consciousness of his soul and “So, my baffled hope / Seeks out 
abstractions” (ll. 607-8). 
The narrator details his decision to “look within no more,” telling Pauline that 
“I aim not even to catch a tone / Of harmonies he [Shelley] called profusely up” (ll. 
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216-217). Nevertheless, Shelley's music can still be heard: “A melody some 
wondrous singer sings, / Which, though it haunt men oft in the still eve, / They dream 
not to essay; yet it no less / But more is honored” (ll. 222-225). He has not renounced 
his idol; rather, Shelley’s song remains the lasting call of the soul—the mysterious 
and transcendent inner reality of the world. The narrator explains that he now 
recognizes that this yearning of soul is itself a yearning for God, but it will take seven 
years of working on Sordello, as the exploration of the historical evolution of the 
romantic soul emerging out of Christianity, for Browning to affirm his ideal realism 
and to define his relationship with Shelley. 
In Sordello and in the Essay on Shelley, Browning shows his pioneering of 
objectivity does not constitute a Bloomian rejection of his romantic and Romantic 
predecessor; the mature poet and his youthful idol are not diametric opposites but are 
part of the historical dialectic between the subjective and the objective poet, or 
between soul and its manifestation: 
If the subjective might seem to be the ultimate requirement of every age, the 
objective, in the strictest sense, must still retain its original value. For it is with 
world as a starting point and basis alike, that we shall always have to concern 
ourselves: the world is not to be learned and thrown aside, but reverted to and 
relearned. The spiritual comprehension may be infinitely subtilized, but the raw 
material that it operates upon must remain (285). 
Both the subjective and the objective operate on the conviction that the material world 
is an embodiment of the ideal. Indeed, although the inward contemplation of the 
subjective continually deepens its spiritual insight, Browning maintains that the 
empirical forms through which soul knows itself must always be retained, and that 
these material manifestations must be “reverted to and relearned” because the 
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progression of the inner spiritual must always body itself forth in new forms.  
In the explanatory titles of 1863 that accompany Sordello’s survey of the 
idealism of romantic poetry from its subjective to its objective form, Browning 
surveys the progression of symbolic embodiment from Greek totality to romantic 
synthesis: from the “epoist” to the “dramatist, or, so to call him, analyst who turns in 
due course synthetist.” The epic poet expressed the classical world where “deeds once 
sufficed” and where action is itself is symbolic and is both the means and the end; by 
contrast the dramatist, or analyst, exemplified by Dante, has an awareness of the soul 
that informs human action but he separates this entity into its constituent parts of the 
ideal and the real; the final phase is the “synthetist” poet, the future Browning, who 
will show soul in its embodiment in the real, recombining the separated constituent 
elements into a approximate reunified whole. 
Browning identifies himself as the romantic symbolist, or “synthetist” poet, in 
his next collection of poetry, Bells and Pomegranates, the series of pamphlets 
wherein he published the plays and monologues that he had worked on while he was 
writing and revising Sordello. Indeed, Browning's debt to the idea of romantic 
symbolism in his next objective, dramatic poetry, can be seen in the title that he gave 
to the series. The deep import of Browning’s symbolic title has been overlooked in 
criticism of the poet's early work, but his explanation of its meaning, at the instigation 
of Elizabeth Barrett, reveals his relationship to the Schlegel brothers and the 
importance of Sordello for Browning in developing a symbolic language that would 
enable him to discuss the role of poetry throughout his work. He writes at the end of 
the last series of Bells and Pomegranates:  
I take the opportunity of explaining, in reply to inquiries, that I only 
meant by that title to indicate an endeavour towards something like an 
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alternation, or mixture, of music with discoursing, sound with sense, 
poetry with thought; which looks ambitious, thus expressed, so the 
symbol was preferred. (viii) 
Viewing this title in the context of the symbolic language that Browning develops in 
Sordello, it becomes apparent that this title is a condensed juxtaposition of symbols 
for the ideal (music, sound, and poetry) and symbols for the material (speech, sense 
and thought); that which looks inward to the noumenal realm and that which looks to 
its outward manifestation in the phenomenal. Indeed in Sordello, Browning uses 
music and sound to delineate the transcendent realm of soul, and by “poetry” he does 
not simply mean verse but along with Shelley refers to the expression of an eternal 
truth accessed by the faculty of imagination. Browning juxtaposes these symbols of 
the ideal with symbols that speak for empirical reality: in Sordello, Browning shows 
that in contrast to the totality of perception, “discoursing,” or language, is conceptual 
and belongs to space and time and that “thought” is the act or embodiment of soul in 
the mind. Finally with “sense” he speaks of the phenomena that comprise the material 
world of manifestation. When Browning explains that his title signifies his endeavour 
towards a “mixture” of these symbols, he declares his role as the poet who strives to 
bring the ideal and the real together by showing the ideal in its manifestation, and by 
the “alternation” of these symbols he denotes the inevitable ironic gap that exists 
between the ideal and the real. 
Bells and Pomegranates is a significant work in the evolution of Browning’s 
new romantic symbolism, and he placed Pippa Passes, which was conceived by 
Browning as he traveled in Northern Italy seeking inspiration for his work on epic, at 
the opening of his first collection of 1841 as a symbolic enactment of the poetics that 
he set forth in Sordello. That Pippa Passes looks back to the poetic theory that he 
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consolidated in Sordello is clear from the scene featuring Jules and Phene, which 
connects the play overtly with classical and romantic aesthetics that he explored in the 
former work. When foreign art students in Asolo trick Jules, a fellow art student 
whose pretensions they abhor, by sending counterfeit letters from a young Greek girl, 
Phene, their machinations bring about a crucial revelation in Jules concerning his art. 
On seeing Phene and reading the letters that he thinks she has written, Jules believes 
that he has found the very ideal that animates his work in her beauty, and upon this 
realization he quickly proclaims his love and asks her to be his wife. When they speak 
for the very first time in person after their wedding, Jules explains to Phene that 
before he beheld her in the flesh, he had accustomed himself: 
To see, throughout all nature, varied stuff 
For better nature's birth by means of art: 
With me, each substance tended to one form 
Of beauty—to the human Archetype. 
On every side occurred suggestive germs 
Of that—the tree, the flower—or, take the fruit,— 
Some rosy shape, continuing the peach, 
Curved beewise o'er its bough; as rosy limbs, 
Depending, nestled in the leaves; and just 
From a cleft rose-peach the whole Dryad sprung! (2. ll. 82-92) 
Jules' explanation of his inspiration is clearly the Schlegelian conception of classical 
art that Browning explored in Sordello: he manifests spirit in the external world so 
that he may worship the beauty of the human form, and now that Jules has found his 
Greek ideal in Phene he decides that she will be the human archetype that inspires his 
art. However, after Jules learns that Phene is merely a pawn in an elaborate joke at his 
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expense, he decides to flee his sham marriage and leave Asolo by himself.  
 In the 1863 revised edition of his works, Browning revisits the play and adds a 
passage that makes it even clearer that Jules has erred in focusing on form, the 
classical ideal, at the expense of the soul, which is the essence of the romantic 
perspective. Only after hearing Pippa's passing song does Jules realize that he has 
only seen the beauty of form in Phene: “This body had no soul before, but slept / Or 
stirred, was beauteous or ungainly, free / From taint or foul with stain, as outward 
things / Fastened their image on its passiveness” (2. ll. 193-96). He had only 
responded to her body as an external stimulus, lacking the inward motivation of soul. 
Through Pippa's song Jules is awakened to a higher order of things that enables him 
to perceive this spirit in Phene and he has the revelation that she can still be his muse 
but, crucially, only as she inspires him to embody this inward soul. Embarking on a 
new kind of art, Jules realizes that he will either be successful at embodying soul in 
form or he will fail and it will be as lifeless as before: “Now, it will wake, feel, live—
or die again!” (ll. 297). Jules debates if creating form from unshaped things 
constitutes art and whether “to evoke a soul / From form be nothing?” (ll. 299-300), 
but he accepts the challenge and declares “Stand aside— / I do but break these paltry 
models up / To begin art afresh” (ll. 316-17).  
 When Monsignor, Jules’ patron, reads out loud a letter that the young artist 
has sent him wherein he describes the change in his concept of art, Browning makes it 
clear that he is continuing the symbolic exploration that he had already embarked on 
in Sordello of the transition from the classical to the romantic in art: 
“He never had a clearly conceived Ideal within his brain till to-day. Yet 
since his hand could manage a chisel, he has practised expressing other 
men's Ideals; and, in the very perfection he has attained to, he foresees 
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an ultimate failure: his unconscious hand will pursue its prescribed 
course of old years, and will reproduce with a fatal expertness the 
ancient types, let the novel one appear never so palpably to his spirit. 
There is but one method of escape: confiding the virgin type to as 
chaste a hand, he will turn painter, instead of sculptor, and paint, not 
carve, its characteristics.” (4. ll. 46-57)   
Although the Greeks perfected the beauty of form, Jules embraces the possibility of 
imperfection in striving to depict the soul, and his decision to abandon sculpture in 
favor of painting reflects the transition of his thought. Indeed, Browning here again 
shows the influence of August Schlegel as he uses the contrast of painting and 
sculpture to define the difference between classical and romantic art. In focusing on 
the embodiment of inward soul that he recognizes through his love for Phene, rather 
than merely imitating the form of Greek art, Browning shows that Jules has become a 
romantic artist. 
 Jules' transition from the classical objectivity to romantic subjectivity is 
paralleled in Pippa Passes, as it is in Sordello, with the transition from romantic 
subjectivity to romantic objectivity, which is represented through the relationship of 
Pippa to the people of Asolo. Pippa is the first of Browning's female characters to 
embody the love for and reverence of a higher power that both Friedrich and August 
Schlegel see as the definition of the romantic age. The imagery of lush and vital 
nature that suffuses Pippa's prologue links her organically with the soul that is imbued 
in all of nature by God, and her desire to become other people mirrors Sordello’s 
recognition that the transcendence he perceives in his own subjective soul exists in 
mankind and nature as well. This requires the objective poet, or the Maker-See, to 
reveal the relationship between the ideal and the real that is no longer perfectly 
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embodied in the world. When Pippa's songs catalyze a significant action—Jules' 
moment of realization—this movement represents the process of illumination where 
those who hear Pippa’s songs are stimulated to a perception of the discrepancy 
between semblance and true reality and are able to act in the real world upon a 
perception of soul. It is the dramatization of this movement in Browning’s poetics that 
comprises the symbolic action of the play.  
As a romantic drama, the unity of form and content of Pippa Passes is derived 
from “the bond of ideas, through a spiritual central point” (Dialogue on Poetry p. 
101); however; in starting from the assumption that the structure and action of drama 
is derived from a logical relation of cause and effect, some contemporary critics of the 
play were puzzled at its seemingly disconnected form. A review of Pippa Passes in 
The Spectator (1841) maintained: “Pippa Passes is not a drama, but scenes in a 
dialogue, without coherence or action” (5, 392). Similarly according to The Atlas 
(1841): “the whole affair is a chaos of speeches, dialogues, and figures, in which we 
can discover neither coherency nor positive meaning... In fact the work is so deficient 
in unity, action, and human character, it will not be difficult to anticipate the issue of 
the experiment” (5, 393-95). Nevertheless, other contemporary reviews recognized 
that Pippa Passes was a symbolic rather than a realistic presentation and that its form 
evolved from and embodied the central idea of the play. The Monthly Review (1841) 
observed that cause and effect in the play did not derive from action and plot but 
rather from the symbolic center that is Pippa:  
Then follow four scenes, morning, noon, evening, and night, scenes 
which would be altogether detached from each other were they not 
connected by the agency of the silk-girl, whose snatches of songs, 
heard from without, fall like oracles upon the ears of the already 
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passion-wrought listeners, give to their wavering feelings a decisive 
bias, and produce the climax of each scene. Thus Pippa's passings, 
apparently of such trivial moment, are really seen to be the moving 
causes of effects incalculable. (5, 392-93)  
 Similarly The Morning Herald  (1841) recognized that the unity of form and 
content consisted in the ethereal figure of Pippa: “Pippa is a delicate little being, half 
maiden of earthly mould and half spirit—a ‘wandering Una,’ who seems intended to 
bring into something of unity four different actions with different dramatis personae, 
which in this libretto, are thrown into juxta-position” (5, 395-6). Furthermore, 
Elizabeth Barrett recognized, before she even met Browning, that the importance of 
Pippa Passes lay in its central idea: in a letter to Mary Russell Mitford she exclaimed, 
“There is a unity & nobleness of conception in 'Pippa Passes' which seems to me to 
outweigh all the riddles in riddledom” (6, 110-112) and she wrote to Browning that: 
“The conception is to my mind, most exquisite & altogether original—and the 
contrast in working out the plan, singularly expressive of various faculty” (10, 78-82), 
which she had praised in Browning as his ability to be both subjective and objective, 
both metaphysical and real. 
 In his analysis of Browning's poetic development from the early poems to 
Pippa Passes, Thomas J. Collins argues that the depiction of Pippa marks a point of 
regression in Browning's work. Collins posits that Browning ignores the lessons he 
learned in his early poems and draws Pippa like the naïve poet of Pauline who looks 
along with Shelley to the perfection of mankind; however, this interpretation misses 
the transition that is symbolized in the play. Pippa is a “Maker-See” because her 
songs precipitate a transformation whereby those that hear them are able to see 
through the mist of semblance to grasp an ideal truth. As J. M. Ariail notes, this does 
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not mean an ethical or moral truth (in fact some contemporary reviews found the play 
to be morally suspect) but a transcendent truth. Sebald realizes through his passion for 
Ottima and the subsequent murder of her husband that he has lost contact with the 
moral foundation that connects man with God and with his own soul; Jules sees that 
he has merely imitated the forms of art without embodying the essence of soul, which 
he now perceives in his love for Phene; Luigi's grandiose visions of being a martyr-
hero are replaced with a true revelation about the meaning of Italian independence 
and he rushes to kill the Austrian Emperor as a testament to his belief in the 
revolutionary cause; and the Monsignor relinquishes the pride he holds in his family 
name and exposes their previous sins so that he can reveal the corruption of Uguccio.  
 If we read Pippa Passes as a drama that strives for verisimilitude, rather than 
as symbolic drama, these sudden transformations can seem nonsensical. Taking this 
approach, Park Honan laments that “Pippa's function in connecting the scenes has the 
unfortunate effect of adding a touch of the contrived and the ridiculous whenever and 
wherever her miracle-effecting song is heard” (91). Similarly, the personal 
transformations in Browning’s play can seemingly point to the possible delusive 
nature of the characters themselves: Ryals argues that Browning's characters only 
hear what they want to hear in Pippa's songs and that their subjective relativism points 
to Browning's own views about the problem of perspective, and E. Warick Slinn 
contends that “Browning focuses attention on the moment of response, and therefore 
on the psychology of each incident, and in doing so he portrays the way people act 
according to self-conceived illusions about themselves” (24). However, if we read 
Pippa Passes in the context of Sordello and Browning's romantic epistemology, it is 
apparent that Pippa's songs bring about a transformation in the dramatis personae 
whereby they are able to perceive themselves and the world around them through the 
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faculty of imagination, which leads directly to a perception of soul. These revelations 
are an enactment of the symbolic method of romantic drama that seeks to bring about 
a perception of noumenal soul that lies within and beyond the material world. 
 The relationship between Pippa’s songs and the realizations of romantic drama 
is derived from the symbol of song made act that Browning utilizes in Sordello to 
depict the manifestation of soul in the romantic age. Similarly to Wagner's concept of 
music drama, in Pippa Passes Browning brings together music, as the expression of 
the inner truth of the world, and drama, which operates in the world of cause and 
effect, to show that Pippa's songs precipitate a transformation in the dramatis 
personae, and in the reader as well, whereby they can see that they are connected to 
another spiritual order of existence that lies within them and transcends the material 
world. Thus, with Wagner in mind, it is interesting that Browning wrote to Eliza 
Flower to ask if she could set Pippa's lyrics to music, and also that The Morning 
Herald described the play as a libretto, suggesting that Browning had in mind a kind 
of mini opera. A contemporary review in The Examiner (1841) acknowledged that 
this transcendent process of illumination was the central idea of the play: 
And this, carried with the light, unconscious steps of Pippa, from 
morning to night, is the purpose and Idea of the poem. It is to inculcate 
the faith in the higher than mere actual things: it is to encourage the 
hope that all who do rightly and cheerfully what duty they are called to, 
however humble, may aspire to their share of influence on the whole 
great scheme of the world: it is to express the truth that, at once 
encircling the meanest and the greatest, there is a fulness of divine life 
which acts upon our own existence, to be made suddenly visible or 
sensible by the lightest thing; and that all, even when the greatest 
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contraries appear to be at work, is yet, to the mind of thoughtful 
insight, interdependent and harmonious. (5, 396-399) 
Herbert Tucker finds this ostensible closure in Pippa Passes, the “transformations to a 
moral idea” in the play, as a disappointing turn in Browning's work, which he sees as 
characterized by a desire to consistently displace “the semantic or metaphysical 
foreclosure of meaning.” He concludes that Pippa Passes must therefore be an 
example of Browning “Writ[ing] the play against his dominant creative impulse” as 
an “ironic expression or negative definition to the themes of his characteristic art of 
disclosure” (122). Assuming that the play is a negative expression of Browning’s 
poetics, Tucker argues that he chose to model his other plays on Strafford and not on 
Pippa Passes. While I agree with Tucker that Pippa Passes is different in form and 
content to the rest of Browning's plays, I would argue that this is due to its crucial role 
as a symbolic articulation of Browning's concept of ideal realism and romantic drama, 
rather than being a strange anomaly in his oeuvre. It is also important to note that, 
even in Pippa Passes, Browning does not focus on the final completed action but on 
the recognition of soul that precedes action. Fish observes that even Pippa does not 
experience the same kind of transformation that her songs instigate in those around 
her. Crucially it is this process of realization that Pippa initiates within others that 
Browning himself hopes to facilitate in the following plays and it is this very idea that 
connects the later plays to Pippa Passes. Indeed, for Browning, it is the very 
discrepancy between soul and act that enables us to see the ideal and to shape our 
actions in accordance with it; therefore, in the plays that follow, Browning turns to 




The Tragedy of Historical Forms: Soul and the Teleology of Democracy in  
Strafford, King Victor and King Charles, A Soul's Tragedy and Luria, 
 
After having enacted the principles of romantic drama in Pippa Passes, 
Browning turned to the concept of history in his first plays to explore the relationship 
between irony and tragedy that is inherent in romantic symbolism. Following the 
Romantics in their conviction that there were two different ways to view the world—
through the mind that saw the material in its empirical relations or through the 
imagination that perceived the material as an embodiment of the ideal—Browning 
recognized that empiricism and idealism not only offered two ways of viewing drama 
but also offered two ways of viewing the material facts of history. The empirical view 
of history, represented by Leopold von Ranke, argued that although the historian 
should always endeavor to present the objective factual data of history, it is inevitable 
that this narrative would be fallible as it is dependent on the individual subjective 
construction of the historian's mind. In contrast to empirical historicism, the 
philosophy of idealism, culminating in Hegel’s Philosophy of History and also in 
Carlyle’s French Revolution and Past and Present among his many other works, 
maintained that it was possible to perceive the embodiment of the spiritual within the 
material phenomena of history. 
These distinct views of history were framed in the same epistemological terms 
that dominated discourse about symbolic embodiment and the modes of empirical and 
symbolic drama. Indeed this connection between history and the epistemology of 
embodiment is reiterated by Schopenhauer when he argues that the empirical study of 
history is subject to the mind as it engages with the laws of cause and effect: the 
empirical observer “has to regard and select the events and persons not according to 
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their inner genuine significance expressing the Idea, but according to the outward, 
apparent, and relatively important significance in reference to the connexion and to 
the consequences” (245). For Schopenhauer this analysis of history only operates 
within the principle of sufficient reason and thus it is only able to “apprehend the 
phenomenon of which this principle is the form” (245). In contrast to this empirical 
approach, Schopenhauer argues that if history is conceived of poetically, or through 
the imagination, then it is possible to perceive “the idea, the inner being of mankind 
outside all relation and all time” (245). Schopenhauer returns to the popular 
epistemological distinction between mind and imagination to present his conviction 
that the historical events of empirical reality are the materialization of the underlying 
noumenal will, which is the same foundational concept that Browning termed soul. 
 Influenced by German idealism, Carlyle also views history as a symbol that 
bodies forth the infinite: “the spiritual will always body itself forth in the temporal 
history of men: the spiritual is the beginning of the temporal” (79). Although Carlyle 
acknowledges in his “Essay on History” the inevitable differing subjective responses 
to history, he argues along with Schopenhauer that this is merely a difference of 
epistemology. For Carlyle the ideal requires the insight of the “Seeing-Eye,” or the 
hero who can see into the spiritual essence of phenomenal reality. Although Morse 
Peckham argues that Browning’s view of history is derived from the empirical 
tradition of Ranke, which emphasizes the relativity inherent in the historian’s 
subjective account of history, we cannot fail to note the similarity of Carlyle’s 
concept of the “Seeing-Eye” and Browning’s “Maker-See,” the poet who reveals the 
relationship between the ideal and the real. Although Carlyle’s “Seeing-Eye” is 
analogous to his idea of the “Seer,” which is also the term that Browning uses to 
denote the subjective poet who looks to the ideal through his own soul, for Carlyle the 
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seer who has the “Seeing-Eye,” like Browning’s Maker-See, perceives the ideal that 
is embodied in the objective, material world. This ability to spiritually see or to know 
through the realm of soul is a crucial issue of epistemology for Browning, as it is for 
Carlyle, because it is the conceptual mind that sees material facts as they are subject 
to the laws of empiricism, and it is feeling and the fancy, which, grounded in soul, see 
material reality as a symbolic expression of its underlying spiritual meaning.   
Browning’s discussion of symbolic embodiment in Sordello, and throughout 
his poetry, along with the affinity that he perceived between Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy and his own view of the relationship between soul and mind, provides the 
conceptual foundation for his symbolic notion of history. Browning’s historical view 
is tied to the Christian concept of history, to idealism and also to the Schlegelian 
theory of romantic epistemology, which are connections that he explored through 
Sordello’s struggle to conceive of the relationship between the romantic poet who has 
insight into the eternal realm of soul and the man of action who sees less but acts 
more in the world of phenomena. Browning’s view of history is encapsulated in 
Sordello’s recognition that in contrast to the perfect totality of the ideal and the real in 
the classical age—which is reflected in its cyclical conception of history—the 
teleological history of the Christian, romantic paradigm is the progressive 
embodiment of soul. Indeed, Sordello’s key revelation, which is so crucial to the 
symbolism of Browning’s plays, is that the progression of historical and political 
action, or “deeds,” is the evolution of action in the real that is based on a developing 
perception of the noumenal aspect of the world. Coleridge expresses the same 
conviction in his Lectures on Shakespeare when he suggests that national histories 
should be performed in the same manner as the medieval mystery plays, revealing his 
assumption that empirical history expresses the same underlying symbolic truths that 
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are embodied in the religious plays (157). 
That Browning shared the German idealist view of history, popularized in 
England by Carlyle, is most succinctly demonstrated in “With Charles Avison,” 
which, as we saw, is also the poem where he defines the relationship between soul 
and mind in terms of symbolic embodiment. Browning reveals his symbolic view of 
history when he uses the prototype of the plant to discuss the progression of art forms 
and to criticize the idea of history that views knowledge linearly rather than 
organically. This linear view accounts the past as “Not knowledge in the bud which 
holds a fruit / Haply undreamed of in the soul's Spring-tide, / Pursed in petals Summer 
opens wide, / And Autumn, withering, rounds to perfect ripe,” but rather as ignorance 
to be dismissed by the ostensibly enlightened knowledge of the modern day. Although 
Browning warns against knowledge that sees itself as timeless and “styles itself truth 
perennial,” this is not a repudiation of the ideal but rather expresses Browning’s belief 
that each period of history is a different manifestation of an unchanging truth. 
As the embodiment of noumenal soul in history is teleological, Browning 
observes that, necessarily, “Truths escape / Time's insufficient garniture,” which 
means that they will eventually outgrow their manifestation in a particular form. 
These empirical forms that embodied truth will “fade / They fall—those sheathings 
now grown sere, whose aid / Was infinite to truth they wrapped” (ll. 371-7). This is 
the very same point that Carlyle makes about symbols in Sartor Resartus when he 
explains that, while “time adds much to the sacredness of symbols, so likewise in his 
progress he at length defaces, or even desecrates them; and symbols, like all terrestrial 
Garments, wax old”  (170). Browning maintains that, although “myth after myth” of 
each distinct epoch will “soon shall fade and fall,” it is precisely these fallen husks 
that enable newly embodied truths to emerge. Browning’s equation of history with 
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myth here is important. Langbaum notes how Browning's conviction that history is 
progressive would seem to undermine a mythical approach; however, Langbaum 
observes that in contrast to Yeats, who believed that “symbols and myths are 
permanent, and the ideas about them change...for Browning, the myths change; myths 
are the progressively changing symbolic language for the same continuing idea” 
(578). Indeed, Sordello’s utilization of Greek mythological cosmology in his 
metaphor for the new romantic symbolism that will be derived from “Life’s 
Elemental masque” demonstrates that Browning views empirical history mythically 
because he sees the embodied events and persons of the observable world as the ever-
progressive symbols that manifest and in some way reveal the ineffable. 
The relationship between history and myth is key to Browning’s symbolism as 
his interest in history is part of the modern quest that is identified by both Schlegel 
and Carlyle when they call for a new mythology—a fresh symbolism that will express 
the connection between the spiritual and the temporal. Thus in the group of history 
plays that Browning composed while he was finishing Sordello, he turns to the 
actions and events of history for his new romantic symbolism. Browning explored in 
Sordello the significance of the ironic space between the ideal and its embodiment in 
romantic symbolism for facilitating spiritual sight; therefore, the romantic irony that 
is essential to the work of the Maker-See, and that defines the concept of historical 
tragedy for Browning, is derived in these plays from the discrepancy between the 
totality of soul and its embodiment in the successive forms of the material world.  
 The plays that I discuss in this chapter—Strafford, and King Victor and King 
Charles, which were written for the stage, and the later plays A Soul's Tragedy and 
Luria, which were written for an “imaginary stage”—are all tragedies of historical 
embodiment. Located in the empirical moment of political change, Strafford, King 
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Victor and King Charles and A Soul’s Tragedy reveal their protagonists to be on the 
threshold of crucial paradigm shifts. In Sordello increasing democratic action is 
conceived by Browning as the progressive embodiment of soul in the material world; 
therefore, the relationship between autocracy and democracy in these plays is integral 
to Browning’s symbolic view of history. Although they might disagree about the 
nature of democracy, Browning shares Carlyle’s conviction that the forms of history 
are the changing symbolic manifestation of the inner essence of the world, and that 
political change comprises the necessary replacement of forms when they have 
become merely semblances that no longer express the inner idea that it once bodied 
forth. Browning’s historical plays focus on the irony inherent in this transition with 
his protagonists caught in the tragic discrepancy that exists between soul and its 
embodiment in these moments of paradigmatic historical change. I argue that Luria is 
the summation of these plays in that it is a symbolic articulation of the relationship 
between epistemology, the Maker-See and the idealist view of history. 
Browning’s first romantic drama, Strafford, which he published and staged in 
1837, was composed while he was still completing Sordello. That Strafford developed 
out of the symbolic treatment of history that Browning explored in Sordello is clear 
from the fact that the same confusion over what Browning was trying to do in 
Sordello has followed Strafford as well, with critics perceiving a contradiction 
between the fact that Browning endeavored to write the play as a historical tragedy, 
which focuses on the phenomena of the material world, and as a play “which is one of 
Action in Character, rather than Character in Action.” Indeed, Park Honan sees a huge 
discrepancy between Browning's idea of action in character and the fact that 
“character in Strafford is utterly swamped in a wild and heavy sea of action and 
event” (48). Similarly, Patricia Ball sees Browning's affinity with the Romantic drama 
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of internal character, but she defines “Romantic” in terms of the literary movement. 
Ball argues that as Romantic drama, Strafford fails because Browning's attention to 
historical details and the successive scenes that represent these details “force[s] other, 
more external considerations upon him [Strafford], and the poet's concern with the 
central sensibility conflicts with them” (210). However, Strafford is not contradictory 
if we view it within the context of Browning's epistemology of embodiment, and his 
interest in the ways in which the internal, which for Browning comprises the 
transcendent realm of soul, is expressed through the empirical phenomena of history. 
Indeed in his historical plays, Browning reverses the dramatic mode that he utilized in 
Paracelsus, which removed the external machinery of persons and events to trace the 
movements of the inward realm of soul, to re-emphasize the objective framework of 
space and time wherein the soul is made manifest.   
At the same time that Browning was tracing the development of the classical 
to the romantic paradigm in Sordello, he turned in Strafford (1837) to seventeenth-
century England leading up to the Civil War to delve into yet another instance of 
historical change, this time where the spirit of England is no longer seen to manifest 
itself in the divine right of the king but in a parliamentary democracy. Since all 
historical forms, as symbols, eventually become distant from the soul that they 
originally bodied forth, the central irony of the play lies in the fact that for Pym the 
truth of England is embodied in a democratic Parliament but for Strafford it is still 
embodied in the divine right of the king. Although in the temporal plot of the play, 
Browning delineates the empirical historical events that lead up to Strafford’s 
execution, the symbolic plot follows the transition of historical forms as the 
embodiment of soul. Browning’s symbolic design reveals the impact of Carlyle’s 
lectures On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History on his historical plays. 
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Indeed, influenced by German idealism, Carlyle argues that the movement of 
Puritanism, as it was expressed through the actions of Pym and Vane, denotes the 
symbolic transition from a form that had become merely tradition, an outworn 
semblance, to a new organic embodiment of noumenal reality. Thus the Puritans, who 
play an important symbolic role in Strafford reveal what Carlyle saw as: “The 
struggle of men intent on the real essence of things, against men intent on the 
semblances and forms of things... It distinguishes true from false in Ceremonial Form, 
earnest solemnity from empty pageant, in all human things” (128).   
Browning’s statement that Strafford focuses on action in character rather than 
character in action is derived from the distinction that he makes in Sordello between 
classical objectivity where the ideal is perfectly embodied in action and romantic 
interiority where action endeavors to manifest inward soul. Recent criticism analyzes 
Browning’s concept of action in character as pertaining to psychological interiority, 
but Browning emphasizes throughout Sordello that his notion of self-consciousness 
refers to the transcendent interiority of the romantic paradigm. Indeed Strafford’s 
action in character is clearly developed from the epistemological discussion that arises 
out of Sordello’s early existential discovery of his own divine inward power. In the 
second book of Sordello, the narrator explains the force of Sordello's soul and the 
diffusive nature of his poetic imagination: “that is, he loves not, nor possesses One / 
Idea that, star-like over, lures him on / To its exclusive purpose” (Sordello 2. ll. 395-
7), and Sordello, at this point in the poem, celebrates the fact that “Himself, inactive, 
yet is greater far / Than such as act, each stooping to his star” (2. ll. 381-2). The star is 
a romantic symbol for Browning in that it partakes of both the ideal and the real: the 
light that radiates from its halo illuminates action in the material world but its 
substance partakes of the celestial realm, and in both Sordello and Strafford the star 
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denotes for Browning the relationship between soul and act. Indeed, Browning returns 
many times to the symbol of the star in his romantic dramas to make the distinction 
between the characters that see the material as an embodiment of soul and those who 
view it merely from a temporal perspective. The tragedy for Sordello is that while he 
can perceive the noumenal framework of the universe through the self-consciousness 
of his soul, ultimately he will not be able to act upon this deepened insight: he is 
“Wise, and restricted to becoming wise” (Sordello 2. ll. 394); therefore, he admits that 
he has no symbol that will enable him to realize his perception of the ideal. However, 
in Strafford Bowning turns to the plight of the individual that is: “moulded to express 
/ Each the idea that rules him” (Sordello 2. ll. 385-6). In his first attempt at romantic 
drama, Browning explores how the king is the symbol that mediates between 
Strafford’s soul and his actions in the world, the ideal and the real, and the tragedy 
lies in the fact that Strafford's existential being is anchored in a fading form. 
Since the play was written for the stage, its tragedy is expressed less 
metaphysically than it is in the notoriously difficult and abstract Sordello; however, 
the imagery that Browning utilizes in the play reveals his symbolic design. Browning 
depicts Strafford’s allegiance to the king as an inversion of teleological development, 
and the biblical imagery that suffuses the play points to the fact that Strafford 
worships a false idol, which is a metaphor for a material form that no longer embodies 
soul. Alluding to the book of Samuel and the Philistines' attempt to worship the ark of 
God in the temple of Dagon, Vane suggests that Strafford's worship of the king, as an 
outworn symbol, looks backward and in doing so goes against the will of God: “And 
when I think on all that's past / Since that man left us, how his single arm / Rolled the 
advancing good of England back / And set the woful past up in its place, / Exalting 
Dagon where the Ark should be” (1. 2. ll. 30-34). Vane argues that Strafford’s loyalty 
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to the king at the expense of parliament has only helped strengthened Charles’ 
autocratic tyranny and oppression, and he has enabled him to act on his lust for power 
without repercussion from the law. 
Pym also sees Strafford’s loyalty to the king as stymying the progress of 
history. Reminiscing about his early friendship with Strafford, he recollects the times 
when they once strolled together animatedly discussing “Fresh argument for God 
against the King” (1.1 l. 196), and their work together on “The Bill of Rights,” which 
sought to limit the power of the king. Continuing the Old Testament biblical imagery, 
Puritan voices call in the background to accuse Strafford of resembling “Haman,” 
who tried to secretly kill the Persian Jews, and “Ahitophel,” the counselor to king 
David who deserted him in favor of Absalom, to depict Strafford's perceived 
treachery (1.1 l. 90). In pleading with Strafford to “shake off, with God's help, an 
obscene dream / In this Ezekiel chamber, where it crept / Upon you first, and wake, 
yourself, your true / And proper self, our Leader, England's Chief” (1. 2. ll. 175-8), 
Pym refers to Ezekiel, which narrates the story of how God showed Ezekiel through 
his dreams the terrible things transpiring in his temple wherein the inhabitants of 
Jerusalem had taken to worshiping false gods. Just as Ezekiel knows that God is no 
longer in the temple and foresees that it must be built anew, Pym also sees himself as 
the one who must rebuild the temple that will properly house and embody the will of 
God—a metaphor for the government that Pym sees as the new manifestation of soul. 
The Puritans of the play prophesize that Pym's fate will mirror Gideon's, who 
was sent by God to protect the Israelites against the Midianites, and will echo the 
bravery of David against the Philistines. Pym perceives that he is on the cusp of a new 
dawn and he feels that it is his responsibility to guide England away from an outworn 
symbol toward the new embodiment of truth: 
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Heaven grows dark above:  
Let's snatch one moment ere the thunder fall,  
To say how well the English spirit comes out 
Beneath it! All have done their best, indeed,  
From lion Eliot, that grand Englishman, 
To the least here: and who, the least one here, 
When she is saved (for her redemption dawns 
Dimly, most dimly, —but it dawns) 
Who'd give at any price his hope away 
Of being named along with the Great Men? (1. 2. ll. 164-173) 
Pym sees Strafford’s allegiance to the king as the as the barrier between his own 
ability to act upon a perception of soul—to be one of the “Great Men” or heroes, 
those individuals who have divine insight into when a symbol no longer bodies forth 
the ideal and usher in its new material expression. Yet although Pym sees Strafford as 
a threat to Parliament, the new form, it is Strafford who implores the king to call 
Parliament after deciding to go to war with Scotland because he obtained proof that 
the Scots' League and Covenanters have intrigued with France. When Parliament 
makes it clear to the king that they will not endorse his war with Scotland, he 
continues to assert his authority by dissolving their new formation.  
Browning stays very close to the narrative of historical events that lead up to 
Strafford’s execution, but he develops the fictional role of Lady Carlisle to illuminate 
the existential nature of Strafford’s tragedy. When Stafford leaves to fight on behalf 
of the king against the Scottish, Lady Carlisle fears that the king will betray him, 
warning Strafford that “Charles never loved you” (2. 3. l. 214). Expressing her deep 
regret over her own role in Strafford having “set / His heart abidingly on Charles,” (ll. 
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222-3) she tells him that she has too has had to accept that the “One image stamped 
within you” (l. 233) has proven to be false. Lady Carlisle sympathizes with Strafford 
over the difficulty of relinquishing such a beloved image of the king, an ideal that 
only “turn[s] blank / The else imperial brilliance of your mind,— / A weakness, but 
most precious,—like a flaw / I' the diamond” (ll. 233-6). Indeed when Strafford 
misses the import of her warning, Lady Carlisle cannot bear to deprive him of his 
existential foundation: “Ah, no— / One must not lure him from a love like that! / Oh 
let him love the King and die!” (ll. 242-3). Even when Lady Carlisle anticipates the 
king's final betrayal of Strafford, she cannot abide the thought of undermining the 
symbol that gives his soul purpose: “Prove the King faithless / I take away / All 
Strafford cares to live for” (4. 1. l. 136). 
Although Strafford remains tethered to the will of the king, he finds himself on 
the precipice of great historical change. When he leaves England to pursue a war with 
the Scottish against the dictates of Parliament, he realizes for the first time that a 
paradigm shift is taking place wherein the interests of king and country are no longer 
indissoluble:  
Only God can save him [the king] now.  
Be Thou about his bed, about his path!  
His path! Where's England's path? Diverging wide,  
And not to join again the track my foot  
Must follow—whither? All that forlorn way 
Among the tombs! Far—far—till... What, they do 
Then join again, these paths? (ll. 270-6) 
Strafford questions the very foundation of his faith, but his love for the king, his “one 
star for guide,” impels him onward “To breast the bloody sea / That sweeps before 
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me” (ll. 294-5). Strafford renews his allegiance to the king even though he now 
acknowledges: “Night has its first, supreme, forsaken star” (l. 296). Following 
Browning's star imagery from Sordello to Strafford, it is apparent that the king is 
Strafford's “forsaken star” because he represents a symbol that no longer bodies forth 
soul; however, although Strafford realizes that the king is no longer the embodiment 
of the ideal, he is unable to embrace the forms that will manifest the spirit of a new 
age.   
Strafford’s loyalty to Charles means that even when he learns that the king has 
made an unexpected truce with the Scots and Parliament, the fact that he already has 
evidence that Parliament and the Scottish have been colluding, leads him to declare 
that “God put it in my mind to love, serve, die / For Charles, but never to obey him 
more!” (3. 2. ll. 156-7); therefore, he fights at Durham despite his knowledge of the 
king’s truce. Strafford expects praise when is recalled by the king; however, while he 
was gone, Pym left the king with no option but to sign an order of treason against 
him. Lady Carlisle offers Strafford the opportunity to flee with her when it becomes 
apparent that Pym will seek his execution, but Browning depicts Strafford as willingly 
accepting his sentence because he knows that it is only in death that he will know the 
truth again from which he is now divorced in the empirical moment of history:  
Earth fades, heaven breaks on me: I shall stand next 
Before God's throne: the moment's close at hand 
When man the first, last time, has leave to lay 
His whole heart bare before its Maker, leave 
To clear up the long error of a life 
And choose one happiness for evermore. (4. 2. ll. 204-9)  
The speeches between Strafford and Pym in the final scene reiterate Browning's 
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theory of embodiment, which posits that it is only in death and in reaching God that 
we can partake of the spiritual meaning that is necessarily obfuscated in the material 
world. Even Pym, who feels that he has done what is best for England, concedes that 
everything human is fallible: “I have done / Her bidding—poorly, wrongly—it may 
be, With ill effects—for I am weak, a man: / Still I have done my best, my human 
best” (5. 2. ll. 281-4). Despite his decision to put Strafford to death, Pym still loves 
his old friend and he contemplates the next world where he will walk with him again; 
when, in the light of the absolute, he will be “Purged from all error, gloriously 
renewed” (l. 298). Strafford has recognized that the transition from king to Parliament 
is part of a larger evolution of history, but he feels that his soul is inextricably bound 
to the old paradigm and that he cannot effect the change that he sees as otherwise 
imminent; thus he laments that it is “dreary, / To have to alter our whole life in age—
The time past, the strength gone! As well die now” (306-8).  
Although Strafford has exclaimed his willingness to die, at the very moment of his 
death he has a sudden vision of the pain and destruction that will bring about the new 
symbolic embodiment of soul, which is Browning’s allusion to the horrors of the 
Civil War. The original version of the play ends with Strafford imploring Pym to 
explain this vision to him and to God and with Pym's cold response that he must 
follow wherever the will of England takes him; however, in the 1863 edition of his 
works, Browning adds two extra speeches by Strafford that serve to focus the ending 
less on the complicated issue of how destruction is sometimes the only means by 
which reality can return from semblance to truth—an idea that Browning had not 
broached at all in the play except for in this last moment—but rather focuses on the 
individual soul and the symbol that spurs soul’s development in the actions of the real 
world. When Stafford declares to Pym: “There, I will thank you for the death, my 
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friend! / This is the meeting: let me love you well!” (ll. 356-7), and in the very last 
line when he reasserts his desire to die: “O God, I shall die first—I shall die first” (l. 
360), Browning returns to an emphasis on Strafford’s tragic inability to act, and 
thereby exist, in a world whose forms are no longer of his own paradigm.   
In Browning’s first attempt at romantic drama, he adheres closely to the 
historical facts surrounding Strafford’s career to emphasize the particularity of 
historical manifestation. Yet critics of the play found that it assumed a level of prior 
knowledge about the historical setting that would exceed the every day spectator. The 
Times lamented the fact that: “The tragedy is very historical; it would be almost 
unintelligible to one who had not made himself acquainted with the minutiae of the 
eventful period to which it relates, and hence we almost fear its becoming so popular 
as its intrinsic merits deserve” (3, 391-2). At the same time that Browning wished to 
delineate historical phenomena, he does so in order to explore the tragedy of a soul 
wedded to a symbol that no longer embodies the inward idea of the age. The True Sun 
recognized that Browning’s focus in the play was this concentration on Strafford’s 
inward dilemma and its impact on his actions, which made the play more “the 
development of a philosophical question than an action upon the emotions of the 
audience,” but they argued that it was “too cold and curious an interest for the 
theatre—more of appeal to the broad and elemental passions of humanity might, we 
apprehend, advantageously mingle with the intensely realised struggle of the public 
men of England in the seventeenth century” (3, 392-3).  
It is precisely Browning’s endeavor to depict the life of the soul that Macready 
found to be so problematic with Strafford. Macready wrote in his diary: “I find more 
grounds for exception than I had anticipated. I had been too much carried away by the 
truth of the character to observe the meanness of plot, and occasional obscurity” (vol 
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1, 362). Responsible for the financial success of the play, Macready was less 
interested in Strafford's internal plight than in the entertainment of external action. 
Recent critics such as Patricia Ball have also been displeased with what they perceive 
as a conflict between content and form in Strafford. However, in contrast to 
Macready's concerns, she emphasizes how Browning compromised his Romanticism 
by deferring to Macready's popular demands, and that in imitating the Elizabethan 
structure of Shakespeare's drama, the form of Browning's play conflicts with his 
interest in Strafford's internal self. With the composition of his first staged romantic 
drama, Browning had not yet found a sufficient form to convey his symbolic design; 
however, the progression of Strafford to King Victor and King Charles and then from 
these early plays to his two final verse dramas shows that Browning was moving from 
working within a popular form to finding a more original structure that would suit the 
experimental, philosophical drama that he was writing—albeit one that was 
essentially incompatible with the style of drama prevailing on the Victorian stage. 
In Browning's next play, King Victor and King Charles (1842), he continues to 
explore historical tragedy from a transcendental perspective whereby his protagonists 
are caught up in the progressive manifestation of soul. Where Strafford presents the 
tragedy of a man whose foundational symbol no longer embodies the truth for his age, 
in King Victor and King Charles Browning again explores the transition from 
kingship to democracy as a symbolic exploration of the soul as it is embodied in act 
throughout history. Divided into two acts, the form of King Victor and King Charles 
is more experimental and looks ahead to the symbolic structure of A Soul's Tragedy: 
the symbolic action of this early play juxtaposes the old form—embodied by the 
father, King Victor—with the emerging new form that is embodied in his son—the 
future King Charles—and Browning represents this symbolism in the compressed 
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structure of his play by separating it into part one, “King Victor,” and part two, “King 
Charles,” which each transpire over one day in the years 1730 and 1731 respectively. 
In focusing on the relationship between Victor Amadeus II, Duke of Savoy and 
King of Sardinia, and his son, Charles Emanuel III, Browning focuses the action of 
his mimetic plot on Victor’s attempt to reclaim his crown after he had abdicated in 
favour of Charles. Browning’s empirical account of the historical events surrounding 
this issue is anchored in the personal relationship between Victor and Charles. While 
Charles has always sought his father's love, his lack of interest in political intrigue in 
contrast to his brother, Philip, meant that Victor paid no attention to him, and when 
Philip, the heir to the throne, is killed, it only increases Victor's bitterness toward his 
younger son. Thus, when King Victor announces that he intends to abdicate the throne 
for his son to take his place, Charles is confused about his motives, believing that the 
only reason his father would abdicate the crown to him would be as part of a plan to 
prove that he is inept, which would then give the child of Victor's mistress, and future 
wife, a chance to take the throne. Victor tries to convince Charles that he wants to 
give up the crown because he is tired and desires peace in the last years of his life, but 
it soon becomes apparent that Victor's political machinations have turned the people 
and the nobles against him, and that in pledging allegiance to both Austria and Spain, 
both countries have made an alliance against him. Victor believes that Charles' 
devotion to him will mean that he will continue the political policies that will 
consolidate his absolute rule, and that Charles will not be held accountable for these 
unpopular policies in the same way as Victor because they were put in place before he 
had taken the throne. However, Victor is surprised and dismayed when Charles breaks 
away from his father's legacy and begins to take political actions that move away 
from an absolute monarchy and sow the seeds for democratic change.  
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Browning’s temporal plot presents a fully realized conflict between father and 
son, but in the embedded symbolic plot, he traces the historical transition of symbolic 
forms. This subtle meaning is illuminated in Charles' declaration to his wife, 
Polyxena, that in replacing his father: 
 a new world  
Brightens before me; he is moved away 
—The dark form that eclipsed it, he subsides 
Into a shape supporting me like you, 
And I, alone, tend upward, more and more 
Tend upward: I am grown Sardinia's King. (1. 2. ll. 354-9)  
Using the image of organic teleology, “I tend upward” and “I am grown Sardinia's 
King,” Browning reveals that Charles has not only gained political power in taking 
the crown but he has moved out of the darkness of his father's eclipse, the fading 
historical form, to be the new symbolic embodiment of noumenal soul. 
As in Sordello and Strafford, this progressive manifestation of soul is reflected 
in Charles’ increasing democratic action. At the start of part two, “King Charles,” we 
learn of Charles' success as a leader: he has appeased the people and the nobles and he 
has secured a treaty with Austria and Spain. Charles believes that he has brought 
about peace through “truthfulness” as opposed to Victor's political machinations, and 
even D'Ormea, who has been intricately involved with all of Victor's political 
intrigue, sees that Charles is a worthy leader and tries to warn him of his father's 
plans. D'Oremea's prediction that Victor will return is confirmed when Victor seeks to 
reclaim his crown because he fears that Charles' actions will ultimately undo the 
political dominion that he has consolidated for himself: 
I left you this the absolutest rule 
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In Europe: do you think I sit and smile,  
Bid you throw power to the populace— 
See my Sardinia, that has kept apart  
Join in the mad and democratic whirl 
Whereto I see all Europe haste full tide? 
England casts off her kings; France mimics England: 
This realm I hoped was safe. (2. 1. ll. 310-9) 
The conflict between Victor and Charles over the crown, between autocracy and 
democracy, symbolizes the struggle between old and new symbols. That Charles' year 
in power is symbolic of this new paradigm is emphasized when Charles tells his 
father “a year has wrought an age's change. / This people's not the people now, you 
once / Could benefit; nor is my policy / Your policy” (2. 2. ll. 307-9), and in his 
feeling that his father has come to “Restore the past—prevent the future!” (2. 2. ll. 
226-7). When Victor exclaims that he intends to keep the crown of Sardinia whole, 
Charles argues that the temporal power of the king is no longer an embodiment of 
God’s will; thus, he tells Victor to “Keep within your sphere and mine! / It is God's 
province we usurp on, else” (2. 2. 281-2). Charles knows that God is immutable soul, 
which is obfuscated when it is embodied in the various symbols of the temporal 
realm, yet he feels that it is his responsibility to find truth in the complex forms of the 
material world: “Here, blindfolded through the maze of things we walk / By a slight 
clue of false, true, right and wrong; / All else is rambling and presumption. I / Have 
sworn to keep this kingdom: there's my truth” (2. 1. ll. 284-7).  
Charles has the deep spiritual vision that allows him to see that autocratic 
kingship is no longer the expression of soul, and Victor makes it clear that all he 
wants from the crown are the “baubles,” the clothing of kingship, or what Carlyle 
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would call the difference between true and false in “Ceremonial Form”— the 
semblance that replaces the true reality when a form is no longer organically 
connected to the truth that it bodies forth in the world. Yet, although Charles 
recognizes Victor's falsehood, his love for his father makes it very difficult to defy his 
wishes. Polyxena, who shares Charles’ symbolic vision of history, recognizes that 
Charles is beginning to waver and she implores him not to forfeit his “soul's charge.” 
Polyxena’s language here is derived from Browning’s own symbolic vocabulary for 
symbolic embodiment. Declaring: “Body, that's much, —and soul, that's more—and 
realm, / That's most of all!” (2. 1. ll. 372-3), Polyxena argues that since the ideal and 
the real are united in Charles’ relationship to his realm, he is the prototypical symbol 
that gives meaning to all other modes of embodiment. In imploring Charles to “Pause 
here upon this strip of time / Allotted you out of eternity! / Crowns are from God: you 
in his name hold yours” (2. 2. ll. 253-5), Polyxena juxtaposes space and time with the 
ideal to show that Charles is the new mediating symbol that will body forth soul.  
Recognizing the significance of the paradigm shift that he represents, Charles 
agrees with D'Ormea that they should arrest Victor if he tries to return; however, the 
love that he has for his father inevitably leads him to relinquish the crown. The 
symbolism that Browning interweaves subtly throughout the play culminates in 
Victor's final speech when he finally realizes that he is the fading symbol of an 
outworn historical paradigm: witness to the love between Charles and Polyxena, 
Victor admits that “Hardly till this moment, / When I seem learning many other things 
/ Because the time for using them is past. / If ’t were to do again! That’s idly wished. / 
Truthfulness might prove policy as good / As guile” (ll. 345-50). Victor has a 
revelation that his re-established position as king is founded on semblance rather than 
the true reality: 
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Guile has made me King again. 
Louis—'t was in King Victor's time: —long since, 
When Louis reign'd and, also, Victor reign'd. 
How the world talks already of us two! 
God of eclipse and each discolour'd star, 
Why do I linger then? (2. 2. ll. 354-9) 
In this last speech of King Victor and King Charles, Browning uses the symbol of the 
forsaken or fading star, as he does in Strafford, to conceive of a symbol that no longer 
bodies forth soul. In having Victor place himself with the reign of Louis XIV, a 
proponent of the divine right of kings, which he emphasizes in italics, Browning 
shows, as he does in Strafford, that the absolute rule of monarchy is no longer the 
embodiment of the spiritual for the modern age. In reiterating Charles' own earlier 
association of his father with an eclipse, Victor's demonstrates the realization that he 
has come to where he now sees that in trying to re-establish the idea of absolute rule 
in the stead of democracy, he has obscured the light of divine truth. 
 In their biography Robert Browning's Dramatic Imagination, Kennedy and 
Hair view Victor's sudden collapse at this point of revelation as the “crowning 
weakness” of the play (74), yet our interpretation of Browning's success as a 
playwright here, and of the significance of Victor's death, very much depends on the 
dramatic tradition that we place him in. If, like Kennedy and Hair, we start from the 
assumption that Browning intended King Victor and King Charles to be an empirical 
historical study, Victor's death would indeed be a nonsensical ending to Browning's 
play; however, if we read the play as a romantic drama, we can see that Browning 
intended Victor's death to be a crucial symbolic moment in the play wherein the 
tragedy shifts from Charles, who will ultimately regain his crown, to Victor, who dies 
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“with kingship dying too” because it is by means of his death that the new symbolic 
forms will emerge. Although Victor declares that he does not repent of his life’s 
actions, actions that were truth for an earlier stage of history—a conviction that he 
shares with Browning—Victor relinquishes life in the same way that Eglamor dies 
after Sordello wins the bardic competition because his death symbolizes the demise of 
a particular historical paradigm in the progressive historical manifestation of soul. 
Browning wrote King Victor and King Charles with the intention that it would 
be performed, but the same problems that Browning found with rendering symbolic 
drama on stage in Strafford followed the latter as well. When Macready read through 
the play he exclaimed that it was “a great mistake” and told Browning that he would 
not stage it. Browning went ahead and published in the second series of Bells and 
Pomegranates, but reviewers found the play difficult to understand even as a closet 
drama. The Spectator lamented that Browning presented his own theory of a historical 
situation in an overly “allusive and mystical way” that made it “unintelligible” to 
those who were not familiar with the facts of the period (5, 400-1). Similarly, the 
review in The Athenaeum regrets that Browning's play, which is “full of thought, full 
of learning, full of fancy,” takes a form that is likely to confuse the “superficial 
observer” (5, 402-5). However, Richard Hengist Horne in his response to Browning's 
dramatic works in The Church of England Quarterly Review argued that King Victor 
and King Charles showed Browning “to possess the finest dramatic genius” and that 
it certainly had the potential to be staged. Nevertheless, in a comment reminiscent of 
Lamb's essay on Shakespeare, it is telling that they felt as an “intellectual drama” that 
it should have been read rather than performed, indicating that Browning’s play was 
incompatible with the empirical emphasis of the Victorian stage that was seen by 
many to preclude the faculty of imagination and the symbolic drama (6, 381-388). 
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It was only when Browning turned to writing for an “imaginary stage” that he 
was finally able to fully develop the symbolic plot that he had attempted to portray in 
his first two plays intended for the stage. The settings for these final plays are 
historical but are not taken directly from specific historical events, which leaves 
Browning more room to develop his symbolism and to expect less from the audience 
in terms of the detail of their historical knowledge. A Soul's Tragedy was published 
with Luria in the last series of Bells and Pomegranates in 1846, but Browning first 
mentions it in a letter to Domett in 1842, wherein he explained that after publishing 
The Return of the Druses, he would “finish a wise metaphysical play about a great 
mind and soul turning to ill” (5, 355-57). Again it is important to note Browning’s 
choice of language here when analyzing whether action in character refers to 
psychological or realistic drama, with its implications for the empirical interpretation 
of the dramatic monologue, or whether it refers to the symbolic drama of ideas, which 
suggests that the form of the monologue belongs to a different literary tradition. It is 
significant that Browning refers to the epistemology of “mind and soul” in his 
description of A Soul’s Tragedy, which he had already discussed at length in Sordello 
to explicate symbolic embodiment, and that he defined the play as “metaphysical” in 
nature, which also reveals its symbolic design.  
A Soul’s Tragedy develops out of his first symbolic history plays in that 
Browning goes from tracing the development of democracy as the progressive 
embodiment of soul back to sixteenth century medieval Italy where the Roman 
Catholic Church is still the living expression of noumenal truth. The romantic irony of 
the play lies not in championing autocracy at the time when democracy represents the 
manifestation of soul, but in championing democracy at the time when soul is 
expressed through autocracy. The protagonist of Browning’s play, Chiappino, is a 
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man of insight, who has Carlyle’s “Seeing-Eye” into the realm of soul, and as a 
revolutionary who opposes Papal rule, he seeks to realize his deep perceptions 
through freeing his city of Faenza from the authority of Rome. 
Browning emphasizes the symbolic design of A Soul's Tragedy in his subtitle 
to the play, which states that act one is “the poetry of Chiappino's life” and the second 
act “its prose.” Ryals, Poston and DuBois all agree that Chiappino's “poetry” lies 
within his liberal principles and that his prose represents the abandonment of these 
principles, but reading Browning’s subtitle through the symbolic language that he had 
developed in Sordello reveals the very different emphasis that he makes in the play. 
When Browning juxtaposed poetry and prose to elucidate the symbolic meaning of 
the title Bells and Pomegranates, it was one of a series of polarities that he used to 
denote the noumenal realm of soul and its manifestation in the real. In writing the 
second act in prose rather than in blank verse, Browning represents the embodied 
empirical world of time and space in contrast to poetry, the timeless Platonic truths. 
As such Chiappino's poetry is his perception of soul whereas his liberal politics, his 
prose, are but its particular material expression. Thus I would argue that the play is 
not about Chiappino's political vacillations and his failure to uphold his republican 
principles, as it has been previously thought; rather, it endeavors to explore the more 
specific philosophical question of whether the subtilized spirit, to borrow Browning’s 
phrase from his Essay on Shelley, requires revolution or whether it can be made 
manifest in already existing forms, which becomes the vehicle for a broader 
discussion about the complex nature of embodiment and the discernment of the 
spiritual in the progressive historical forms that it takes in the finite. 
Browning shows in the first act that Chiappino’s “poetry” is his perception of 
the ideal by making the same comparison between Chiappino and Luitolfo that he 
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makes in Sordello between Sordello and Taurello, the man who has insight into soul 
and the man of action who sees less but turns it to account in the world. As the man of 
insight, Chiappino is unable to articulate what he can spiritually see, which means that 
he has been unable to embody his deep vision in the world of sense and action. 
Chiappino resents the ability of his friend, Luitolfo, who does not see as deeply as he 
but can speak easily about what he has seen. He feels more acutely his own failure in 
being so close to an individual “Whose slight free loose and incapacious soul / Gave 
his tongue scope to say whate'er he would” (1. ll. 170-1), and laments his own 
“craven tongue, / These features which refuse the soul its way, / Reclaim Thou! Give 
me truth—truth, power to speak— / And after be sole present to approve / The spoken 
truth!—or, stay that spoken truth” (1. ll. 44-6). The emphasis on speech, or 
discoursing as Browning referred to it in his explanation for Bells and Pomegranates 
where it is juxtaposed with music, denotes the imperfect manifestation of soul, and in 
emphasizing that Chiappino is unable to speak in contrast to Luitolfo’s fluency, 
Browning symbolizes the struggle of the man of insight in comparison to the man of 
action. Up until the beginning of the play we learn that Chiappino, like Sordello, has 
experienced an existential stasis whereby he is unable to act upon soul, which is why 
he has also not been able to express his love for Eulalia nor his profound feelings of 
agony now that she is engaged to marry Luitolfo. 
 Since Chiappino is a man of insight rather than a man of action, Browning 
presents his democratic principles as constituting an abstract idealism, which will be 
significant for his discussion of history, political action and embodiment in the play: 
I trust in Nature for the stable laws 
Of Beauty and Utility. —Spring shall plant, 
And Autumn garner to the end of time: 
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I trust in God—the Right shall be the Right 
And other than the wrong, while he endures: 
I trust in my own soul, that can perceive 
The outward and the inward, nature's good  
And God's: so, seeing these men and myself, 
Having a right to speak, thus do I speak. (1. ll. 256-65) 
To realize these abstract ideals, Chiappino desires to free Faenza through a violent 
strike that will sunder the yoke of Papal rule. He resents the fact that Eulalia and 
Luitolfo have abandoned the idea of breaking completely with Rome through 
revolution and now advocate for patience and peace: 
Here's our Faenza birthplace; they send here 
A provost from Ravenna: how he rules, 
You can at times be eloquent about. 
“Then, end his rule! “ — “Ah yes, one stroke does that! 
But patience under wrong works slow and sure. 
Must violence still bring peace forth? He, beside, 
Returns so blandly one's obeisance! ah— 
Some latent human virtue may be lingering yet, 
Some human sympathy which, once excite, 
And all the lump were leavened quietly: 
So no more of striking for this time!” (1. ll. 94-104) 
In Browning’s mimetic plot, Chiappino’s own revolutionary designs have been 
thwarted in that his liberal stance has caught the attention of the provost who has 
banished him on pain of death from the city. Luitolfo goes to the provost to plead 
peacefully on behalf of his friend, but Chiappino insists that whatever the outcome of 
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the meeting might be, he will stay and fight for Faenza's liberty. It is at this point that 
Chiappino and Eulalia's discussion is interrupted by Luitolfo who frantically tells 
them the unexpected news that he has killed the provost, although it turns out later 
that the provost's injuries were not fatal. Chiappino quickly provides his friend with a 
previously prepared disguise and escape plan and exclaims valiantly that he will take 
the fall for his friend. However, in a surprising turn of events, the people hail 
Chiappino as the next provost, and when the Pope's Legate, Ogniben, comes from 
Ravenna at the beginning of the second act to invest power in this new provost, his 
long dialogues with Chiappino are crucial for the embedded symbolic plot. 
Critics have been unanimous in viewing Ogniben as a sophistical figure who 
lures Chiappino away from his republican principles, yet while it is clear that Ogniben 
makes an argument that obviously benefits him and the status quo, his arguments are 
certainly not specious. Indeed, Browning wrote to Elizabeth Barrett that he meant 
Ogniben to be “a man of wide speculation and narrow practice,—universal 
understanding of men and sympathy with them, yet professionally restricted claims 
for himself, for his own life” (12, 200-2). The specific problem that Ogniben 
addresses in the play is made more apparent when we know that Browning attended 
Carlyle's Lectures on Hero-Worship, and was reading his work on Cromwell while 
writing this play, and that subsequently many of Ogniben's speeches are strikingly 
similar to the thoughts of Carlyle about the problems inherent in revolution. When 
Ogniben says that he wants Chiappino to take the position of provost because he 
wants to find a reconciliation that will maintain order, he echoes Carlyle's argument in 
his lecture on “The Hero as King, Cromwell, Napoleon: Modern Revolutionism” that 
before Napoleon compromised his ideals, he was in fact a true democrat because he 
knew that authority was necessary in order for the Revolution to continue to prosper. 
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Carlyle says that Napoleon wanted “to bridle in that great devouring, self devouring 
French Revolution; to tame it, so that its intrinsic purpose can be made good, that it 
may become organic, and be able to live among other organisms and formed things, 
not as a wasting destruction alone” (150). Here Carlyle frames revolution and political 
change in terms of the transition from old to new symbolic forms, and he emphasizes 
that the ideal must always accommodate itself to, and grow within, the real, which is 
an important argument that Ogniben expresses in the play when he attempts to 
convince Chiappino that the young man's ideals can be embodied within the already 
existing forms that constitute the current autocratic political structure.   
On arrival in Faenza, Ogniben explains that his purpose has always been to 
help people realize their principles but only as he can reconcile them with already 
established forms. In a letter to Elizabeth Barrett, Browning explains that he removed 
from the play a long sermon spoken by Ogniben, which would have explained further 
his motivation for reconciling Chiappino's principles within the existing structure of 
government under the authority of Rome. In the letter, Browning tells Elizabeth that if 
he had kept the original sermon in the play, Ogniben would have explained how he 
himself actually believes in Chiappino's ideas of a pure republic and democratic 
equality, but that his favor to the papacy is part of a view with a longer scope—
holding that God's will is inextricably bound with Rome—which is a perspective that 
enables him to reject ideas that might benefit him personally. In removing the 
theological foundation from Ogniben's attempt to convince Chiappino that his 
principles can be realized under the authority of Rome, Browning brings more 
emphasis to the philosophical quandary of the play, which is of more importance to 
him than any theological motivation; however, if he had included it, Ogniben's 
sermon might have made it clearer that, at this specific moment in history, soul is still 
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embodied in the form of the Roman Catholic Church. Ogniben attempts to show 
Chiappino that the old political structure is entirely compatible with his ideals so as to 
achieve his own goal of reconciling revolution with the existing status quo, but it is 
also the vehicle for Browning’s symbolic plot in the play, which explores the question 
of whether a new conviction of how soul should be symbolically embodied in the 
material world can be reconciled with already existing forms.  
 Insisting that the only natural government is the “Best” and the “Wisest,” 
Ogniben echoes Carlyle's emphasis on the superiority of a heroic leader over the 
results of a ballot box. Ogniben observes in Chiappino that it is precisely the nobility 
of his soul, and its wide sympathy that enables him to recognize the equality of all 
men, that is self-defeating and precludes effective action. He asks Chiappino to 
consider “what is this perpetual yearning to exceed, to subdue, to be better than, and a 
king over, one's fellows,—all that you so disclaim,—but the very tendency yourself 
are most proud of, and under another form, would oppose to it,—only in a lower stage 
of manifestation?” (2. ll. 177-83). Browning’s choice of language here is critical 
because in arguing that the desire to lead people as king is but “a lower stage of 
manifestation” of the nobility of soul and the perception of truth that Chiappino 
claims for himself, he emphasizes that Ogniben is referring to the progressive nature 
of symbolic embodiment. Indeed Ogniben’s argument is similar to Carlyle's 
declaration in his On Heroes that the revolutionary leader is but a further progression 
of the divine role of the king: they are different manifestations of the same hero “who 
lives in the inward sphere of things, in the True, Divine and Eternal, which exists 
always, unseen to most, under the Temporary, Trivial” (99). Here Ogniben's “wide 
sympathy,” like Browning’s own, encompasses a transcendental awareness of history 
where he can see that the desire to lead above men is an earlier manifestation of the 
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same democratic truth that Chiappino perceives, and therefore he tries to convince 
him that autocracy is still a form that partakes of his original principles. 
 Chiappino finds Ogniben's arguments to be very persuasive and the aspirant 
leader begins to contemplate whether he can truly stay faithful to his principles if they 
are embodied in a form other than a democratic republic. Eulalia and Luitolfo are 
dismayed that Chiappino has been so quickly swayed by Ogniben's arguments, but 
Chiappino tries to explain to Eulalia that his principles have not changed and that he 
has only chosen to manifest them in an already existing form: 
Now, why refuse to see that in my present course I change no principles, only 
readapt them more adroitly? I had despaired of, what you may call the material 
instrumentality of life; of ever being able to rightly operate on mankind through 
such a deranged machinery as the existing modes of government: but now, if I 
suddenly discover how to inform these perverted institutions with fresh purpose, 
bring the functionary limbs once more into immediate communication with, and 
subjection to, the soul I am about to bestow on them—do you see?  Why should 
one desire to invent, as long as it remains possible to renew and transform? (2. 
ll. 220-32) 
Using Browning’s language of symbolic embodiment—body and soul, the material 
and the spiritual— Chiappino implores Eulalia to see that rather than abandoning their 
cause, he only wants to infuse soul into already existing forms so that they may 
embody truth once again. He presents her with an architectural metaphor to try and 
explain what he means by this: he asks her to imagine that he has the option of either 
building his new palace—as a metaphor for his government—on a completely empty 
building lot or of using the already constructed palace as a starting point for his new 
edifice. He concedes that the foundation of the old edifice is “ruinous” and “wrongly 
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constructed” but that he would rather “restore, enlarge, abolish or unite these to 
heart's content” than face the certain prospect of failure by starting to build without 
any tools or materials at all. This looks back to Sordello’s discovery that when the 
past forms of history are demolished to make room for the new forms, they leave 
behind the scaffolding for the next age that is integral to its structure, and it also 
reflects Carlyle’s belief that even the new symbols that will embody the ideal must 
continue to grow within the real rather than be “a wasting destruction alone.” 
Chiappino's believes his principles to remain unchanged, but he confesses to 
Ogniben that he is nervous that the people will perceive him to be inconsistent:  
though you and I may thoroughly discern—and easily, too—the right principle 
at the bottom of such a movement, and how my  republicanism remains 
thoroughly unaltered, only takes a form of expression hitherto commonly 
judged  (and heretofore by myself) incompatible with its existence,—when thus 
I reconcile myself to an old form of government instead of proposing a new 
one.” (2. ll. 372-79)  
Ogniben’s reiterates Chiappino’s own emphasis on “expression” to suggest the crucial 
symbolic idea of the play: “As for adding to the stock of truths,—impossible! Thus 
you see the expression of them is the grand business” (2. ll. 395-8). In repeating what 
he sees as significant in Chiappino’s word choice, Ogniben call attention to the 
philosophic importance of Browning’s language in that while soul is unchanging, it is 
expressed, or manifested in the material world in ways that will continually change, 
which is a stance that reflects Browning's own symbolic view of history. 
The tension between Ogniben's symbolic sense of history, and his own finite 
position as Legate, means that he takes it upon himself to show Chiappino that what 
he perceives of as false in history can still be seen as an embodiment of truth. 
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Ogniben links his philosophical observation to Chiappino's change of heart: “you 
have got a truth in your head about the right way of governing people, and you took a 
mode of expressing it which now you consider to be imperfect. But what then? There 
is truth in falsehood, falsehood in truth” (2. ll. 398-402). It is important to note here 
that Ogniben's arguments do not espouse philosophical relativism but rather a version 
of Browning's theory of embodiment. When soul embodies itself in the material world 
and enters into the categories of cause and effect, what is true becomes necessarily 
implicated in what is false, but for Browning the crucial point is that both manifested 
truth and falsity partake of the original truth; therefore, the embodied world is not 
meaningless, rather it is complicated because everything in it is meaningful. As he 
says in Fifine at the Fair: “Truth inside, and outside, truth also; and between / Each, 
falsehood that is change, as truth is permanence” (ll. 2182-3). It is key that Browning 
has his casuist, Don Juan, voice one of his deepest convictions about embodiment 
here, as his casuists so often do, not because it questions his foundational views about 
the possibility of transcendent truth and the ability of the poet to impart this truth, but 
rather because it provides Browning with a way to reiterate his central belief that with 
the sympathy of imagination it is possible to see truth in even its lowest expression or 
manifestation—as we see when Browning’s truths, which are everywhere formulated 
in his symbolic language, are articulated in the self-serving arguments of his sophists.  
Browning is emphatic about making this distinction in A Soul’s Tragedy. 
When Chiappino begins to mistake Ogniben's arguments for a kind of relativism, 
Ogniben insists that it is not. He explains that he has the “quickened eyesight,” the 
spiritual vision that gives him Browning’s sense of transcendent sympathy to see truth 
in falsity and beauty in ugliness, and he emphasizes that he always strives to refer 
these various qualities back to their origin in the absolute, or God: 
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I answer, “So I do; but preserve the proportions of my sympathy, however 
finelier or widelier I may extend its action.” I desire to be able, with a 
quickened eyesight, to descry beauty in corruption where others see foulness 
only: but I hope I shall also continue to see a redoubled beauty in the higher 
forms of matter, where already every body sees no foulness at all. I must retain, 
too, my old power of selection, and choice of appropriation, to apply to such 
new gifts; else they only dazzle instead of enlightening me.” (2. ll. 467-78) 
Browning’s choice of the nouns “selection” and “appropriation” and the verb “apply” 
all emphasize fitting the truth that is perceived for a particular purpose or bringing it 
to action, which reveals Ogniben’s interest in realizing the ideal. Ogniben argues that 
his gift of seeing the ideal must be “enlightening,” used to inform action, rather than 
“dazzle” him, which would result in an abstract idealism that precludes meaningful 
action. Ogniben, like Browning, says that discerning truth involves looking at both to 
soul and its embodiments in the forms of the finite world: “God has his Archangels 
and consorts with them—tho' he made too, and intimately sees what is good in the 
worm” (2. ll. 478-80). Thus Ogniben is Browning’s archetypal casuist, not merely 
because he is a sophist, but because his self-serving argument actually embodies the 
argument about the nature of progressive symbolic embodiment and the various 
manifestations of truth, which explains Browning’s repetition of Ogniben’s statement: 
“Observe, I speak only as you profess to think and, so, ought to speak: I do justice to 
your own principles, that is all” (2. ll. 480-82). Indeed, although Ogniben is acting on 
behalf of the Church, his arguments establish the symbolic context of history that the 
reader must perceive through his/her “cooperative fancy” so as to sympathize with 
and interpret the philosophic nature of Chiappino’s tragedy. 
As Chiappino still does not have this same kind of transcendent scope as 
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Ogniben, he uses a mathematical metaphor to help him elucidate Browning’s theory 
of embodiment: “I help men to carry out their own principles: if they please to say 
two and two make five, I assent, so they will but go on and say, four and four make 
ten” (2. ll. 365-8). Five is clearly not the sum of two and two; however, if this sum is 
instead assumed to be true, then ten as the sum of four plus four would follow 
logically from it and become, not only consistent, but true in its own right—thus a 
true statement may issue from a false one. Ogniben wants to show Chiappino that if 
he proceeded in a right fashion on the basis of a false supposition—in other words, if 
he came to support the political forms that he previously saw as false—he would in 
fact not be acting inconsistently, since all forms partake of the original truth. This is 
why Ogniben exclaims to Chiappino: “No man ever told one great truth, that I know, 
without the help of a good dozen of lies at least, generally unconscious ones” (2. ll. 
402-4). It is Ogniben's awareness of the nature of embodiment that leads him to 
declare that it is “through the contradictory expression” that “men should look 
painfully for, and trust to arrive eventually at, what you call the true principle at the 
bottom” (2. ll. 410-13). This is a crucial point in the play because it is this 
“contradictory expression” of truth that constitutes tragedy for Browning, and it is by 
means of the ironic space between soul and its symbolic embodiment that Browning, 
as the Maker-See, hopes to facilitate spiritual sight in his audience so that they too 
might perceive a relationship between the ideal and the real in the material world. 
Ogniben's philosophical arguments throughout the second act about truth and 
its expression in political forms, and his transcendent sense of history, illustrate what 
Browning meant when he said he intended Ogniben to be “a man of wide 
speculation” who has a “universal understanding of men and sympathy with them”; 
however, in the final scene when Ogniben tells Chiappino that he must profess 
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allegiance to himself as the representative of Rome and give up the man who attacked 
the provost so that he can be brought to justice before he is able to confer the position 
of provost upon him, we are also privy to Ogniben's own historical, theological 
position—what Browning saw as his “narrow practice” and “professionally restricted 
claims for himself, for his own life.” It is at this moment that Luitolfo returns to 
confess his role in the attack against the provost and that we learn of Chiappino’s 
sudden escape from the city. Chiappino’s indecision at the moment of mounting the 
steps, and his final inability to act either in his new role as provost or as an arbiter of 
revolution, reveals the central tragedy of the man of insight who is unable to express 
his deep vision of soul into the action of the real world. 
The critical consensus is that the tragic downfall of Browning’s protagonist, a  
“great mind and soul turning to ill,” is caused by Chiappino's original abandonment of 
his democratic goals, a conclusion determined by the fact that Chiappino's politics 
vacillate away from Browning's own self-proclaimed liberal politics; however, it is 
important to note that in A Soul's Tragedy, as in all of his plays, the emphasis is not 
placed on Browning's own commitment to a specific political cause but on the 
historical manifestation of noumenal soul. Thus the tragedy of Chiappino's soul, 
which is the very title of Browning’s play, is not that he lets down his republican 
stance; rather, the tragedy lies in the larger epistemological quandary that he faces 
when he sees that at this point in history, autocratic overthrow and the establishment 
of democratic rule does not constitute a viable form through which to symbolically 
express the truth of the age. Indeed, as Sordello surveys the progressive embodiment 
of soul throughout history as it is mirrored in increasing democratic action, he learns 
that the Church is a necessary step in the evolution of the absolute, and that one step 
of action before its allotted time effects no change: “If one step’s awry, one bulge / 
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Calls for correction by a step we thought / Got over long since, why, till that is 
wrought, / No progress!” (Sordello 5. ll. 230-33). In contrast to the historical moment 
of Strafford and King Victor and King Charles, the time period of A Soul’s Tragedy 
does not reveal autocratic rule to be a false form but rather in its earlier manifestation 
Browning presents it as a living expression of truth. Therefore, at this point in the 
symbolic movement of history, Chiappino’s idealism, which seeks to break with the 
Church, has no form through which to embody and realize his search for truth: it only 
results in an abstract idealism that cannot act in any way upon the world. 
Browning's discussion of Shelley's political idealism in his Essay on Shelley 
serves to explicate further the philosophical problems that he had hoped to explore 
through the medium of politics in the play. In Browning's analysis of the youthful 
Shelley, he argues that Shelley's power to “see” and to “idealize,” his ability to 
perceive soul, was accompanied by his desire to “contrive” and to “realize” these 
truths in the material world. Indeed it is Browning's perception of Shelley's tragedy—
of his space between the perception of the ideal and its embodiment in the real—that 
forms the prototype for so many of the protagonists of Browning's romantic dramas.  
In the Essay, Browning argues that Shelley’s problem lay in that he always 
sought to realize in the world what he first idealized in his mind; Shelley's desire to 
realize meant that he always sought remedies for the wrongs that he perceived, and 
that because he felt so strongly about the falsities that he saw, he came to defend a 
specific set of actions to such an extent that they themselves began to represent the 
great principles, which meant that he attacked “various great principles” if they 
appeared incompatible with the specific remedies that he had proposed (295). Thus 
Shelley saw the Church as equivalent to Christianity and sexual oppression as the 
same as marriage. The key here for Browning is that Shelley does not see that since 
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material forms are always evolving to be the next expression of soul, what are now 
seen as false forms do not invalidate the inner idea that they once bodied forth. 
Browning agrees with Carlyle in his Lectures on Hero-Worship that the Church was 
indeed a living embodiment of Christianity until it became, as with all material forms, 
merely tradition, a semblance divorced form its inner reality, whereupon 
Protestantism and political democracy became the new symbolic manifestation.  
Browning's inquiry into Shelley's political idealism gives insight into the 
foundation of Ogniben's philosophic discussions with Chiappino, in which he labors 
to convince the young revolutionary that Chiappino's ideals are not only compatible 
with his proposed remedy of revolution, but also with the very existing political 
structure that he has hitherto accused of being unjust. Yet this does not compromise 
Browning’s liberalism, as in the play it represents Browning's belief that the past 
forms of history should not be disregarded as false but merely as different 
manifestations of what is true, and that real vision requires us to separate the truth or 
principle from the specific form it takes in time. According to Browning, Shelley was 
gradually “leaving behind him this low practical dexterity, unable to keep up with his 
widening intellectual perception” so that: “Gradually he was raised above the 
contemplation of spots and the attempt at effacing them, to the great Abstract Light, 
and, through the discrepancy of creation, to the sufficiency of the First Cause. 
Gradually he was learning that the best way of removing abuses is to stand fast by 
truth. Truth is one, as they are manifold; and innumerable negative effects are 
produced by the holding up of one positive principle” (295).  
This is the problem that the tragedy hinges upon in the play: for Browning, 
when soul is manifested in the realm of cause and effect, it is bodied forth in different 
material forms that are continually evolving throughout history. He argues that 
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Shelley was beginning to look through the multiplicity of forms to the perfection of 
the first cause; he was beginning to separate the noumenal truths that he perceived 
through his imagination from their specific embodiments in the phenomenal. This is 
important to Browning because it was his conviction that it is more damaging to 
fixate on soul in one particular form than it is to realize that contradictory 
manifestations of truth still partake of soul, which is why he can hold simultaneously 
that “Truth is one, as they are manifold” (295).  
After Luitolfo returns and before Chiappino flees, he admits to Chiappino that 
although he does not fully understand his agreement with Ogniben, he can see that 
there “is some proof of your superior nature in this starting aside, strange as it seems 
at first” (2. ll. 637-8). Along with this confession, he reiterates the patience that he 
advocated to Chiappino in the first act: “I understand only the dull mule's way of 
standing stockishly, plodding soberly, suffering on occasion a blow or two with due 
patience” (2. ll. 641-4). Although Ogniben is dismissive of Luitolfo's return, he 
recognizes in Luitolfo's patient demeanor a future leader who might be able to 
reconcile his conception of the ideal within the complex realities of the world of 
forms. He exclaims to Luitolfo: “I understand it: it would be easy for you to die of 
remorse here on the spot and shock us all, but you mean to live and grow worthy of 
coming back to us one day” (2. ll. 657-60) It is this potential that Ogniben sees in 
Luitolfo that Eulalia realizes is the final vindication of her decision to choose Luitolfo 
over Chiappino: “I was determined to justify my choice, Chiappino,—to let Luitolfo's 
nature vindicate itself” (2. ll. 645-7). It is significant that the play ends on Ogniben's 
often repeated declaration that he has known four and twenty revolts, because it is he, 
like Browning, who knows that changes in the manifestations of soul are gradual and 
are usually effected through evolution and not revolution. 
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A Soul's Tragedy is Browning's most complicated play, and I would argue the 
most misunderstood. Confusion arises from two aspects of the play: the first is how 
Browning uses a political subject symbolically, and secondly from the ambiguous 
nature of Ogniben's character. Although Browning saw Ogniben as the moral center 
of the play, the fact that his philosophical arguments also serve his own agenda has 
led most critics to see him as a sophistical, dangerous figure. Although Elizabeth 
Barrett saw the play as something very new, and admired the power of its 
philosophical thought, especially in the second act, she admitted to feeling confused 
over Ogniben: “Your Ogniben (here is my only criticism in the ways of objection) 
seems to me almost too wise for a crafty worldling—tell me if he is not!” (12, 188-
90). Her comments point to the common problem of reconciling the clarity and depth 
of Ogniben's philosophical thought with the fact that his arguments are also self-
serving in that they ensure subservience to Rome's rule. 
Browning himself was concerned that the play would be misunderstood. In a 
letter to his future wife, he expressed his reservations about publishing A Soul's 
Tragedy after Luria to close his series of Bells and Pomegranates because he was 
unsure that his readers would understand the  “main drift of it”—the symbolic nature 
of the tragedy—and was concerned that they would miss the overall moral of the 
play: 
Two nights ago I read the 'Soul's Tragedy' once more, and though there were 
not a few points which struck me as successful in design and execution, yet on 
the whole I came to a decided opinion, that it will be better to postpone the 
publication of it for the present. It is not a good ending, an auspicious wind-up 
of this series; subject-matter and style are alike unpopular even for the literary 
grex that stands aloof from the purer plebs, ...so that, if 'Luria' is clearish, the 
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'Tragedy' would be an unnecessary troubling of the waters. Whereas, if I printed 
it first in order, my readers, according to custom, would make the 
(comparatively) little they did not see into, a full excuse for shutting their eyes 
at the rest, and we may as well part friends, so as not to meet enemies. But, at 
bottom, I believe the proper objection is to the immediate, first effect of the 
whole—its moral effect—which is dependent on the contrary supposition of its 
being really understood, in the main drift of it. Yet I don't know; for I wrote it 
with the intention of producing the best of all effects—perhaps the truth is, that 
I am tired, rather, and desirous of getting done, and 'Luria' will answer my 
purpose so far. (12, 69-70) 
Browning recognized that the philosophical subject matter and symbolic style would 
prove unpopular for readers. As the Maker-See, Browning wanted to facilitate 
spiritual sight in his readers, but he feared that even his more insightful readers might 
miss the deeper meaning of the symbolic plot embedded in A Soul’s Tragedy.  
Browning was much more confident that Luria, the last play that he wrote 
before abandoning verse drama altogether, would be understood. Luria continues 
Browning's symbolic discussion of embodiment in A Soul’s Tragedy, but it also 
engages the question of epistemology and how embodiment is perceived, which is 
also the central symbolic predicament of the group of plays that I will discuss in the 
next chapter. In Luria, Browning presents the tension between Luria's Eastern nature 
and the Western Florentine army leaders as a symbolic exploration of the difference 
between feeing and fancy— the perception of the noumenal—and the reasoning 
faculty—the logical interpretation of the sensory perceptions of the world of cause 
and effect. This is crucial for Browning’s exploration into the tragedy of historical 
forms because it is feeling and the fancy that sees form as the embodiment of soul 
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whereas the intellect can only perceive the material in its empirical relations. This 
emphasis again on spiritual sight is significant because although Browning sees 
democracy as an inevitable and welcome part of the progressive manifestation of soul, 
he also asserts, in the same way that Elizabeth Barrett does in her discussion of poetry 
in Aurora Leigh, the enduring need for the individual poet—the Maker-See whose 
office it is to reveal the relationship between the ideal and the real. 
As with A Soul's Tragedy, Browning emphasizes the symbolic form of the 
play when he says that it is written in the “high fantastical style” (10, 233-6) and 
again when he explains in a letter to Elizabeth Barrett that “It is all in the long 
speeches—the action, proper, is in them—they are no descriptions or 
amplifications—but therein a drama of this kind, all the events, (and interest), take 
place in the minds of the actors” and he compares this to his method in Paracelsus (11, 
306-12). It is important to note here that Browning is not talking about “mind” and 
interiority in terms of psychology, but, as he asserts in Sordello, mind in the romantic 
paradigm is the embodiment of soul in thought, which expresses the relationship 
between soul and its manifestation in act that comprises the inward/outward action of 
symbolic drama.  As with A Soul’s Tragedy, Luria is historical but it is only loosely 
based on the fifteenth century animosity between Florence and Pisa, which provides 
the external framework in which Browning embeds his symbolic plot. 
Critics have often pointed out that Luria is derivative of Shakespeare's 
Othello, but rather than being an unconscious imitation, as DeVane suggests, I would 
argue that Browning consciously rewrote Othello to convey his symbolic purpose in 
the play. In making Luria “a Moor of Othello's country” (10, 97-101), Browning takes 
up the issue of race as a means to explore the relationship between emotion and 
thought in his own day; yet, crucially, Browning's discussion of passion and reason no 
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longer refers conceptually to the Christian dichotomy between the sensual bodily 
nature of man and reason, which is the voice of God in man, but to the philosophical 
paradigms of idealism and empiricism. Luria's passion is the stamp of his Eastern 
nature, but his passion does not represent feeling in the empirical sense—which refers 
to subjective, experiential emotions—but rather feeling in the German Romantic 
sense, which, as Bonaparte has shown, means the intuition of something transcendent. 
If this distinction is missed, as it is by Lawrence Poston, who, reading Browning's 
political plays in the tradition of empiricism, views Luria as a conflict between 
emotion and reason, then the symbolic plot is missed in our analysis of the play. 
Browning's symbolic concept of the East in Luria contrasts to Shakespeare's 
medieval view in that it does not conceive of the East as primitive in a savage or 
uncivilized way, but rather as being closer to the inner kernel of religious truth. It is 
true that Shakespeare only uses this dichotomy symbolically to convey the conflict 
between passion and reason; but for Shakespeare Eastern passion represents the 
fallible flesh, whereas for Browning Eastern feeling is that which apprehends soul. 
Luria's proximity to religious truth is spiritual rather than theological, which is 
reiterated by the fact that his actual creed is never discussed, whereas Othello is 
clearly demarcated as a Christian. Browning's reveals his spiritual concept of the East 
when Luria exclaims to Domizia that God is still immanent in that part of the world 
and that only in the East can man intuit God's divine presence: 
My own East! 
How nearer God we were! He glows above 
With scarce an intervention, presses close 
And palpitatingly, His soul o'er ours: 
We feel him, nor by painful reason know! 
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The everlasting minute of creation 
Is felt there; now it is, as it was then; 
All changes at his instantaneous will, 
Not by operation of a law 
Whose maker is elsewhere at other work. 
His hand is still engaged upon his world—. (5. ll. 228-38)  
Luria, as a Moor, embodies the concept of feeling that can intuit the noumenal realm 
of soul. Significantly, Luria accesses the divine through intuition and not through the 
intellect: “We feel Him, nor by painful reason know!” Reason, which for Shakespeare 
is the voice of God in man, is conceived by Browning as the faculty that perceives 
and interacts with only the facts and observations of the material world, and he places 
this faculty symbolically in the West. Thus, just as the conceptual meanings of 
passion and feeling have been inverted, so have the implications of reason. 
The central symbol of Browning's final play is of course Luria himself: on the 
level of the mimetic plot, he is a fully realized human character who is a noble 
military leader, a commander of the Florentine Forces; yet, in the symbolic plot of 
ideas, he is transcendent feeling and the intuition of the imagination, and like so many 
of Browning's protagonists, Luria seeks to embody the perceptions of his soul in the 
forms of the material realm. Domizia sees this desire in Luria and he is grateful to her 
that she has the vision to intuit the divine inner purpose of things:  
And here stand you—you, lady, praise me well! 
But yours—(your pardon)—is unlearned praise: 
To the motive, the endeavour,—the heart's self, 
Your quick sense looks: you crown and call aright 
The soul o' the purpose, ere 'tis shaped as act, 
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Takes flesh i' the world, and clothes itself a king. (3. ll. 66-71) 
Here Browning utilizes the symbolic language that he developed in Sordello, and 
takes from Carlyle, to show that Domizia sees the endeavour of romantic action to be 
the embodiment of soul. It is this manifestation that effects action in the material 
world that constitutes Carlyle’s king, the hero in his many different incarnations 
through time who acts upon a perception of the ideal. Indeed, as a Carlylian hero, 
Luria's importance is not only externally political but is internally spiritual. 
Luria comes to the West, which as the intellect represents the material world 
in the play, so that he may embody the ideal in the real, reflecting Browning's belief 
that the divine must be known in the material world and not only through the self-
consciousness of soul. An early image that Browning uses to show how Luria wants 
to bring the East and the West together, the ideal and the real, is in Luria's sketch for 
the new Duomo: Jacapo reports to Braccio that “Lady Domizia / Spoke of the 
unfinished Duomo, you remember; / That is his [Luria's] fancy how a Moorish front / 
Might join to, and complete, the body” (1. ll. 122-5). Luria knows that intuition—“the 
East's gift”—“Is quick and transient—comes, and lo, is gone— / While Northern 
thought is slow and durable” (5. ll. 243-5), and he explains how his mission to Italy 
was reserved for someone like him, “Who, born with a perception of the power / And 
use of the North's thought for us of the East, / Should have remained, turned 
knowledge to account, / Giving thought's character and permanence / To the too 
transitory feelings there—” (5. ll. 246-12). In another metaphor for symbolic 
embodiment, Luria exclaims that in coming to Florence, he wished to inscribe “God's 
message plain in mortal words” (5. l. 252). 
Browning shows that in traveling West, Luria feels “a soul grow on me that 
restricts / The boundless unrest of the savage heart!” (1. ll. 323-4); however, rather 
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than being a taint of uncontrollable passion such as that which plagues Othello, 
Luria's quick feeling is the undulating essence of inner soul that, in yet another 
metaphor for embodiment, he compares to a wild sea that, curtailed by land, is finally 
channeled into narrower brooks—a popular metaphor for organic form: 
The sea heaves up, hangs loaded o'er the land, 
Breaks there and buries its tumultuous strength; 
Horror, and silence, and a pause awhile: 
Lo, inland glides the gulf-stream, miles away, 
In rapture of assent, subdued and still, 
'Neath those strange banks, those unimagined skies! (1. ll. 325-30)  
Although Luria has noble intentions, the West—the province of the intellect—does 
not at first recognize Luria's fresh instinct. Hussain, a fellow Moor and friend of 
Luria, warns him: “I doubt and fear. There stands a wall /  'Twixt our expansive and 
explosive race / And those absorbing, concentrating men. / They use thee” (2. ll. 81-
3). Here it is important to note that Browning is not suggesting an opposition between 
the Orient and the Orientalist, but rather an epistemological distinction between the 
explosive force of noumenal soul and the molding and fashioning of the intellect. 
The mimetic plot follows the Italian response to Luria, as Braccio, the 
Commissary of the Republic of Florence, does not trust him despite the fact that he 
led Florence to a victory over Pisa. Braccio believes that Luria placed himself in a 
position of power that he will not want to relinquish after the end of the war; thus, he 
plans to betray Luria by accusing him of treason. Even Domizia, who has recognized 
Luria's nobility from the start, expects Luria to react vengefully against Florence and 
even wishes him to punish Florence, an act that she has been hoping for all along. Yet 
when Braccio confronts Luria about his suspicions, the symbolic nature of this dispute 
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is made clear: it is not just Luria as an army commander that Braccio disbelieves in 
but the concept of the Carlylian hero as well. Carlyle argues that when the 
“Ableman,” or hero, is found,” the man of insight who can act on soul, “he should be 
raised to the “supreme place” and loyally reverenced. Indeed “the Ablest Man; he 
means also the truest-hearted, justest, the Noblest Man: what he tells us to do must be 
precisely the wisest, fittest, that we could anywhere or anyhow learn” (123). Mocking 
Carlyle's idea of the hero, Braccio exclaims to Domizia and Luria: 
Call any man the sole great wise and good!  
But shall we therefore, standing by ourselves, 
Insult our souls and God with the same speech? 
There, swarm the ignoble thousands under Him: 
What marks us from the hundreds and tens? 
Florence took up, turned all one way the soul  
Of Luria with its fires, and here he glows! (3. ll.220-26 ) 
Braccio refuses to believe that one soul could influence the people, arguing that 
Florence “binds so many, that she grows out of them—” (3. l.186). Reiterating that he 
will not “stake this permanence / On any one man's faith” (3. ll.201-2), in declaring to 
secretary, Lapo, that the intellect and not intuition will rule Florence: “Intellect / May 
rule her, bad or good as chance supplies: / But intellect it shall be, pure if bad, / And 
intellect's tradition so kept up / Till the good come” (1. ll. 190-4), Braccio refuses to 
recognize the province of feeling: “There, my Lapo! / A Moorish front ill suits our 
Duomo's body: / Blot it out—and bid Luria's sentence come” (1. ll. 209-11).  
Perceiving the purity of Luria's soul as it is reflected in his reverential love for 
Florence, Lapo assures Braccio “that man believes in Florence as the Saint / Tied to 
the wheel believes in God” (1. ll. 108-9). Lapo had earlier witnessed the extent of 
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Luria’s devotion to Florence as he was repairing the half-effaced Duomo: “while he 
spoke of Florence, turned [to the Duomo]/ As the Mage Negro King to Christ the 
Babe” (1. ll. 382-3). Even Puccio, who was displaced as commander by Luria, 
believes in his integrity, and he is reluctant to accept the position of commander when 
it is offered back to him because he knows the extent to which the troops revere 
Luria: “I want men, / The hearts as well as hands—and where's a heart / But beats 
with Luria, in the multitude” (4. ll. 29-31). Puccio desires a spiritual connection with 
his men as well as a temporal one, but he is beholden by his military duty to take the 
post although he feels in his heart the wrongs that have been committed against Luria. 
Despite taking his place, Puccio will always be reminded of how his “better nature, 
fresh-inspired, / Mounted above me to its proper place!” (4. ll. 77-78). Echoing 
Carlyle’s reverential attitude toward the hero, Puccio emphasizes that Luria’s 
transcendent significance makes him a symbol for men and that as such he should 
oversee the actions of himself and the army that he is supposed to lead. 
Browning shows that Luria's mission to give form to his soul rests on his faith 
in Florence as a symbol. Consequently, when his noble and honest foe, Tiburzio, tries 
to tell Luria about Florence's treachery, he refuses to act on what he has discovered: 
And act on what I read? What act were fit? 
If the firm-fixed foundation of my faith 
In Florence, who to me stands for Mankind 
—if that break up and, disemprisoning 
From the abyss...Ah friend, it cannot be. (2. ll. 240-4)  
Without Florence, Luria has no symbol to mediate between the noumenal aspect of 
his inward soul and his outward actions in the world. In words that echo Othello's 
existential despair upon losing his faith in Desdemona, Luria laments the loss of 
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Florence: “Oh world, where all things pass and nought abides, / Oh life, the long 
mutation—is it so?” (2. ll. 269-70). Without Florence, Luria fears formlessness and 
chaos; yet this is not the biblical chaos before creation, but a romantic conception of 
the amorphous, divine, inner soul of all and every creation. Thus, despite their deceit, 
Luria decides that he must retain his belief in Florence and in the intellect: 
Yes—when the desert creature's heart, at fault 
Amid the scattering tempest's pillared sands, 
Betrays its steps into the pathless drift— 
The clam instructed eye of man holds fast  
By the sole bearing of the visible star, 
Sure that when slow the whirling wreck subside, 
The boundaries, lost now, shall be found again,— 
The palm-trees and the pyramids over all. 
Yes: I trust Florence: Pisa is deceived. (2. ll. 290-8) 
Rather than be left adrift amongst the maelstrom of the desert sandstorm, Luria fixes 
himself upon the symbol of Florence, his “visible star,” in order to give form to his 
unbodied soul. Now that Luria is aware of the treacherous accusations of treason, 
Puccio warns Braccio that he could turn his indignant troops against Florence or else 
join the Pisan troops; but Luria knows that if he takes revenge, it would mean that “I 
ruin Florence, teach her friends mistrust, / Confirm her enemies in harsh belief” (4. ll. 
286-7). Rather than destroy Florence, the symbol that anchors him in the real, Luria 
drinks a phial of poison, declaring that, “This was my happy triumph-morning: 
Florence / Is saved: I drink this, and ere night,—die! Strange” (4. ll. 327-8).  
Luria’s enduring loyalty to Florence is demonstrated when he still visits 
Puccio after he has imbibed the fatal poison to give the new commander strategic 
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advice that will ensure the ultimate dominion of Florence against her enemies even 
though he knows they have betrayed him. Puccio is overwhelmed with gratitude that 
Luria has chosen to help him, which leads to a revelation about Luria's truth and 
nobility. Prostrating himself before Luria, Puccio cries:   
I am yours now,—a tool your right-hand wields. 
God's love, that I should live, the man I am, 
On orders, warrants, patents and the like, 
As if there were no glowing eye i' the world 
To glance straight inspiration to my brain, 
No glorious heart to give mine twice the beats! 
For, see—my doubt, where is it?—fear? 't is flown! (5. ll. 99-105) 
In a crucial symbolic moment in the play, Puccio realizes that up until knowing Luria, 
he has lived on “orders, warrants, patents,” or within the realm of language, reasoning 
and logic, whereas Luria’s “glowing eye”—his spiritual sight—and his 
“inspiration”—his divine feeling— has brought knowledge of soul to Puccio’s 
“brain,” which for Browning is the fashioning faculty. Browning states this view of 
the relationship between soul and mind definitively in a letter to Mrs. FitzGerald 
wherein he praises Schopenhauer’s concept of will and representation and compares it 
to his own foundational idealism. Writing about his striking affinity with the German 
philosopher, he exclaimed that he had always believed in the supremacy of soul 
which “is above and behind the intellect which is merely its servant” and that he had 
based his whole life upon this conviction (McAleer 34-5). It is important to note that 
Browning italicizes “behind” to place emphasis on his notion that the divine 
perceptions apprehended by the soul are embodied in thought, which mirrors the ideal 
foundation of reality for Browning. In the symbolic plot, Luria—as the soul of the 
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East— helps Puccio recognize that up until now he has lived merely in the material 
world without acting upon or acknowledging the noumenal realm. 
Luria also brings about this crucial revelation in Domizia about the 
relationship between soul and its embodiment in forms. Following Puccio, Domizia 
recognizes that Luria has “brought fresh stuff / For us to mould, interpret and prove 
right,— / New feeling fresh from God, which, could we know / O' the instant, where 
had been our need of it?” (5. ll. 263-6). Domizia realizes that it is Luria, as the man of 
insight and feeling, “whose life re-teaches us what life should be, / What faith is, 
loyalty and simpleness” (5. ll.267-8), and who reveals that the forms, symbolized by 
the West, are no longer the organic embodiment of truth: 
All, once revealed but taught us so long since 
That, having mere tradition of the fact,— 
Truth copied falteringly from copies faint, 
The early traits all dropped away,—we said 
On sight of faith like yours, “So looks not faith 
We understand, described and praised before. (5. ll. 269-74) 
In this very abstract passage, Browning is discussing the embodiment of the noumenal 
in the forms of the material world: these symbols are “Truth copied falteringly from 
copies faint” —they are derived from the material, which is itself a manifestation of 
soul that can only ever be partial in time and space. For Browning, like Carlyle, 
tradition refers to those forms that overtime are divorced from their essential content, 
which requires the hero, who has the divine sight into the true reality that informs 
empirical phenomena, to reveal this discrepancy. Through Luria, “trace by trace / Old 
memories reappear, old truth returns, / Our slow thought does its work, and all's 
reknown / Oh, noble Luria!” (5. ll. 276-9). His “feeling fresh from God” has brought 
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back what Carlyle sees as the desired “veracity, a natural spontaneity in forms” 
(129)—the vital connection between the transcendent and its embodiment in the real.  
Tiburzio also proclaims the magnetic influence that Luria has had on him and 
valorizes the need of the individual spiritual hero that Braccio had fervently rallied 
against: “A people is but the attempt of many / To rise to the completer life of one; / 
And those who live as models for the mass / Are singly of more value than they all. / 
Such a man are you, and such a time is this, / That your sole fate concerns a nation 
more / Than much apparent welfare” (5. ll. 299-305). Thus the symbolic significance 
in Luria lies in the fact that he is a Maker-See poet. While Browning views the 
teleological manifestation of soul in history as comprising a greater awareness of 
wider humanity that takes the form of democratic action, he also emphasizes the need 
at all times throughout history for the Maker-See, the individual who might act less in 
the real world but whose function is to reveal the relationship between the ideal and 
the real. Indeed, Browning uses Domizia’s exact phrase “tradition of a fact” when he 
says in his Essay on Shelley that there is a need for a new poet when “the world is 
found to be subsisting wholly on the shadow of a reality, on sentiments diluted from 
passions, on the tradition of a fact, the convention of a moral, the straw of last year's 
harvest” (286). Tiburzio reiterates Browning’s conviction about the role of the poet in 
facilitating the transition from old to new forms when he implores Luria not to leave 
but to “keep but God's model safe, new men will rise / To take its mould, and other 
days to prove / How great a good was Luria's glory” (5. ll. 309-11).  
Luria is astonished at the reversal of his fortune and looks to Braccio, who has 
been his staunchest foe, for a final confirmation of his redemption. In begging for 
Luria's forgiveness, Braccio acknowledges “His lapse to error, his return to 
knowledge” (5. l. 322)—a different kind of knowledge that can perceive spiritual 
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truth—and the need for the man of insight in illuminating this distinction. Declaring 
the grandeur and glory of Luria's future, Braccio calls on him to speak, but Luria has 
already fallen down dead. Similarly to Puccio and Domizia, Braccio’s revelation has 
come too late to save Luria. Although Elizabeth Barrett praised Luria, she did not 
agree with Luria's death and what she perceived as Luria’s unheroic suicide. 
Browning, however, explained that Luria's decision to take his own life is driven by 
his need to uphold Florence as a symbol, in the same way that Strafford dies for the 
king:  
Observe only, that Luria would stand, if I have plied him effectually with 
adverse influences, in such a position as to render any other end impossible 
without the hurt to Florence which his religion is, to avoid inflicting—passively 
awaiting, for instance, the sentence and punishment to come at night, would as 
surely inflict it as taking part with her foes. His aim is to prevent the harm she 
will do herself by striking him, so he moves aside from the blow.  
When Browning says that Florence is Luria's religion, he intends a Carlylian 
conception of religion— not the theological beliefs of a particular creed, but in the 
way in which mankind feels himself to be spiritually related to the noumenal realm. 
Browning explains that as Luria's religion, Florence is a symbol that mediates 
between the transcendent realm of soul and its manifestation in the real world and that 
he dies in order to retain its vital connection.  
Elizabeth had also hoped for a more developed role for Domizia, and although 
Browning had wanted to grant her wishes by developing Domizia's feelings for Luria, 
he felt that ultimately her role had fulfilled his symbolic design: “I meant to make her 
leave off her own projects through love of Luria. As it is, they in a manner fulfil 
themselves, so far as she has any power over them, and then, she being left 
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unemployed, sees Luria, begins to see him, having hitherto seen only her own ends 
which he was to further.” Indeed, the ability to see Luria is the meaning behind the 
play's tragedy. Browning’s romantic irony lies in the fact that Luria's comrades, and 
the intellectual faculty that they represent, have realized too late the nature and means 
of their spiritual salvation, but it is precisely through the tragedy of Luria's suicide 
that Browning as a Maker-See awakens them and the reader to the soul that girds the 
material world. Indeed, Elizabeth recognized this as the symbolic meaning of the play 
when she wrote to Browning praising Luria as: “a magnificent work—a noble 
exposition of the ingratitude of men against their 'heroes,' and (what is peculiar) an 
humane exposition ... not misanthropical, after the usual fashion of such things: for 
the return, the remorse, saves it—and the 'Too late' of the repentance and 
compensation covers with its solemn toll the fate of persecutors and victim” (12, 57-
60). She saw that the tragedy did not reflect a skepticism on Browning's part 
regarding Luria as a hero, which she place in quotation marks to emphasize its 
Carlylian symbolic meaning, but rather that his demise served as the final recognition 
of his spiritual significance that comprised the meaning of the play. 
 Browning was right in his prediction that A Soul’s’ Tragedy would prove to be 
unpopular as it was barely noted by critics in the reviews of the final instalment of 
Bells and Pomegranates. Luria received praise, but it confirmed for the reviewers that 
Browning’s plays were too symbolic and philosophical to be rendered on the 
contemporary stage. Indeed, The New Monthly Belle Assemblée observed that as “an 
heroic production,” Browning’s last verse drama was a: 
beautiful truth idealized; a creation that could only have emanated from a mind 
accustomed to find its daily food in the noblest aspirations of humanity. We do 
not apprehend this drama was ever intended for theatrical representation, 
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although we can understand how actors of genius might in its embodiment 
delight a cultivated and sympathising audience; but it possesses none of the 
claptrap effects and bustling activity which are necessary to please the general 
taste, lowered and corrupted as it has been by the greedy seekers of an 
evanescent popularity. (13, 395-7) 
In their review of Luria, Douglas Jerrold’s Shilling Magazine argued that the modern 
degradation of the theater meant that: “The theatre and Mr. Browning’s dramas are 
never likely to come in contact; not at all events until, as in the early days of our true 
drama, the most refined minds, and therefore the comparatively few, again visit the 
playhouse as a place to study nature and philosophy. The high drama was always 
played in its entirety, and always must be, to the reflecting few” (13, 393-4). In The 
Examiner, John Forster complimented Luria “This is writing of no ordinary kind,” 
but he noted “if Mr. Browning’s tone of treatment were simpler, less remote, less 
abstrusely metaphysical, the stage would in him have found its noblest supporter in 
these latter days” (12, 384-7). Both the praise and criticisms that Browning received 
regarding his historical plays testify to the fact that he was writing philosophic and 
symbolic drama, which, although perceived to be unsuitable for the stage, has far 




The Irony of Love: Forms of Knowledge in The Return of the Druses, A Blot in the 
'Scutcheon and Colombe's Birthday 
 
While Browning’s history plays explore the relationship of history to the 
romantic, symbolic mode, he turns to the concept of love in his other plays to express 
the idea of symbolic embodiment. In Browning’s poetic study of the classical and the 
romantic paradigms in Sordello, the narrator asks how it is that the Greeks, who 
perfected the fusion of spirit and form, can truly love, a question which can be 
explained by Browning's conviction that love connects mankind with the noumenal 
aspect of the world that transcends material reality. Friedrich and August Schlegel 
argue that the vital combination of Northern heroism and Christianity created the 
concept of chivalric love, an internally driven feeling that embodies the desire for and 
reverence of a higher power that they see as the definition of the romantic age. Thus 
Friedrich Schlegel argues that romantic art always evokes spiritual feeling, and that 
“the source and soul of these emotions is love, and the spirit of love must hover 
everywhere invisibly visible in romantic poetry” (99). This also becomes a question 
of epistemology for Schlegel in that “it cannot be grasped forcefully and 
comprehended mechanically” (99) by the logical faculties of the intellect, but “only 
the imagination can grasp the mystery of this love and present it as a mystery” (100). 
Therefore, in the endeavor to reveal the inward spiritual meaning of the external 
material realm, love is central to the new mythology of the objective poet as to love is 
to see the material as “a hint of something higher, the infinite, a hieroglyph of the one 
eternal love and the sacred fullness of life of creative nature” (100). Love in the 
romantic paradigm reveals the real to be a symbol that bodies forth the ideal. 
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Browning conceives of love in this religious and philosophic sense as the 
vehicle through which mankind feels connected to the deeper noumenal reality that 
underlies the phenomenal world. The love of God is also central to Browning's 
concept of symbolic embodiment in that the Incarnation of Christ, the expression of 
divine love in the material realm, symbolizes the aspect of God that is intelligible to 
man; therefore, human love is the expression of the infinite love of God. Yet, as the 
mediator between human and divine, the real and the ideal, love also comprises the 
space of romantic irony. The misapprehension of love as belonging to solely the 
physical or spiritual realm becomes the site of Browning’s irony in The Return of the 
Druses and A Blot in the ’Scutcheon, and as in Luria, the epistemological nature of 
these earlier tragedies is compressed more abstractly in his final examination of the 
same subject in Colombe’s Birthday where Colombe’s two suitors, Berthold and 
Valence, juxtapose the faculties of mind and imagination. In Browning’s only 
comedy, he presents the relationship between love and symbolic embodiment, which 
he also hoped to elucidate through the tragic irony of his earlier plays. 
Browning first mentions love as the central theme of The Return of the Druses 
(1843) as early as 1837 in a letter to Miss Haworth when he professes his intention to 
embark upon “a subject of the most wild and passionate love, to contrast with the one 
I mean to have ready in a short time [King Victor and King Charles]” (3, 255-8). He 
writes that he already has had “many half-conceptions, floating fancies” about a 
suitable subject for his play, but he ponders “what circumstances will best draw out, 
set forth this feeling?” (3, 255-8). Finally, Browning settled upon the religious tenets 
of the Druses to symbolically explicate his philosophic exploration of love in the play: 
the Druses' belief in the one ineffable God who manifests Himself in successive 
incarnations, the last of which was Hakem-Biamr-Allah the Third Fatemite Caliph, 
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brings the concept of embodiment to the forefront of the play and conveys the irony 
that arises from a love that belongs to and yet transcends the embodied world.  
In The Return of the Druses, both the realistic action of the empirical plot and 
the embodied ideas of the symbolic plot unfold from the deception of Browning's 
protagonist, Djabal, who has falsely professed to be the reincarnation of the Hakeem. 
Djabal feels guilty about his dissimulation, but he tries to assuage his feelings by 
thinking of his lifelong quest to help the Druses. After traveling the world to seek 
allies for his tribe, he asks “could I call / My mission aught but Hakeem's? Promised 
Hakeem / More than performs the Djabal—you absolve?” (2. ll. 53-55). Djabal's close 
friend, Khalil, explains to Karshook, a fellow Druse, that without Djabal, the Druses' 
tribe would remain subject to the Christian Knights of Rhodes who have kept them in 
bondage under the authority of a corrupt prefect ever since they fled from Lebanon 
and sought their help in escaping the reach of the Ottoman Empire. Although one 
knight, Loys of Bretagne, pledges to fight their cause, Djabal plans to kill the 
tyrannical prefect so that his people can leave captivity and return to Lebanon on the 
Venetian ships that he has secured. 
 In the opening speech of Act One, Khalil declares that when Djabal kills the 
prefect he will finally be “exalted” and transformed into their old leader who is the 
incarnation of God:   
The moon is carried off in purple fire: 
Day breaks at last! Break glory, with the day, 
On Djabal's dread incarnate mystery 
Now ready to resume its pristine shape 
Of Hakeem, as the Khalif vanished erst 
In what seemed death to uninstructed eyes, 
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On red Mokattam's verge—our Founder's flesh, 
As he resumes our Founder's function! (1. ll. 1-8)   
In the 1863 edition of his works, Browning added several lines (my italics) to 
further emphasize that although Djabal is the manifestation of Hakeem—his “dread 
incarnate mystery,” he will dispense with his human form when he is exalted “to 
resume its pristine shape” as God, and only then will he be able to lead his people 
back to Lebanon. The return to Lebanon is a key detail in the explication of 
Browning’s symbolic plot. In his seminal work Natural Supernaturalism, M. H 
Abrams argues that even though the concept of the Fall was no longer a theological 
actuality for the Romantics, they used the Christian narrative of returning to Eden as a 
symbolic language to convey their quest to transcend the material realm. Similarly, 
Browning configures Lebanon symbolically as a quest to return to the ideal.  
Khalil explains to Karshook that after Djabal has killed the prefect, he will 
cast off his human body to reveal the divine: 
As I approach him, nearer as I trust 
Soon to approach our Master, he reveals 
Only the God's power, not the glory yet. 
Therefore I reasoned with you: now, as a servant 
To Djabal, bearing his authority, 
Hear me appoint your several posts! Till noon 
None see him save myself and Anael: once 
The deed achieved, our Khalif, casting off 
The embodied Awe's tremendous mystery, 
The weakness of the flesh disguise, resumes 
His proper glory, ne'er to fade again.” (1. ll. 186-96) 
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Browning reiterates in the appended lines (my italics) that Djabal must relinquish the 
fallible flesh—embodiment—in order to reclaim the glory of the ideal. Indeed, 
utilizing Browning’s symbolic language for the two aspects of the world, Khalil 
exclaims that Djabal's physical self is only “the man in semblance” but that mystical 
“signs and portents” have revealed him to be their God (1. ll. 134-6). Here Browning 
changed “our Khalif” to “our God” to further emphasize that he is using the Druses' 
belief that the Hakeem is God made manifest to express symbolically the tension 
between the real (Djabal, or the condition of embodiment) and the ideal (the Hakeem, 
or God) that comprises the philosophical irony in the play.  
 Despite the fact that Djabal has dedicated his life to freeing the Druses, he is 
still plagued by his deceit, especially to Anael, the beautiful Druse woman he loves 
who is to become his bride after he is exalted. The import of Djabal's identity as the 
Hakeem for his relationship with Anael becomes another site of romantic irony in the 
play since Djabal mistakenly believes that Anael cannot love him unless he 
transcends his physical being to become the divine Hakeem, while, in turn, the 
emotions that Anael takes to be evoked by his divinity are actually inspired by the 
love she feels for him as a human being. When Anael ponders Djabal's forthcoming 
exaltation, she asks her mother, “What will be changed in Djabal when the / Change 
arrives? Which feature? ” and laments the inevitable loss of the human features that 
originally inspired the reverence that she feels for him: 
   Not his eyes! His voice perhaps? 
   Yet that's no change; for a grave current lived  
— Grandly beneath the surface ever lived, 
That, scattering, broke as in live silver spray  
While … ah, the bliss... he would discourse to me  
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In that enforced still fashion, word on word!  
'T is the old current which must swell thro' that,  
 For what least tone, Maani, could I lose?  
'T is surely not his voice will change!  
Contemplating Djabal's transformation into the Hakeem, Anael wonders what of 
Djabal will remain, and asks “—If Hakeem / Only stood by! If Djabal, somehow, 
passed / Out of radiance as from out a robe; Possessed, but was not it!”  (2. ll. 189-
204). In this metaphor, Anael configures the glory of Hakeem as a robe that Djabal 
might wear while remaining intrinsically himself; whereas for Khalil, Djabal's human 
form is the semblance or clothing that he must cast off in order to reveal the true 
reality of his divinity, it is Djabal's humanity that is the truth for Anael: “For never 
seem you—shall I speak the truth? — / Never a God to me! 'T is the Man's hand, / 
Eye, voice! Oh do you veil these to our people, / Or but to me? To them, I think, to 
them! / And brightness is their veil, shadow—my truth!” (2. ll. 259-3).  
 Anael questions whether the effect that Djabal's physical presence has on her, 
which she had taken as proof of his divinity, might actually be inspired in others by 
any human being. She confesses in an aside that when she first heard his voice: 
My faith fell, and the woful thought flashed first 
That each effect of Djabal's presence, taken  
For proof of more than human attributes  
In him, by me whose heart at his approach 
Beat fast, whose brain while he was by swam round, 
Whose soul at his departure died away, 
—That every such effect might have been wrought  
In other frames, tho' not in mine, by Loys 
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  Or any mere mortal presence? (2. ll. 274-82)  
Anael's feelings for Djabal raise doubts in her mind as to whether he can truly be the 
divine Hakeem, revealing her perceived distinction that the human and divine realms 
are separate. Directly juxtaposed with Anael's monologue is an aside by Djabal that 
highlights how the central irony of the play lies in their critical miscommunication 
around his divinity: 
Avow the truth? I cannot! In what words 
Avow that all she loved in me was false?  
--Which yet has served that flower-like love of hers 
To climb by, like the clinging gourd, and clasp 
With its divinest wealth of leaf and bloom. 
Could I take down the prop-work, in itself 
So vile, yet interlaced and overlaid 
With painted cups and fruitage—might these still 
Bask in the sun, unconscious their own strength 
Of matted stalk and tendril had replaced 
The old support thus silently withdrawn! 
But no; the beauteous fabric crushes too. (2. ll. 285-96)   
Djabal believes that his ostensible divinity is the “prop-work,” the stalks and the vines 
of the plant, which have enabled Anael's love to grow, and he fears that if he were to 
take away this false foundation, the fruit that it is inextricably bound with it would be 
fatally compromised as well. Furthermore, Djabal thinks that it is only through 
Anael's union with him as the Hakeem that she herself can reach the divine, and thus 
he declares that he must continue with the ruse so that Anael will be transcended with 
him: “Djabal disappears, / And Hakeem, Anael loved, shall, fresh as first, / Live in 
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her memory, keeping her sublime above the world / She cannot touch that world/ By 
ever knowing what I truly am” (2. ll. 313-17). At this point in Browning's play, 
Djabal, unlike the audience/ reader, has not realized that Anael's love for him is 
actually rooted in his humanity rather than in his professed divinity; likewise, Aneal 
has not yet realized that Djabal's divinity has been inherent in his humanity all along. 
Together, they do not know that they have already been exalted through their human 
love for each other. 
 The tragic misunderstanding, which carries Browning's philosophic point, is 
nearly resolved when Anael greets Djabal by declaring that her love belongs to him, 
“Djabal, I am thine!” This salutation gives Djabal the hope that he has been mistaken 
in his view of their relationship: “Mine? Djabal's?—As if Hakeem had not been?” (3. 
ll. 85-8). Anael follows his question by asking whether Djabal can read her thoughts, 
and when he says that he cannot, she begins to profess her feelings to him; however, 
rather than addressing her previous confusion, Anael placates her earlier doubts by 
expressing the conviction that she had perceived Djabal's divinity in the 
overwhelming happiness and completion that she felt from the very first time that she 
saw him. She goes on to reveal that she was fearful of the intensity of her feelings for 
him because she foresaw that it would come between her and her devotion to the 
cause of the Druses, which is why she made her vow to only marry the one who saved 
her tribe. At this point, in a moment of illumination, Djabal is finally able to see that 
Anael loved him, not as Hakeem, but first and foremost for himself: “And she loved 
me! Naught remained but that!” (3. l. 109).  As his mistake dawns on him, Djabal 
decides that he must leave; however, the irony persists in that Anael misconstrues his 
response, believing that he thinks her unworthy of him. Consequently, Anael decides 
that she must commit an act that will testify to her love and faith in Djabal as the 
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Hakeem and pledges to kill the prefect in his place.  
 It is only when Anael tells Djabal what she has done for him that he finally 
feels compelled to admit his deception. In his confession to Anael, Djabal voices his 
hope that he can find a way to reach truth upon the basis of a false foundation: “The 
past / Is past: my false life shall henceforth show true. / Hear me!” (4. ll. 118-9). He 
implores Anael to consider the possibility that they can still find truth by imitating an 
old form of faith: 
What if we reign together? --if we keep 
Our secret for the druses' good? --by means 
Of even their superstition, plant in them 
New life? I learn from Europe: all who seek  
Man's good must awe man, by such means as these. 
We two will be divine to them—we are! 
All great works in this world spring from the ruins 
Of greater projects—ever, on our earth, 
Babels men block out, Babylon's they build.” (4. ll. 118-30)  
As Browning's plays were conceived of together, the ideas that he explores in them 
build upon each other within and across the plays, and thus can only be fully 
explicated when analyzed together. Therefore the symbolic significance of Djabal's 
argument to Anael is rendered clearer when we compare it with the development and 
iteration of similar ideas in the later plays, A Soul's Tragedy and Luria. In a similar 
manner to Chiappino, Djabal argues that in pretending to be the Hakeem, he is trying 
to infuse soul into old forms of the Druses religion—their “superstition” that 
emphasizes the empirical reality of miracles and the literal return of their original 
leader— so that they may embody truth once again. Like Chiappino, Djabal uses an 
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architectural metaphor to explain his intention of building a new edifice, or a fresh 
expression of truth, on the foundation or “ruins” of old forms. 
 When Anael leaves in disgust, Djabal continues to justify his deception to 
himself: “Has Europe then so poorly tamed / The Syrian blood from out thee? Thou, 
presume / To work in this foul earth by means not foul? / Scheme, as for heaven, —
but, on the earth, be glad / If at least ray like heaven's be left thee”  (4. ll. 142-6). 
Again the symbolic significance of this statement could easily be missed if we did not 
compare Browning's concept of the East and the West in The Return of the Druses 
with its full symbolic development in Luria. As in Luria, the East—Djabal's “Syrian 
blood”—symbolizes the intuitive or imaginative perception of the noumenal whereas 
the West—Djabal's European “Frank policy” and “Frank brain”—represents the 
intellectual perception of the embodied forms of the material realm. Djabal's “Frank 
brain” chastises his “Arab heart” for believing that he could find soul while operating 
in the real world, which leads him to concede that it is not feasible, “To work in this 
foul earth by means not foul.” This has epistemological significance for Browning as 
Djabal’s “Frank brain” –his fashioning faculty—is necessarily skeptical because it 
can only see the limits of the empirical realm while it is his “Arab heart” that intuits 
the ideal. Djabal’s “Frank brain” triumphs over his intuitive faculties at this moment, 
which leads him to decide that he has no choice but to continue with his plan; 
however, when Anael betrays Djabal and tells the Nuncio that he is not really the 
Hakeem, he has an epiphany that is crucial to the symbolic meaning of the play: 
I with my Arab instinct, thwarted everywhere 
By my Frank policy, —and with, in turn, 
My Frank brain, thwarted by my Arab heart— 
While these remained in equipoise, I lived 
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– Nothing; had either been predominant, 
As a Frank schemer or an Arab mystic, 
I had been something;—now, each has destroyed 
The other—and behold, from out of their crash, 
A third and better nature rises up— 
My mere man's-nature! And I yield to it! (5. ll. 270-279)  
Djabal contrasts the reach of the intellect (symbolized by his Western “Frank policy,” 
“Frank brain,” and his being “a Frank schemer”) and the scope of the imagination 
(symbolized by his “Arab instinct,” “Arab heart,” and his being “an Arab mystic”) to 
show that his divided focus on the ideal and the real held each other in abeyance and 
effectively canceled each other out. It is only in their symbolic collision that he finally 
realizes that it is within his own humanity—“My mere man's-nature” — that the 
embodiment of the divine can be found. Browning uses the central tenet of the 
Druses' faith—the idea that God is made manifest—to show how it comprises a 
pattern that gives meaning to all of human embodiment. 
 Indeed, it is through this epiphany that Browning's exploration of the irony of 
love and the concept of symbolic embodiment come together in the play: Djabal 
realizes that he can truly conceive of himself as the Hakeem—the manifestation of the 
ideal—because he has been transcended through Aneal's love and recognition of him 
as a fallible human rather than as a God, and in turn, when Aneal sees that Djabal has 
been exalted by means of her love, she is finally able to perceive in his very human 
nature the embodiment of the ideal that she, along with her people, had only reserved 
for the mythical and transcendent Hakeem. In his analysis of the play, Ryals argues 
that although Browning stated that he wished to explore love in The Return of the 
Druses, he actually only focuses on the “psychopathology of love” whereby Anael 
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has to accept that it is only romantic passion that she feels for Djabal (175). However, 
this psychological reading misses the philosophical irony in the play. Significantly, 
when Anael cries out “Hakeem” and falls down dead, it is the culminating symbolic 
moment in the play—as it is in all of Browning's plays— because she has perceived a 
central truth, which is the realization that mankind partakes of the divine through 
human love. Yet the symbolic significance of Anael's death can easily be missed if we 
look for causal explanations in the play. Indeed, looking for an empirical explanation 
for Anael's demise, the reviewer for The Athanaeum remarks: “why, or by what 
instrument, she dies, is no way explained,” which leads them to conclude that “the 
catastrophe is managed in a manner bungling and obscure” (7, 399-401). 
 Charlotte Porter and Helen Clarke recognize the symbolic import of 
Browning's treatment of the Druses in the play. They assert that Browning's 
discussion of the figure of Hakeem allows him to explore the idea of the Christian 
Incarnation: through Djabal and Anael, he resolves the conflict between a skeptical 
view of the Incarnation and one of sincere belief, in a similar way to the voices of 
David, Renan and the third speaker in the “Epilogue” to Dramatis Personae. 
According to Porter and Clarke, Anael and Djabal realize that “instead of their cruder 
belief or their awakened disbelief of any present efficacy and truth in an energy of 
loving deity, lost now in the the deeps of a doubtful past, the presence of that energy 
was reaffirmed within themselves” (xvii). Indeed, Browning draws the analogy 
between Christianity and his symbolic treatment of the Druses in the play to show 
what he perceives to be the true spirit of Christianity, which is love. The Incarnation 
for Browning is the act, or manifestation, of God's love in the phenomenal realm, and 
it is through love in the real world that man can perceive his relation to the divine. 
This is the conceptual function of the noble and faithful knight, Loys, in the play. 
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When Loys declares that he is sublimated through his feelings for Anael, Browning 
shows that it is his true Christian perception of love, and not the vows that he pledges 
to his chapter, that makes him a true knight or one of Bowning's “soldier-saints”: 
Alas, say nothing of myself, who am 
A Knight now, for when Knighthood we embrace, 
Love we abjure: so, speak on safely: speak, 
Lest I speak, and betray my faith! And yet 
To say your breathing passes through me, changes  
My blood to spirit, and my spirit to you, 
As Heaven the sacrificer's wine to it— . (3. ll. 7-14)  
Loys avows that it is through his physical love for Anael that he reaches the divine: 
his feelings transform his blood (passion) into spirit in the same way that he 
experiences heaven by partaking of the blood of Christ in the Eucharist. Through his 
love for Aneal and his admiration for Djabal and the Druses, Loys continually fights 
against institutional Christianity and the corruption that is exemplified in the prefect 
and in the prefect's Nuncio as they try to turn the Druses against Djabal.  
 When the Nuncio arrives after the murder of the prefect, he endeavors to 
expose Djabal's fraud to the Druses and he challenges Djabal to prove that he is truly 
the Hakeem by discarding his human form in order to reveal himself as God: 
Look to your Khalif, Druses! Is that face 
God Hakeem's? Where is triumph,—where is ...what 
Said he of exaltation— hath he promised 
So much to-day? / Why then, exalt thyself!  
Cast off that husk, thy form, set free thy soul 
In splendour! … (5. ll. 328-33) 
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Here Browning uses the Druses' belief that only a special class is permitted to be 
initiated into the deeper and secret mysteries of the religion to serve his symbolic 
purpose in the play as it is the uninstructed Druses that listen to the Nuncio and ask 
Djabal to “cast off that husk”--his embodied form—to reveal himself as God. They 
cry: “show us all the glory!” (5. l. 127), “Exalt thyself! Exalt thyself, O Hakeem!” (5. 
ll. 336). Yet just as Djabal is about to confess his deception, Browning's stage 
directions tell us that when he looks upon his people, “the old dream comes back, he 
is again confident and inspired.” In asking “— Am I not Hakeem?” Djabal realizes 
that he has embodied the transcendent in his human striving for truth. Criticizing the 
Druses for their primitive need to witness the literal miracle of the reincarnated 
Hakeem: “Not grand enough / — What more could be conceded to such beasts / As 
all of you, so sunk and base as you, / Than a mere man? A man among such beasts 
was miracle enough” (5. ll. 341-5), Djabal avows to his people that they do not need 
the reincarnated Hakeem in order to know the divine.  
 Djabal informs the Druses that it is Khalil and Loys—men of truth and soul—
who will take their people back to Lebanon. Browning’s use of language here is again 
important as it is through the intuitive faculties that the Druses will return to Lebanon, 
the transcendent realm, which is “Out of mere mortal ken—above the cedars” (5. l. 
353). Turning to Anael's lifeless body, Djabal avers that she has won the greatest 
exaltation of all, and he stabs himself so that he may join her in the ideal: 
And last to thee! 
Ah, did I dream I was to have, this day, 
Exalted thee? A vain dream: hast not thou 
Won greater exaltation? What remains 
But press to thee, exalt myself to thee? 
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Thus I exalt myself, set free my soul” (5. 386-391).  
Djabal last dying words, where he calls upon the Druses to start the journey home, are 
symbolically significant because they reveal that love is the route to the divine. He 
shows the uninstructed Druses that they do not need to see the old miracles to reveal 
God because the true miracle is love, which is the act, or embodiment, of God in the 
world— an idea that Browning will return to in “A Death in the Desert.” Indeed, 
earlier in the play when Djabal admits his fraud to Anael, he confesses that when “I 
saw my tribe: I said, 'Without / A miracle this cannot be' —I said / 'Be thee a miracle!' 
— for I saw you (4. ll 60). For Browning, it is God's divine love that is made manifest 
in the Incarnation of Jesus Christ—in embodiment— and it is through human love 
that man can intuit God and the divine realm. Thus in The Return of the Druses, love 
itself acts as the symbolic mediation between the ideal and the real that comprises 
romantic drama, and the romantic irony that is expressed in this dialectic brings about 
a perception in Djabal and Anael, and in the audience/ reader, whereby they see that 
they do not need to be part of the “initiated” to experience the mysteries of the divine 
since love allows all of humankind to transcend the material realm.  
 Browning composed The Return of the Druses with a view to performance, 
but Macready criticized it for being a “mystical, strange and heavy play” (80). When 
Browning went ahead and published The Return of the Druses in Bells and 
Pomegranates IV (1843), it did not elicit much critical attention; however, what 
criticism it did receive points again to the difficulty of bringing the mimetic and 
symbolic together without compromising either of them. While Browning did seek to 
create fully realized characters, as the embodiment of ideas they tend to be far more 
abstract than a realistic play would expect. Indeed, looking for verisimilitude, The 
Spectator objected to what they perceived to be a lack of reality in the characters, 
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accusing the actors of being “mere phantasmagoria, talking Browning” (6, 392). Thus 
after Macready rejected The Return of the Druses in 1840, Browning set to work on A 
Blot in the 'Scutcheon, which was a play that Browning felt would finally succeed in 
reconciling his notion of drama, the romantic, symbolic mode, with Macready's more 
popular, melodramatic demands for the stage. In a letter to Macready, he exclaimed: 
'The luck of the third adventure' is proverbial. I have written a spick 
and span new Tragedy (a sort of compromise between my own notion 
and yours — as I understand it, at least) and will send it to you if you 
care to be bothered so far. There is action in it, drabbing, stabbing, et 
autres gentillesses, — who knows but the Gods may make me good 
even yet? (4, 293-4) 
In A Blot in the 'Scutcheon, Browning rewrites the conceptual focus of The Return of 
the Druses, but he picks a temporal plot that he hoped would lend his play a more 
popular appeal; however, this endeavor to find a story that would appeal to a wider 
audience is the reason why A Blot in the 'Scutcheon is his one of his weakest and most 
criticized plays. Indeed, the survival of the manuscript, which records Macready's 
suggested emendations, illuminates the difficulty that Browning found when he tried 
to reconcile his aims for symbolic drama with the demands of the stage.   
 The mimetic and symbolic plot of A Blot in the 'Scutcheon revolves around 
Lord Tresham's proposal to marry his sister, Mildred, to the Earl, Henry Mertoun, and 
his shocking discovery that they have already been in a clandestine relationship with 
each other. In the Early Literary Career of Robert Browning, Thomas Lounsbury's 
analysis of this central plot line evinces the confusion and the very different 
interpretation that can ensue from reading Browning's plays as dramas that strive 
solely for verisimilitude. Lounsbury criticizes Browning’s failure to mimetically 
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represent real life because he sees the psychological motives of Mildred and Mertoun 
as unrealistic. Thus he asks why Browning's hero did not court “the heroine in the 
way of honourable marriage as he is represented as doing at the time the play opens” 
and he queries why Mildred would “cast aside maidenly reserve and virginal modesty 
on a slight pretext?” (135). Lounsbury is right that the motives of Browning's 
protagonists are unconvincing, but this is only the case if we interpret them as 
belonging solely to a mimetic plot that is governed by cause and effect rather than as 
the embodiment of ideas. 
 The fact that Mildred and Mertoun have already enjoyed a physical 
relationship before Lord Tresham arranges their marriage purposely sets up the 
central romantic irony in the play. Browning's idea of love, as it is for the Schlegels, 
is derived ultimately from Plato and the Christian concept of love espoused by John in 
his First Epistle, wherein love is seen as the way that the real, or human, partakes of 
the ideal, or the divine. Moreover, as love is perceived as the relationship between the 
spiritual and the temporal, this mystical union incorporates the physical and sexual as 
well, which is emphasized by Friedrich Schegel in his verse novel Lucinde and by 
Shelley in his Epipsychidion. In the context of Browning's romanticism, it is clear that 
A Blot in the 'Scutcheon is not his moral condemnation of Mildred and Mertoun's 
relationship; rather, the perceived tension between the sensual and the spiritual 
symbolizes the productive space between the ideal and the real that constitutes 
romantic irony in the play. Since marriage in A Blot in the 'Scutcheon is presented as a 
social contract, Mildred is not conceived by Browning as a sinful fallen woman as a 
realistic reading of the play might suggest because Browning's symbolic plot reveals 
that Mildred and Mertoun's physical love is already the marriage of souls. Indeed, as 
it is made clear in Browning's depiction of love and marriage in “The Statue and the 
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Bust,” he does not consider himself beholden to any prevailing moral scheme; the 
revelations of romantic drama are not moral truths, which are constructed by society, 
but rather ideal truths: “Not what man sees, but what God sees—the Ideas of Plato” 
(Essay on Shelley 283). 
 Where the return to Lebanon is symbolic of the return to the ideal in The 
Return of the Druses, Browning, like the Romantics before him, uses Biblical imagery 
of Eden and of the Fall of Man in A Blot in the 'Scutcheon to express his point that 
“evil,” as J. Hillis Miller has shown, consists of anything that is not the totality of 
God, or in other words is embodied. Browning, however, shows through Mildred's 
misapprehension of her relationship to the divine that all “evil” points back to the 
divine cause. Mildred mistakenly believes that in the physical manifestation of her 
love for Mertoun she has re-enacted the original Fall and that she has lost her 
connection to transcendent truth. When Mildred hears Mertoun's song outside of her 
window, she asks, “Oh why, why glided sin the snake / Into paradise Heaven meant 
us both?” (1. 3. ll. 79-80), and when she thinks about facing her brother after she is 
ostensibly introduced to Mertoun, she exclaims, “I'll not affect a grace / That's gone 
from me—gone once, and gone forever” (1. 3. ll. 153-4). Moreover, when Mildred 
and Mertoun's secret is finally revealed, Mildred declares to Austin and Guendolen, 
“I—I was so young! / Beside, I loved him, Thorold and I had / No mother; God forgot 
me: so, I fell” (2. ll. 371-3). While Mildred sees the sensual aspect of their 
relationship as “the curse of the beginning” (1. 3. l. 76), Mertoun argues that the true 
sin would be to deny the purity of their love: “if sorrow— / Sin—if the end came—
must I now renounce / My reason, blind myself to light, say truth / Is false and lie to 
God and my own soul? / Contempt were all of this!” (1. 3. ll. 205-9). He believes that 
to turn away from their love would be to turn away from spiritual truth; therefore, 
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Mertoun avows that even though their physical love has transgressed social 
boundaries, he has been sublimated through his love for Mildred: “Mildred, break it if 
you choose, / A heart the love of you uplifted—still / Uplifts, thro' this protracted 
agony / To heaven!” (1. 3. ll. 164-67).   
 In his study of Macready's changes to the play, Joseph W. Reed, Jr notes that 
Macready's advice to omit the full implications of Mildred and Mertoun's sexuality, 
and the religious imagery that implies it, “make[s] the whole affair seem pretty 
harmless, giving the audience the impression that the 'blot' was nothing more than a 
stolen kiss” (601). It is significant that Browning did not accept these suggested 
changes because it confirms that the issue of sin is central to his symbolic design in 
the play. Indeed the sexual dimension of their relationship is key because it expresses 
Browning's romantic irony: Mildred believes that she has lost her connection with the 
divine when in fact love in the real world, expressed by the sensual, is actually the 
manifestation of the ideal. Although the same level of emphasis on sexual passion is 
not placed in The Return of the Druses as it is in A Blot in the 'Scutcheon, the ironic 
implications of Mildred's convictions are the same as Djabal's failure to see that 
Anael's love for him is grounded in his humanity and not in his professed divinity, as 
well as Anael's inability to see that Djabal's divinity has been inherent in his human 
attributes all along.  
 Browning emphasizes in A Blot in the 'Scutcheon the contrast between a 
concept of marriage that views it merely from a temporal perspective as a social and 
economic arrangement, and a symbolic concept of marriage that expresses the union 
of the ideal and the real. That Lord Tresham only views Mildred and Mertoun's 
marriage as a social contract is clear from his obsessive interest in Mertoun's family 
name and aristocratic pedigree: 
 173 
                     “Your name 
– Noble among the noblest in itself,  
Yet taking in your person, fame avers, 
New price and lustre, — (as that gem you wear, 
Transmitted from a hundred knightly breasts, 
Fresh chased and set and fixed by its last lord, 
Seems to rekindle at the core) — your name 
Would win you welcome ! —  ” (1. 2. ll. 1-9) 
Guendolen testifies to Lord Tresham's pride when she speaks with Mildred about 
Mertoun, “He's proud, confess; so proud with brooding o'er / The light of his 
interminable line” (1. 3. ll. 44-5). When Guendolen teases Mildred, telling her that 
Lord Tresham has discovered a flaw in the Earl's line, she makes a joke at Tresham's 
expense: “Perdition! all's discovered! Thorold finds / – That the Earl's greatest of all 
grandmother's / Was grander daughter still—to that fair dame / Whose garter slipped 
down at the famous dance!” (1. 3. ll. 65-8). Guendolen continues to poke fun at her 
brother-in-law's family pride when Lord Tresham hints at Mertoun's fallibility after he 
has discovered their affair: “Has what I'm fain to hope, / Arrived then? Does that huge 
tome show some blot / In the Earl's 'scutcheon come no longer back / Than Arthur's 
time?” (2. ll. 111-14). Mertoun's impassioned request to Lord Tresham that he 
consider his suit not because of his social status but rather because of his love of 
Mildred, establishes the crucial contrast between Browning's two protagonists and it 
also serves to reveal Mertoun's spiritual import in the play. 
 The contrast between two different concepts of marriage, which is so 
important to the philosophical meaning of the play, is further elucidated by the 
relationship between A Bot in the 'Scutcheon and Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet. 
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When Lord Tresham exclaims that he is honored that Mertoun wants his sister 
Mildred's hand in marriage, which will unite “both / Our Houses even closer than 
respect / Unites them now,” it is clear that Browning is invoking Shakespeare's play. 
This is also apparent from the fact that Browning makes a point to tell the audience 
that Mildred is fourteen, the same age as Juliet, and from the similar plot line that sees 
Mertoun clamber up Mildred's balcony into her chamber. Crucially, Browning uses 
Romeo and Juliet as a conscious foundation for A Blot in the 'Scutcheon in the same 
way that he uses Othello for Luria by drawing similarities between their respective 
mimetic plots only as they relate to the symbolic plot of his plays.  
 DeVane's focus on the empirical similarities between A Blot in the 'Scutcheon 
and Romeo and Juliet reveals the inevitable problems that arise from looking for a 
sequence of cause and effect in Browning's romantic dramas. DeVane argues that in 
not including a dispute between the two great houses of Tresham and Mertoun, 
Browning takes away the motive for Mildred and Mertoun's secrecy: while “Romeo 
and Juliet suffer their tragedy because their joyous and passionate love is thwarted by 
a fate which works through the bloody feud of their families. Mertoun and Mildred 
undergo their tragedy because of embarrassment, lack of control, and gnawing 
consciousnesses.” Thus DeVane maintains that Browning's tragedy is not as well 
grounded in reason as Shakespeare's, and is therefore not as convincing” (142). 
However, Bonaparte's discussion about the importance of St. Francis for the symbolic 
presentation of love in the nineteenth century gives insight into the significance of 
Romeo and Juliet for Browning's play. In analyzing the Christian concept of love as it 
is expressed in the First Epistle of John, Bonaparte explains how, “It was from this 
passage...that St. Francis had chosen the idea of "love" as the idiom in which religion 
was to speak in his own time, becoming almost from that moment the very image of 
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agape through the centuries that followed, surely the reason Shakespeare takes the 
trouble to tell us that Friar Lawrence, who marries Romeo and Juliet despite the 
enmity of their parents, is of the order of St. Francis. In the very heart of hatred, he is 
one who sanctions love” (Poetics of Poesis). With this in mind, I would argue that 
Browning invokes Shakespeare because he wants the audience to know that Mildred 
and Mertoun's immediate and instinctive love for each other, like that of Romeo and 
Juliet, is itself the manifestation of God's love. 
 That love is the central symbolic focus in the play is clear from the 
philosophical discussions that arise from Tresham's discovery of Mildred's affair. 
When Gerard, the loyal retainer, informs Lord Tresham that Mildred has been 
receiving nocturnal visits from a cloaked man, he engages Mildred in a conversation 
about the nature of love. Before confronting Mildred about her lover, he asks her 
“what love should you esteem—best love?” However, when she answers “true love,” 
he asks her to consider precisely “whose love is best / Of all that love or that profess 
to love?” (2. ll. 151-5). Mildred tries to address the different types of love, but Lord 
Tresham interrupts her to express his belief that a brother's love exceeds them all: 
  Mildred, I do believe a brother's love 
For a sole sister must exceed them all. 
For see now, only see! there's no alloy 
Of earth that creeps into the perfect'st gold 
Of other loves—no gratitude to claim; 
You never gave her life, not even aught 
That keeps life—never tended her, instructed, 
Enriched her—so, your love can claim no right 
O'er her save pure love's claim: that's what I call 
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Freedom from earthliness. (2. ll. 157-66) 
 Lord Tresham uses the metaphor of pure gold and base metal to argue that 
unlike other types of love, his unconditional brotherly love is not infused with alloy, 
or earthly concerns, which would serve to diminish the purity of the gold. Lord 
Tresham sees his love as transcendent and pure and entirely untarnished by the 
concerns of the material world. This leads him to the conclusion that “a brother's love 
exceeds / All the world's love in its unworldliness” (2. ll. 200-1).  
 Similarly, Lord Tresham sees Mildred's purity as something divine and 
eternal, and thus when he discovers her physicality, he cannot see how she can be 
both pure and corporeal at the same time: “And must I rend this web, tear up, break 
down / The sweet and palpitating mystery / That makes her sacred?” (2. ll. 211-13). 
Lord Tresham's conviction that Mildred cannot be both transcendent and worldly 
leads to an epistemological crisis that bears upon Browning's symbolic exploration of 
embodiment and the irony of love in the play: 
Oh, thought's absurd! — as with some monstrous fact 
Which, when ill thoughts beset us, seems to give 
Merciful God that made the sun and stars,  
The waters and the green delights of earth,  
The lie! I apprehend the monstrous fact— 
Yet know the maker of all worlds is good, 
And yield my reason up, inadequate 
To reconcile what yet I do behold— 
Blasting my sense! ” (2. ll. 80-88) 
In this simile, Lord Tresham exclaims that to believe that Mildred is guilty is the same 
as believing God to be false, and he declares that since he believes in God, he must 
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maintain the separation between the ideal and the real: “Heaven / Keep me within its 
hand! — / I will sit here / Until thought settle and I see my course. / Avert, oh God, 
only this woe from me!” (2. ll. 99-103). Browning emphasizes the epistemological 
implications of Lord Tresham's speech when his protagonist concedes that his reason 
cannot solve the contradiction that he perceives through his senses. Browning’s 
choice of language here calls attention to the symbolic plot: utilizing diction that 
denotes the mind as it interacts with the material—“reason,” “thought,” “fact,” and 
“sense,”—he reveals that Lord Tresham cannot reconcile the ideal and the real 
because he apprehends the “monstrous fact” of Mildred's sexuality—her 
embodiment— through his reason, or the faculty of conceptual thought. 
 Browning shows how, caught in cause-and-effect reasoning, Lord Tresham 
can only come to the inescapable conclusion of Mildred's sinfulness: 
There — reasoning is thrown away on it! 
Prove she's unchaste...why, you may after prove 
That she's a poisoner, traitress, what you will! 
Where I can comprehend naught, naught's to say. 
Or do, I think. Force on me but the first  
Abomination, — then outpour all plagues, 
And I shall ne'er make count of them.” (2. ll. 141-7) 
Moreover, in starting from the false foundation which views the physical as inimical 
to the sacred, Lord Tresham's discovery of Mildred's “sin” soon leads to his 
existential despair. Lord Tresham makes it clear that he fears that the erosion of his 
faith in Mildred's purity will lead to moral chaos. 
 Browning contrasts Lord Tresham's recourse to his reason with Guendolen, 
who uses her instinct—the same term that Browning uses to denote Luria’s spiritual 
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sight —to perceive Mildred's truth. After Lord Tresham has unveiled Mildred's 
indiscretions to Guendolen and Austin, Guendolen rejects her husband's request that 
they abandon Mildred because she wants to stay and find out for herself whether 
Mildred has really sinned. Guendolen’s request that Austin “Wait for me. Pace the 
gallery and think / On the world's seemings and realities, / Until I call you” (2. ll. 397-
8), is an important symbolic moment that can easily be missed., if A Blot in the 
'Scutcheon was intended to be read as a realistic play, this statement could be taken as 
a typical example of what is often seen as Browning's needless obscurity; however, 
read symbolically, it is clear that in referring to “seemings” and “realities,” the two 
aspects of the world, Guendolen is asking Austin, and in turn Browning is asking the 
audience, to consider the relationship between truth and embodiment. 
 When Guendolen asks Mildred whom it is that she loves, it is significant that 
she is able to perceive that Mildred's lover and Mertoun are the same person without 
needing to be told. Thus she calls back Austin to say “spare your pains— / When I 
have got a truth, that truth I keep.” Guendolen explains to Mildred that she “divined, / 
Felt by an instinct how it was” and exclaims “why else/ Should I pronounce you free 
from all that heap / Of sins which had been irredeemable” (2. ll. 425-29). Since 
Guendolen has looked upon the “monstrous fact” with her intuitive faculties, she is 
able to see how the real and the ideal can coexist. This very plot point confused 
contemporary reviewers who could not understand why Mildred would not tell Lord 
Tresham after he confronts her that her lover and Mertoun are both one and the same. 
A reviewer for The Literary Gazette argued that “Mildred has no reason on earth, 
when detected in and confessing her folly, for not telling her brother the whole truth, 
saving him from paroxysms of passion, herself from the bitterest denunciations, and, 
in short—the tragedy from its catastrophe” (6, 401-2). This is the same criticism that 
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most reviews leveled against A Blot in the 'Scutcheon; however, I would argue that 
Mildred's silence is only problematic if we look for a plot that is driven by the laws of 
cause and effect rather than as the embodiment of ideas in the play. Indeed, Mildred's 
failure to tell her brother that her lover and Mertoun are the same person is central to 
Browning's discussion of epistemology and to the tragic irony that is derived from the 
fact that Lord Tresham fails to see how Mildred can be both worldly and transcendent 
at the same time. 
 Lord Tresham's focus on the stainless purity of his love for Mildred and his 
obsession with her unsullied innocence is symptomatic of his preoccupation with the 
ideal at the expense of the real, and it is this inability to see how the material can 
partake of the divine that also explains the symbolic significance of the “blot” that 
entitles Browning's play. In Act three when Lord Tresham lies in wait to catch 
Mildred's lover outside of her window, he reflects on the hope that he had always held 
that no taint should ever come to his aristocratic line: 
But I … to hope that from a line like ours 
No horrid prodigy like this would spring, 
Were just as though I hoped that from these old 
Confederates against the sovereign day, 
Children of older and yet older sires, 
Whose living coral berries dropped, as now 
On me, on many a baron's surcoat once, 
On many a beauty's wimple—would proceed 
No poison tree, to thrust, from hell its root, 
Hither and thither its strange snaky arms”  (3. 1. ll. 17-26)  
Throughout the play, Browning refers to Adam and Eve's fall from paradise, and the 
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serpent who is responsible for them losing their immortality to become merely 
temporal beings, to show Mildred's belief that her relationship with Mertoun has 
brought about her separation from the ideal. Similarly, Lord Tresham continues these 
Biblical allusions to display his concern that no such poisonous, serpentine root will 
become entwined with the unadulterated purity of his family name. Thus the “blot” of 
Mildred's sexuality that has ostensibly marred his escutcheon mirrors the earlier 
metaphor of the alloy to reveal once more Lord Tresham's conviction that what is 
embodied cannot also be pure. 
 It is Browning's characters' failure to apprehend what he believes to be the true 
nature of embodiment that comprises the philosophical tragedy of his romantic drama 
and that leads Sir Tresham to confront Mertoun in the denouement of the play. In the 
final act, the fact that Lord Tresham fights Mertoun even though he has learned of his 
real identity is another plot point, alongside Mildred's reticence, that has riled critics 
of A Blot in the 'Scutcheon. In his suggested emendations to the play, Macready 
wanted to change this part as well so that Lord Tresham recognized Mertoun only 
after he has stabbed him; however, Browning did not incorporate this modification in 
the published version of the play because the violent outburst that proceeds from Lord 
Tresham's discovery that Mildred's lover and Mertoun are the same person is key to 
Browning's symbolic plot, the importance of which is revealed in the speech that Sir 
Tesham's makes to Mertoun before striking him with his sword: 
  Not one least word on your life! 
Be sure that I will strangle in your throat 
The least word that informs me how you live 
And yet what you are! No doubt 'twas you 
Taught Mildred still to keep that face and sin! 
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We should join hands in frantic sympathy 
If you once taught me the unteachable, 
Explained how you can live so, and so lie! 
With God's help I will keep despite my sense 
The old belief—a life like yours is still 
Impossible! Now draw! (3. 1. ll. 72-83) 
The symbolic significance of Lord Tresham's speech is easier to explicate when we 
see that it is the summation of the epistemological crisis that he experiences after he 
first learns of Mildred's deceit. In Act Two when Sir Tresham struggles to reconcile 
what Gerard has told him of Mildred's relationship with Mertoun and his faith in her 
purity, he exclaims, “That Mildred...oh no, no! Both tales are true, / Her pure cheek's 
story and the forester's!” (2. ll. 96-7) In accusing Mertoun of being the one who 
“taught Mildred still to keep that face and sin,” Lord Tresham is referring to the 
dichotomy that he first perceived between Mildred's spirituality and her sensuality, 
which is the also the same tension that leads him to ask Mertoun to explain how “you 
live / And yet what you are!” Indeed, the crux of Sir Tresham's speech is that he 
wishes Mertoun to explain the inexplicable to him—how Mildred can be both pure 
and earthly, and on the level of ideas, how the ideal can also be real. Even though Sir 
Tresham concedes that he perceives an assault on his principles, he declares that he 
will retain “the old belief,” his conviction that the idea and the real are separate; yet 
despite his desperate need to confirm the foundation of his existential being, Lord 
Tresham's epistemological worldview is inevitably violently uprooted, which is what 
leads him to strike out at Mertoun at this pivotal moment in the play. 
 When Lord Tresham confesses to Mildred that Mertoun is dead, she assumes 
that her brother's code of honor would have let Mertoun explain the genesis of their 
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clandestine affair, and she condemns him for still killing Mertoun even after he knew 
the truth; however, Lord Tresham assures her that it was only as he looked upon 
Mertoun's body bathed in the moonlight that he had a sudden illumination about the 
true nature of their love: 
            I gathered all 
The story ere he told it: I saw through 
The troubled surface of his crime and yours 
A depth of purity immovable, 
Had I but glanced, where all seemed turbidest 
Had gleamed some inlet to the calm beneath; 
I would not glance: my punishments at hand.” (3. 2. ll. 98-103)  
The epistemological implication of Browning's river metaphor in this dialogue can be 
better understood if we look at his similar use of it in La Saisiaz. In this later, more 
personal poem, the stream denotes the will or the divine force that is the prime agent 
of all of the causes and effects in the embodied world, which manifests in the ripples 
and eddies on the surface of the water. Browning follows this metaphor by stating his 
conviction that only the fancy can perceive the divine cause that propels the water: 
“what before caused all the causes, what effect of all effects.” (La Saisiaz l. 225).  
 Similarly, in Sir Tresham's speech “the troubled surface” of the water “where 
all seemed turbidest” is the crime or sin of Mildred and Mertoun's love as it is 
perceived in the manifested world of cause and effect. Lord Tresham wishes that he 
had “gleamed” how their illicit love was grounded in the ideal: “A depth of purity 
immovable” —the original first cause that comprises the calm beneath the rippling 
surface of phenomena. Browning's choice of the verb “gleam” here is also significant 
because it points to a realization that is brought about suddenly and clearly like a flash 
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of light. This is the intuition of the fancy through which Guendolen is able to perceive 
Milded's truth. The fact that Sir Tresham tells Mildred that his mode of perception 
changed as he saw “the moon on his [Mertoun's] flushed cheek” (l. 97) is an 
important example of Browning's Romantic symbolism, as it was for the German 
Romantics, as seen in Novalis' Hymns to the Night, which was reviewed by Carlyle in 
the Foreign Review in 1829. In Novalis' poem sequence the night, signified by the 
moon, is the time when we no longer perceive through our senses and thus we are 
able to perceive the noumenal realm. Indeed through this metaphor Browning shows 
that rather than looking at Mildred's “sin” through his reason, which only interacts 
with the forms of conceptual knowledge that process sensory data, Lord Tresham has 
finally looked through the real with the fancy to see its inception in the ideal. 
 Mildred's sudden death upon hearing Lord Tresham's confession can seem 
confusing on the level of the mimetic plot in much the same way that Anael's 
spontaneous demise perplexed readers of The Return of the Druses, but her death, 
viewed on the level of the symbolic plot, allows Mildred to set her soul free as she has 
finally realized that it is through her love of Mertoun that she reaches the ideal. It is 
only after Mildred's illumination that the audience learns that Lord Tresham is also 
dying after having taking poison to end his life. The fact that Browning fails to 
mention such a crucial act up until this point makes Lord Tresham's sudden revelation 
seem more farcical than tragic, which was perhaps an oversight on Browning's part 
having cut five acts to three on Macready's recommendation in order to speed up the 
action of the play. Although Browning does not make it clear at what point Lord 
Tresham drank the poison, his expostulations upon taking the poison appear to refer 
back to his initial discovery of Mildred's transgressions: 
I said, just as I drank the poison off, 
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The earth would no longer be earth to me, 
The life out of all life was gone from me. 
There are blind ways provided, the foredone 
Heart-weary player in this pageant-world 
Drops out by, letting the main masque defile 
By the conspicuous portal: I am through— ” (3. 2. ll. 134-40)    
Lord Tresham's dying words are clearly derivative of Macbeth's speech in Act 5 
Scene 5 where Shakespeare shows that Macbeth has lost all existential meaning in the 
world, having destroyed his soul. In referring the audience to this point in Macbeth 
Browning wants to emphasize Lord Tresham's epistemological crisis, which is why he 
was particularly insulted when Macready suggested that he changed the ending so that 
Lord Tresham does not die but rather sequesters himself in a monastery— a finale 
that Browning felt would take away the dignity of tragedy. It is important to note that 
after Lord Tresham reflects upon his reasons for taking his own life, it is no longer his 
existential pain that he dwells on but rather the nature of his imaginative epiphany and 
thus, like Mildred, he dies having perceived truth.  
 A Blot in the 'Scutcheon is Browning's most well known play but it is also his 
weakest. The pressure from Macready to write a play that would appeal to a mass 
audience, as well as Browning's own desire to succeed on the stage, led him to form 
his symbols from elements of the popular courtship plot, including a secret affair and 
a final duel that lead to melodramatic deaths of both protagonists. The ideas that these 
symbols embody, however, are not as clearly conveyed as they are in A Return of the 
Druses or in his closet dramas, as Browning condenses his philosophical exposition in 
order to speed up the action of the play. Furthermore, as Browning's ultimate goal of 
the play is not verisimilitude but romantic irony, its extremely subtle philosophic 
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foundation often makes the temporal plot seem illogical and overall poorly 
constructed. Indeed, contemporary reviews of A Blot in the 'Scutcheon comment on 
the tension between the simplicity and accessibility of its plot with the complexity and 
obscurity of its execution: the critic of The Athaenaum exclaimed that “The plot is 
plain enough, but the acts and feelings of the characters are inscrutable and abhorrent, 
and the language is as strange as their proceedings” (6, 400). Similarly, The Spectator 
complained that “The motives, situation, and purpose of the characters, are alike 
unaccountable” (6, 402) and The Times lamented how “His [Browning's] whole 
thoughts seem to have been directed to the production of striking effects, and these, in 
some instances, he has certainly obtained, but it has been at the expense of nature and 
probability” (6, 398-400). 
      However, the play was not universally criticized: while The Pathfinder conceded 
that “The language is harsh and perplexed” and that “It is difficult to read A Blot in 
the 'Scutcheon without studying it,” they assert that they would prefer to work at 
grasping Browning's obscure but original thought than to watch the formulaic 
reproductions that prevailed on the Victorian stage: “we would rather search this 
stony, rugged soil for a few wild delicate flowers of the mountain than pluck hotbeds 
of gaudy tulips which may be raised in any garden” (7, 396-7). Moreover John 
Forster, who was part of Browning's literary circle and a keen proponent of restoring 
the poetic drama, defends the play in The Examiner against those critics who 
questioned the logic of Mildred's silence and of Lord Tresham's violence, arguing that 
they had clearly missed the point of Browning's tragedy. Reading it as symbolic, 
romantic drama, Forster declared “There is a deeper moral for those who can see 
deeper truths than the conventional ones” (6, 400-1).   
 It is clear from contemporary reviews of The Return of the Druses and A Blot 
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in the Scutcheon that the most misunderstood aspect of these plays is Browning's use 
of romantic irony and how it informs his philosophic sense of tragedy. The tension 
that arose between Browning and Macready over their different dramatic aims finally 
led to the dissolution of their working relationship, and Browning turned from Covent 
Garden to write his next play, Colombe's Birthday, for Charles Kean. In this last play 
that Browning would write for the stage, he moves away from romantic irony for a 
more direct philosophical exposition on romantic love, which was perhaps in response 
to the negative reviews of his previous two plays. Nevertheless, Browning still wrote 
Colombe's Birthday as a romantic drama in that the mimetic plot is an embodiment of 
the symbolic plot of ideas. On the realistic level of the play, Prince Berthold's claim to 
power threatens Colombe's right to rule over Juliers. When Berthold offers to marry 
the duchess, she has to make a choice between a loveless marriage with the prince and 
a loving union with Valence, who is not of noble birth. This simplistic choice between 
power and love is also symbolic of Colombe's choice between the real and the ideal, 
which has important implications for Browning's discussion of epistemology and the 
concept of romantic love in the play. As Forster remarks in The Examiner, “the germ 
of the story is a very simple in contrast to its subtlety of treatment, as with the greater 
part of Mr Browning's writings” (9, 381-2).  
 When Prince Berthold learns that he has a possible right to the duchy of 
Juliers, he sees it as part of his grand quest to become Emperor: it is the “one link, 
however insignificant, / Of the great chain by which I reach my hope— / A link I 
must secure” (3. l. 18). Melchior, the prince's confidante, argues that the prince's 
conquest of Juliers will only be insignificant if he acquires it through an easy 
assertion of his right to the duchy rather than through the wily machinations that 
prove and develop the assiduity of his intellect. Comparing Berthold to his uncle, the 
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Pope, and to his cousin, the king, Melchior exclaims: “You are a mind, — / They, 
body: too much of mere legs-and-arms / Obstructs the mind so! Match these with 
their like: / Match mind with mind” (ll. 55-7). The implications of what Browning 
means here by “mind” can be more fully explicated by comparing it to his discussion 
of embodiment in “Charles Avison.” In this later poem, Browning exclaims that soul, 
as the expression of noumenal truth, seeks to embody itself in the forms of the 
material world that are apprehended by the mind: “Yet wherefore heaving sway and 
restless roll / This side and that, except to emulate / Stability above? To match and 
mate / Feeling with knowledge,—make as manifest / Soul's work as Mind's work” (ll. 
183-187). Thus by referring to mind in Colombe's Birthday, Browning means the 
intellectual assertion of individual will in the phenomenal realm: Melchior wants the 
prince to approach the conquest of Cleves not as a blind assertion of power, or 
“body,” like the Pope and King, but by means of tactics that will test and evolve the 
progress and prowess of this faculty.  
 That Melchior perceives Berthold's conquest—the progress of his mind—as 
belonging to the real realm and not the ideal realm is clear from his declaration that he 
is unable to understand neo-Platonic philosophy. Melchior jokes with the prince that 
his own Juliers, in other words his own conquest, will be to understand the writings of 
Amelius “this tough Platonist / Your holy uncle disinterred, Amelius— ” and the 
Pope's own exegesis of Amelius' work (3. ll. 70-1). Melchior's offhanded comment is 
a seemingly unimportant detail that can easily be overlooked, but it offers the key to 
Browning's symbolic plot. When Berthold replies that the pope “o'er-refines—the 
scholar's fault!” (l. 76), Browning reveals that, like Melchior, the prince also finds 
little worth in metaphysical thought. Thus, it is significant that when Berthold wants 
to examine the purpose of his life he echoes Aristotle, whose concrete nature led him 
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to focus on sensory observation as the basis of philosophical thought, rather than 
Plato, whose more abstract mind led him to ponder the ideal forms that transcend 
material realty:  
How do I let my life slip? Say, this life, 
I lead now, differs from the common life 
Of other men in mere degree, not kind, 
Of joys and griefs, — still there is such degree 
Mere largeness in a life is something, sure, — 
Enough to care about and struggle for, 
In this world: for this world, the size of things; 
The sort of things, for that to come, no doubt 
A great is better than a little aim. (ll. 76-85) 
Utilizing Aristotelian terms, Berthold concedes that his life is only different from the 
life of other men in degree and not in kind. The philosophical import of the passage is 
derived from the fact that by “kind” Berthold refers to things in their essence and that 
by “degree” he refers to things in their particularity. Crucially, Berthold sees the 
world as differing only in degree and not in kind, which shows that he does not see 
things as they are in themselves but simply as they are more or less difficult for him to 
acquire. For Berthold the particular, “the size of things,” belongs to the temporal 
world whereas the essential, “the sort of things,” belongs to heaven, and thus 
Browning makes it clear that the prince sees no relationship between the particular 
and the universal in the material realm. In striving to become Emperor, Berthold says 
that it will be no different to fail at a larger aim than it is to fail at a smaller one 
because the distinct feelings that they invoke will only ever be one of degree. 
 When Colombe asks Valence about his impressions of the prince, he responds 
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with a long, abstract speech wherein he further explicates Berthold's epistemological 
worldview:  
He gathers earth's whole good into his arms 
Standing, as man now, stately, strong and wise, 
Marching to fortune, not surprised by her. 
One great aim, like a guiding-star, above— 
Which tasks strength, wisdom, stateliness, to lift  
His manhood to the height that takes the prize; 
A prize not near—lest overlooking earth 
He rashly spring to seize it—nor remote, 
So that he rest upon his path content:  
But day by day, while shimmering grows shine, 
And the faint circlet prophesies the orb, 
He sees so much as, just evolving these, 
The stateliness, the wisdom and the strength, 
To due completion, will suffice this life, 
And lead him at his grandest to the grave.” (4. ll. 208-222) 
Browning configures Berthold's goal to be Emperor—his aim to master the actual— 
as a guiding star, which for Browning, as we have seen in Sordello, Strafford and 
Luria, is a symbol that expresses the relationship between man and the ideal. 
However it is only the shimmer of the “faint circlet,” or the halo of light surrounding 
the star, that Berthold sees and not the celestial substance that is the true source of the 
light. Valence makes it clear that Berthold follows the star's light only insofar as it 
enables him to evolve temporal life to its fulness: as it “will suffice this life / And lead 
him at his grandest to the grave.” Thus Berthold is essentially circumscribed in that 
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his scope is entirely human and finite; therefore, Valence suggests to Colombe that 
what is Berthold's greatest strength as a man is also his greatest weakness in terms of 
spirit. 
 Nevertheless Valence marvels at how the whole scope of the world seems to 
magically serve the prince for his own advancement so that while he exerts his will on 
the half below him, he continues on his upward journey to conquer that which is left:
  This for his own good: —with the world, each gift 
Of God and man, —reality, tradition, 
Fancy and fact—so well environ him, 
That as a mystic panoply they serve— 
Of force untenanted, to awe mankind, 
And work his purpose out with half the world, 
While he, their master, dextrously slipt 
From such encumbrance, is meantime employed 
  With his own prowess on the other half” (4. ll. 228-36) 
It is significant for the symbolic meaning of Colombe's choice between Valence and 
Berthold that when Valence speaks of the scope of the world he begins, like 
Browning, from the assumption that the objective material world of phenomena as 
they exist in space and time is the manifestation of the noumenal realm of soul. 
Valence emphasizes this assumption by setting off in parentheses the symbolic 
language that Browning uses throughout his poetry to denote these two aspects of the 
world that are dependent on and inseparable from the other: “ —with the world, each 
gift / Of God and man, —reality, tradition, / Fancy and fact—.” However, although 
the entirety of the world appears to serve Berthold in his quest, Valence emphasizes 
how the force that propels him is “untenanted,” by which he means that this force is 
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not aware of, or beholden to, a higher power. Thus in Valence's depiction of the 
prince, Browning juxtaposes vocabulary of the ideal and the real in striking pairs: 
“mystic panopoly,” “airy might,” “the spirit of all flesh,” “man of men” and “the fiery 
centre of an earthly world,” employing these pairs not to suggest poetic embodiment, 
as he does in the symbolic title of Bells and Pomegranates, but rather to show that 
here the ideal is circumscribed by the body, or by Berthold's merely temporal reach. 
Despite the fact that Berthold's power will gradually transform him into a type that 
makes meaning for the temporal world, he does not see that the real is part of and is 
informed by the noumenal realm of soul. Therefore, Browning shows that ultimately 
the prince will thus never be able to create a deeper truth.  
 At this point in the play, Colombe has not fully perceived the meaning of 
Valence's assessment of her powerful suitor, and she laments what she sees as her 
own impotence as a ruler: “Some such a fortune I had dreamed should rise / Out of 
my own—that is, above my power / Seemed other, greater potencies to stretch— ” (4. 
ll. 252-4). She confesses to Valence that she had thought that it would be through the 
love of such a powerful man that she could realize her own potentiality, “It was not I 
moved there, I think: But one I could, —though constantly beside, / And aye 
approaching, —still keep distant from, / And so adore, 'T was a man moved there” (ll. 
255-8). Valence tells Colombe that because of Berthold's mastery of actuality, his 
offer of marriage would indeed enable her to realize her potentiality in this world; 
however, he maintains that it is precisely this finite scope that precludes the prince's 
ability to love her, since for Valence, as it is for Browning, love is the means through 
which the ideal can be intuited by mankind. 
 When Colombe asks Valence how it is that the prince could help her realize 
her potential but not love her as well, Browning brings together the discussion of 
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epistemology and its implications for romantic love in the play. Instead of utilizing 
the reason, which apprehends the facts of the material world, Valence defers to his 
“lover's instinct,” the same term that Browning uses to denote Luria’s and 
Guendolen’s spiritual sight, which allows him to gleam the deeper truth of the 
situation: “Because where reason, even, finds no flaw, / Unerringly a lover's instinct 
may” (4. ll. 292-3). Indeed for Browning, intuition, or the faculty of fancy, is 
synonymous with the ability to love as it denotes a perception of the connection 
between the real and the ideal. That Valence embodies fancy is clear from the fact 
that he is sublimated through his love for Colombe: “well, Heaven's gifts are not 
wasted, and that gaze / Kept, and shall keep me to her end, her own! / She was above 
it—but so would not sink / My gaze to earth!” (II. ll. 88-91) 
 Browning makes it clear in the play that in contrast to Valence, Berthold 
embodies reason and the mind. This is why when Melchior encourages Berthold to 
feign love for Colombe to achieve his goal, he says, “I cannot shut my soul to fact. / 
Of course I might by forethought and contrivance / Reason myself into a rapture” (5. 
ll. 51-3). Browning's use of alliteration here emphasizes what he perceives to be an 
oxymoron in Berthold's speech: the idea that man can reach rapture, or transcendent 
illumination, through reason. Indeed, it is precisely Berthold's recourse to reason and 
his cultivation of mind that leads him to admit that while he admires Colombe's 
lineage, virtue and intelligence, “A further love I do not understand” (l. 106). This is 
epistemological for Browning as Berthold cannot attain a love that transcends the 
material world. The Prince makes it clear to Colombe that their marriage will not be a 
symbolic union of the real and the ideal because he is only proposing to her in order 
to consolidate his political position. Avowing his incapacity to love, Berthold 
exclaims that he will not “promise what my soul can ne'er acquit” (l. 126) and in 
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asking Colombe to join him as “the Earth's first woman,” (l. 132), Browning 
emphasizes the mundane limits of his temporal scope. Indeed, once Valence thinks 
that Colombe has accepted Berthold, he sees it as a “farewell to Heaven / Welcome to 
earth—this taking death for life— / This spurning love and kneeling to the world” (5. 
ll. 280-2). Valence's juxtaposition of heaven, life and love with earth, death and world 
highlights what would be the temporality of their union at the expense of the ideal. 
 Berthold's inability to truly love Colombe speaks to the fact that in using his 
mind he can only see the world in its phenomenal form; on the other hand, Valence's 
instinctive love for her shows that in using his fancy he sees things as they really are: 
the “sort of things” rather than the “size of things.” It is this essential contrast between 
Berthold and Valence that also explains the seemingly underdeveloped role of politics 
in the play. DeVane notes that Browning's characters in Colombe's Birthday are 
derived from the realm of politics but that no political issues are actually raised or 
resolved in the play (148). This is true when we read the play from the perspective of 
realistic drama; however, political issues are indeed raised in the play but only as they 
pertain to the symbolic plot. As we have seen in Browning's political and historical 
dramas, the change from autocracy to democracy, in its different iterations, 
symbolizes the progressive manifestation of soul, and it is the poet-figure who can 
perceive when the forms of the empirical world no longer embody truth for the age. 
The fact that in Valence's depiction of Berthold he uses the terms “reality” and 
“tradition” in conjunction with “fancy and fact” to denote the scope of the world — 
which is the very same language that Browning uses to describe the poet-seer in his 
Essay on Shelley and in Luria— indicates that the political positions of Berthold and 
Valence in the play denote their respective relationships to the real and the ideal.  
 As in Strafford and King Victor and King Charles, the transition from 
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autocracy to democracy in Colombe's Birthday signifies the transition to a new 
paradigm. Berthold uses the metaphor of the end of a grand dance to express his 
recognition that the aristocratic right of kings is fading with the night as the dawn of 
democracy emerges: “We seem, in Europe, pretty well at end / O' the night, with our 
great masque” (V. ll. 28-9). When the prince is considering whether to assert his 
lineage and inherited political power— his 'kingly craft” — in his attempt to secure 
Juliers, or whether to court Colombe's heart, he continues the metaphor of the ball, 
arguing that it would be better for him to stay in his finery until morning signals the 
end of the dance, rather than try to steal out and re-enter in a new costume (ll. 30-45). 
Thus, clinging to a fading paradigm, Berthold exclaims that if he proposes to 
Colombe, he will not pretend that it is an expression of love because he is only 
seeking a union that will further his hereditary claim to her realm. The significance of 
this for the symbolic plot is that Berthold clings to tradition, the shadow of reality—
the phenomenal rather than the noumenal, which is its internal spiritual meaning.  
 In contrast to Berthold, Valence's transcendent love for Colombe reveals that 
he can see into the true reality that is the foundation of the material world. As such, he 
represents the dawn of democracy, the new form that will embody the truth of the age. 
Valence comes to Colombe as the representative of Cleves to address the wrongs of 
his people and to encourage her to do her duty. He explains to Colombe that although 
she might not have Berthold's power, his power is based on a false foundation 
whereas her rule is founded on the people's love:  “although the lowest, on true 
grounds, / Be worth more than the highest rule, on false: / Aspire to rule, on the true 
grounds!” (3. ll. 335-7) Up until this point, Colombe has only played at being a queen. 
Sequestered in her palace, she has only held sway over the retinue that respects only 
her hereditary position, yet with Valence by her side, the duchess sees a way to realize 
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her potentiality: “I take my stand / Only as under me the earth is firm: / So, prove the 
first step stable, all will prove!” (ll. 347-8), and when she declares that “This is indeed 
my birthday—soul and body” (l. 339), it is a  revelation that through Valence she has 
found a means to act upon a perception of soul. Valence has shown Colombe that she 
must move away from “established form” (l. 292) for “there needs a new 
consecration,” (l. 296) — an ordainment of a new expression of soul. Even Guibert 
who, along with his fellow courtiers, has relied on intellect to secure his political 
position and who previously emulated the prince's temporal rise to power, sees truth 
in Valence, proclaiming: “whate'er your birth, — / As things stand now, I recognize 
yourself / (If you'll accept experience of some date) / As like to be the leading man o' 
the time” (ll. 277-80). Thus, while Gaucelme maintains that Valence is only pursuing 
his own political agenda, Guibert testifies to the prince and Colombe that Valence's 
actions are impelled by love. 
  Although Colombe has perceived spiritual growth through her interactions 
with Valence, she still considers a union with Berthold as a possible way to manifest 
her inner potential. When Valence tells Colombe that it is because he loves another 
(meaning Colombe) that he knows a union with the prince would preclude such love, 
the central crux of the play is disclosed. In a scene that would typically incur a tragic 
misunderstanding in Browning's romantic dramas, Colombe is shocked to hear that 
Valence loves and mistakenly thinks that he loves another; however, instead of a 
realization brought about through romantic irony, Valence professes his feelings for 
Colombe and the symbolic plot of the play is revealed in the direct question that he 
poses for her: “Is love or vanity the best? / You, solve it for the world's sake—you, 
speak first / What all will shout one day—, you, vindicate / Our earth and be its 
angel!” (ll. 404-7). Colombe has to choose between romantic love and the Empire, or 
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symbolically speaking, she has to choose between transcendence and temporal 
circumscription. 
 The true nature of this choice is made clear to Colombe after the prince 
discovers a law that forbids Colombe from marrying below her rank unless she forfeit 
her right to the duchy, and Berthold tells her that she must choose between Valence's 
love and his own power. When Colombe finally defers to the prince, he defiantly 
declares to Melchior that the Empire has won. However, although Berthold's plan to 
marry Colombe had led Melchior to forego metaphysical thought——symbolized by 
Amelius—and return to his usual books, he uncharacteristically argues that since 
Colombe accepted the prince without hearing Valence speak, it is not a sufficient test 
of form and mind. Melchior implores Berthold to “Let me, but this once, work a 
problem out, / And evermore be dumb! / The Empire wins? / To better purpose have I 
read my books!” (ll. 249-51). Thus Melchior's quest to prove the supremacy of 
Empire (the material) over love (the immaterial) also becomes a test of Valence's 
conception of love. 
 Informing Valence that if he were to make a claim upon Colombe, then the 
prince would withdraw his suit and she might be forced to accept him, thereby losing 
her land and title, Melchior asks Valence to decide whether he will pursue his own 
good or that of Colombe's instead. Although Valence loves the duchess, he is also 
able to recognize the restorative potential that her love would have upon another: 
“Who knows how far, beside, the light from her / May reach, and dwell with, what 
she looks upon?” (5. ll. 299-300). Thus he exclaims that “Had I seen such an one, / As 
I loved her—weighing thoroughly that word— / So should my task be to evolve her 
love: / If for myself! --if for another—well” (ll. 316-19). However, when Melchior 
maintains that the prince is not receptive to this kind of love, Valence speaks 
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hypothetically about himself to explain to Colombe that she would become both form 
and mind to the man who could receive her love. In loving the duchess he would not 
serve her by addressing her temporal power as Berthold would; rather his life would 
be the expression of selfless devotion to her. Although Valence is clearly speaking 
about his own deep love for the duchess, when he is given the chance for a final 
request before departing he resists his own desire to ask for a remnant of Colombe 
that he longs to take with him—flowers she has worn or a touch of her hand— and 
instead selflessly asks the prince to redress the wrongs of Cleves. It is in this moment 
that Colombe sees in Valence the expression of a deeper, all-encompassing love that 
transcends the self, and she declares to the Berthold that she chooses Valence and 
“give[s] up Juliers and the world” (l. 354) 
  Surprised by Colombe's change of mind, Melchior exclaims: “Berthold, my 
one hero / Of the world she gives up, one friend worth my books, / Sole man I think it 
pays the pains to watch,— / Speak, for I know you through your popes and kings” (ll. 
355-58). Since Melchior only knows the prince through his mastery of the temporal, 
he is unable to comprehend the metaphysical, and thus he asks the prince to explain 
what has just happened. Although Berthold is still unable to comprehend the meaning 
of Colombe's choice, he is left with a vague awareness that something is missing in 
his outlook on the world: he admits that “a somewhat wearier life seems to remain / 
Than I thought possible” (ll. 369-70) and he asks the courtiers to make preparations 
for his new rule,“while I prepare to plod on my old way, / And somewhat wearily, I 
must confess!” (ll. 394-5).  
 The importance of Colombe's choice for the symbolic plot of the play, and the 
symbols that Browning uses to carry the level of ideas, can be further explicated if we 
look at the relationship between power and love that he had already explored in 
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Sordello and later consolidated in his concept of the three souls in “A Death in a 
Desert” (1864) an The first soul, which uses the evidence of the senses, is the 
instrument of human power, and is what Browning defines as “what does.” This first 
soul “has the use of earth, and ends the man  / Downward” (ll. 87-8). The second soul 
uses both the mind and the senses and is the instrument of human wisdom, and is 
what Browning defines as “what knows.” However, these souls are both delimited 
unless they are transformed by human love, which is the third soul and is defined by 
Browning as “what Is.” This third soul uses both the first and second souls:  
Subsisting whether they assist or no, 
And constituting man's self, is what Is—  
And leans upon the former, makes it play,  
As that played off the first: and tending up,  
Holds, is upheld by, God, and ends the man  
Upward in that dread point of intercourse,  
Nor needs a place, for it returns to Him. (ll. 96-102) 
It is only in evolving the third soul, human love, that the temporal limits of the senses 
and the intellect can be transcended to reach the ideal. Clearly in the play, by “form” 
and “mind,” Browning is speaking of the first and second soul, and we know that 
Berthold is circumscribed by the material world precisely because he is unable to 
love. As John says: “He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love” (1. John. 
4.8). In choosing Valence Colombe chooses romantic love, which Browning 
understands in its philosophic sense to be the vehicle through which the temporal can 
meet the divine. Thus when Colombe says that she gives up the world, it is not that 
she has rejected the temporal, but rather that love has revealed the temporal to be the 
embodiment of the divine. This is why in the last line of the play she declares: 
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“Come, Valence, to our friends, God's earth...” (my italics; l. 388). Because of this 
final reconciliation Colombe's Birthday can be considered Browning's only comedy, 
yet for Browning the marriage is not conveyed in typically social terms but rather in 
symbolic terms—as it is in The Blot in the Scutcheon—in that Colombe's finds in 
romantic love the union of the ideal and the real. 
 Browning's decision to move away from romantic irony towards a more direct 
explication of his philosophical subject rendered Colombe's Birthday far more 
successful than any of his other plays. Although Browning decided to publish 
Colombe's Birthday in Bells and Pomegranates VI (1844), Charles Kean had been 
interested in the play, although he wanted more time to study the part than Browning 
was willing to give, and it was eventually performed for seven nights at The 
Haymarket theater in 1853 with Helen Faucit in the title role of Colombe. The 
performance of Browning's play garnered many appreciative reviews, but again they 
emphasized the perceived unsuitability of symbolic drama for the Victorian stage. 
Reviews in The Leader, The Spectator, The Court Journal, The Manchester Examiner 
and Times, John Bull, and The Examiner admired the beauty and thought of the play, 
but felt that it was completely unsuited for theatrical representation. Indeed, the 
comments in The Athenaeum sum up the essence of all of the critical reviews in its 
assertion that Colombe's Birthday is a “charming poem, rather than drama. Its 
movements for the most part, occur in the chambers of the mind” and thus would fail 
to attract those who seek “ordinary dramatic motion and action” (9, 382-4). However, 
The Era and The Atlas both felt that despite its lack of melodramatic ingredients, 
Browning's play could indeed succeed on the stage if the audience was more receptive 
to intellectual drama. Indeed, The Literary Gazette remarked that “the production at 
the Haymarket, on Monday, of Mr. Browning's fine drama of Colombe's Birthday, 
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was an interesting experiment upon the state of the public taste, and speaks well for 
the determination of Mr Buckstone to illustrate the higher drama, so far as the means 
within his reach will permit” (19, 388-9). Although Elizabeth Barrett admitted to 
Mary Russell Mitford that the play had indeed enjoyed a marginal success on the 
stage, she maintained that “there could be no 'run' for a play of that kind” (19, 98-102) 
— in other words for the symbolic, romantic drama. The difficulty of presenting 
symbolic drama for the theater inevitably led Browning to write his last two plays for 
reading, but during the ten years that he attempted to write for the stage, he had also 
been developing another symbolic form, the dramatic monologue, the genesis of 





Symbolic Embodiment, the Dramatic Monologue 
 And the Romantic Drama of Men and Women 
 
After Browning turned from writing plays and began the composition of Men 
and Women, he wrote to Joseph Milsand in February of 1853 that “I am writing, a sort 
of first step towards popularity (for me!) ‘Lyrics,’ with more music and painting than 
before, so as to get people to hear and see” (18, 337-40). While this statement might 
appear contradictory to Browning’s self-proclaimed objective poetics, I would argue 
that he does not intend lyric here to mean the form of lyrical poetry, indicated by his 
placement of lyric in quotation marks and also by the fact that he would go on to 
remove the more lyrical pieces from the 1863 revised collection of Men and Women; 
rather, Browning is utilizing the same symbolic language that he had already 
developed in Sordello to express his poetics. Indeed, there are several crucial aspects 
to this statement that reveal the relationship between Browning’s exploration of the 
romantic symbolism in Sordello and the development of his dramatic monologues, 
which were composed alongside his romantic dramas. 
As in Sordello, Browning does not intend music and painting to be taken 
literally but instead to express the ontology of the romantic paradigm, which does not 
refer to the movement of poets now known as “Romantic” but to the inward turn of 
the historical development of the Christian consciousness as it contemplates the 
transcendence of soul. This inward noumenal soul, inward to both man and the world, 
culminates for Browning in the philosophical idealism of his own age and the poetics 
of his predecessor Shelley. In his depiction of the progression from classical 
objectivity to romantic interiority, Browning uses music and song to symbolize the 
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infinite reach of the inward soul, and in mentioning painting alongside music 
Browning reveals the influence of August Wilhelm Schlegel, who refers to painting in 
comparison to sculpture to denote the deepened transcendent perspective of romantic 
art in comparison to the classical age, which is a transition that Browning had already 
symbolized in Jule’s decision to forego sculpture and the classical aesthetic in favor 
of painting and the recognition of soul in Pippa Passes.  
Yet Browning as the next objective iteration of idealism in the historical 
progression of romantic art will place Dante’s (and by implication Shelley’s) abstract 
forms conceived through the subjective soul in their objective embodiment. When 
Sordello heralds Browning as the next step in ideal realism, he foresees that he will 
depict soul in its material manifestation, which for Browning is represented in 
dramatic form. Indeed, the image of “light thwarted,” of ideal white light broken into 
the myriad colors of real life, is how Browning famously defined his poetry to his 
future wife (10, 21-23). Browning’s own definition of his monologues as “dramatic 
lyrics” is derived from his symbolic language for the two aspects of the world that are 
perceived by the double faculty of the objective poet: here lyric refers to the inward-
noumenal soul and drama refers to the complexity of personality and identity that is 
soul in its outward-phenomenal manifestation. 
Browning’s desire to “get people to see and hear” also echoes his call in 
“Transcendentalism” to suffuse poetry with “sights and sounds”—the mythology that 
will reveal to the consciousness the obfuscated relationship of the ideal to the real. 
The true transcendentalism recognizes that the objective realm is a symbol that bodies 
forth the inner meaning of the world, and the objective poet is the Maker-See who 
recreates the divine in its material existence, revealing the ironic space between the 
noumenal and its phenomenal embodiment so as to facilitate an increased insight 
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within the reader whereby he may endeavor to act in the real world upon a perception 
of soul. Thus Browning places “Transcendentalism” first in the 1863 reorganization 
of Men and Women to serve as a testament to his poetics: his men and women will be 
the symbols that comprise his new mythology, and in delineating the irony inherent in 
embodiment he will reveal the relationship of the external to inward life. 
That the irony of embodiment is crucial to Browning’s symbolism and his 
poetics of realism is clear from the fact that he followed “Transcendentalism: A Poem 
in Twelve Books” in the rearrangement of his monologues with “How it Strikes a 
Contemporary,” which enacts in its form and content the ironic space between soul 
and act, or the ideal and the real. The central irony of the poem lies in the 
misinterpretation of the poet from the perspective of the speaker who lacks spiritual 
insight. He notices that the poet is a man who studies the material world: “He walked 
and tapped the pavement with his cane, / Scenting the world, looking it full in the 
face” (ll. 11-12). In taking note of the realm of embodiment and of man in action in 
the world, “Of all thought, said and acted” (ll. 42-3), the poet observes and 
appreciates the minutiae of daily life in the town of Valladolid. 
The speaker intuits that the poet has some kind of power and insight into their 
lives, yet he inverts Shelley’s declaration that the poet is the spiritual legislator of 
mankind because he can only understand the poet’s power in temporal terms; thus, he 
exclaims that the poet is  “chief-inquisitor” (l. 39) and is the actual governor of the 
town: “The town’s true master if the town but knew” (l. 40). The narrative persona 
misinterprets the poet’s force as material rather than spiritual, which is indicated by 
the fact that he describes the poet’s will as pertaining to his physical appearance “The 
cloak, that somewhat shone and showed the threads / Had purpose, and the ruff 
significance” (ll. 8-9). The speaker imagines that the poet has influence over concrete 
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events and assumes that it is by virtue of a privileged relationship with God who he 
personifies as “our Lord the King.” In visualizing the poet writing letters to an 
omnipotent King in order to relay all that he has seen, the speaker serves to trivialize 
this relationship, but more importantly it signifies how the speaker conflates the 
spiritual and the temporal. 
Convinced of the poet’s power over the town, the speaker follows him home 
and is surprised to find that he does not lead the extravagant and decadent life that he 
had been rumored to lead, but rather lives contentedly and simply with little material 
wealth. The speaker imagines the funeral of the poet and perceives the poignant 
tragedy in the discrepancy between the man’s seeming power and his actual lack of 
material wealth and societal influence. Pondering the poet’s frugal appearance and 
congratulating himself upon his good fortune to be dressed in fine attire, the speaker 
exclaims jovially, “Well I could never write verse” (l. 14), a statement which serves to 
equate the speaker's materialism with an understanding of verse as merely the skilful 
metrical arrangement of language rather than as an act of imagination that perceives 
the ideal that transcends and is embodied in the real world. Indeed, when the speaker 
calls upon his friends to join him at the Prado and to embrace the brevity of life, it is 
clear that he slips back into a daily existence that is uninformed by the ideal.  
In the form of a dramatic monologue the speaker as an embodied entity is 
limited in his perception of soul, and in viewing the poet through a temporal lens he is 
at a remove from the poet who has the perception of spiritual truth. Sympathizing 
with the narrative persona allows the reader to experience the irony inherent in his 
incomplete awareness of the ideal and in turn to transcend his limited perspective. I 
would argue that rather than denoting the relativity of all judgment, as Langbaum 
argues, this realization is crucial to Browning’s symbolic design in that it facilitates a 
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perception of his own role in Men and Women as the Maker-See and of the concrete 
and objective nature of his transcendentalism, which is a commitment to discern in 
the contradictory phenomenal expressions of his dramatis personae the relationship 
between the relative and the absolute. As we saw in A Soul’s Tragedy, Browning 
often puts some of his deepest convictions into the mouths of his casuists: not to 
qualify his “optimism,” as Armstrong suggests in her essay on Browning’s “Mr 
Sludge,” but rather to show how truth can be found in even the lowest forms of 
manifestation. Thus we can see that the monologue is similar in concept to 
Browning’s plays where he distinguishes the level of spiritual insight in his characters 
through their response to a problematic circumstance that is epistemological in nature, 
which reveals the central romantic irony that he defines in Sordello between the man 
of perception who has the spiritual insight into the realm of soul and the man of action 
who adheres to a merely temporal perspective. Similarly, Browning shows in his 
plays the differing degree of distance between sight and being in its relation to 
epistemology through the comparison of characters who, through fancy and feeling, 
perceive the objective as the embodiment of soul and those who, through the logic of 
reason and power, perceive the objective as merely an empirical series of cause-and-
effect relations. In the plays it is this dialectic between the characters and this tragic 
space between the ideal and the real that brings about the final recognition of soul.  
Similarly to the characters in his plays, Browning’s monologues reveal souls 
in various degrees of manifestation. David Shaw also views a hierarchy among the 
monologues, which he observes as a juxtaposition of speakers who have reached an 
aesthetic, ethical or religious stage of moral and spiritual awareness. Shaw notes that 
Browning's earliest monologues occupy the aesthetic stage and as such their 
perspectives are too selfish to address an auditor, or else the address does not bring 
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about a meaningful interchange. It is significant that the monologues included by 
Browning in Bells and Pomegranates alongside the plays are at this aesthetic stage 
because it suggests that they are intended to form a contrast to the plays, which reveal 
the productive space of romantic irony through the dialectic of ideas embodied in the 
temporal and symbolic plot. Thus at this point, the early monologues can be seen as 
fragments of Browning’s romantic dramas, and as single manifestations they 
emphasize the circumscribed existence of the speakers who are individuals unable to 
grasp anything beyond their senses or who have become imprisoned in the particular, 
which is why Browning originally grouped “Porphyria’s Lover” and “Johannes 
Agricola in Meditation” under the title of  “Madhouse cells.” 
Shaw argues that Browning moved beyond the monologues at the aesthetic 
stage because as a dialectical poet he wanted to expose the limitations of ideas and 
points of view in order to facilitate moral and spiritual growth in his readers. As such, 
Browning begins to write monologues that put more emphasis on the dialectic 
between the speaker and the auditor in order to create a rhetorical irony whereby the 
cooperating fancy of the reader is encouraged to reject and analyze the ideas 
presented, which is a view shared by Painter, Erikson and Woolford. I would argue 
that this development of the monologue is intimately related to Browning’s work as a 
romantic dramatist. As Browning conceptualized and composed his romantic dramas, 
the monologue began as an offshoot from his plays to emphasize in form and content 
the circumscription of the temporal, but as he found that his concept of symbolic 
drama was incompatible with the stage and as he realized the difficulty of reconciling 
the mimetic and the symbolic in even his closet dramas, Browning continued to 
develop the monologue so that they became romantic dramas in and of themselves. 
Thus within the monologue, the relationship between the speaker and the auditor, or 
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the embodiment of a dialectic of ideas, and the presentation of differing 
epistemological responses to them, creates the space for the cooperating fancy of the 
reader. 
Browning develops irony not only within the individual monologues but also 
by putting them in a dialectical relationship. That Browning intended for his 
monologues to be considered in relation to each other as well as on an individual basis 
is clear from the revised arrangement of Men and Women, where he removed many of 
the simpler poems that were rhymed presentations of an emotional or narrative 
experience and added monologues that connected conceptually with the remaining 
dramatic personas that were written in blank verse like the plays. This alternative 
arrangement served to create one dramatic entity in which irony exists not only within 
but also between the separate monologues. Indeed, the monologues occupy different 
degrees of ironic distance from each other through the various ways in which the 
speakers and the paradigms of their respective time periods perceive material forms in 
both art and religion. Thus I will argue in this chapter that the revised Men and 
Women becomes Browning’s next romantic drama and, as the Maker-See, Browning 
represents the different iterations of the central irony between perception and being to 
precipitate the same realization of soul that he had hoped to bring about in the 
audience/reader of his plays. 
The dialectic of ideas that comprises the symbolic plot of Men and Women is 
embodied in each speaking persona who manifest in their temporal existence the spirit 
and epistemologies of distinct historical epochs from the early classical period to the 
inception of Christianity and the romantic paradigm, through the late medieval period 
into the Renaissance and up until Browning’s own nineteenth century. In this chapter, 
I start by focusing on “Artemis Prologizes” and “Cleon,” individually and in relation 
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to each other, because they reveal how Browning’s developing formulation of the 
dramatic monologue is derived from romantic epistemology: while “Artemis 
Prologuizes” reveals the fusion of the internal and external that characterizes the 
classical age, “Cleon” examines the epistemological paradigm shift from the classical 
to the romantic paradigm to show the development of romantic interiority. Finally I 
turn to its modern culmination in  “Bishop Blougram’s Apology,” which provides a 
center from which to analyze the ironic dialectic of Men and Women. 
Not much attention has been paid to “Artemis Prologizes” as a dramatic 
monologue, yet it is integral to Browning’s symbolic design in Men and Women. 
DeVane explains that the monologue was originally intended as a prologue to a play 
that Browning planned to compose about Hippolytus but did not ever write and that 
there is no clear reason as to why he moved it from the Dramatic Lyrics of 1842 into 
the revised order of Men and Women; however, the fact that Browning incorporated it 
into the revised collection is certainly not an arbitrary decision, but rather reveals the 
difference between the classical and the romantic symbol and defines the monologue 
as a modern form that derives from romantic epistemology. 
It is crucial to Browning’s conception of the ontology of the classical world 
that the prologue is spoken by Artemis and not by Hippolytus because it is not 
possible to display the interiority of a Greek hero in that his being is inextricably 
bound with his external action. As Browning explored in Sordello, in the classical 
paradigm the subjective is perfectly fused with the objective world, which means that 
classical art manifests spirit by means of the human form and takes the shape of 
human gods in contrast to the infinity of the romantic subjective soul that inevitably 
exceeds its manifestation. In contrast to the inward- outward manifestation of the 
romantic soul, it is represented here as the perfect union of the subjective and the 
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objective as it finds its consummate symbol in the anthropomorphic god, Artemis. As 
the Greek mindset projects internal truth into the externality of the gods, Artemis 
comes down to reinvest in men the truth that she embodies. Artemis’ uncomplicated 
opening statement of who she is — “I am a goddess of the ambrosial courts, / And 
save by Here, Queen of Pride, surpassed / By none whose temples whiten this the 
world” (ll. 1-3) — reflects this unified and externalized form of Greek identity. 
 The poem’s linguistic sonority and its metrical cadence are intended to echo 
those of classical Greek prosody; similarly, the poem’s narrative tropes and its 
incantatory tone are adapted from the epic poetry of that tradition. Yet this is not 
merely an exercise in form or structure because for Browning these elements were the 
natural expression of the underling truth of their age. It is crucial that unlike all of 
Browning’s other monologues, in “Artemis Prologizes” the language is wholly 
narrative and the succession of action is a means to an end, while the conjunctions 
that often commence his sentences spur and impel the narrative sequence. The 
significance of this narrative mode for Browning’s symbolic plot is rendered more 
apparent if we remember that when Sordello reflects upon the Greek age where 
“deeds once sufficed” (5, l. 549) he envisions “deeds in their due gradation till Song 
dawns” (5, l.560), which traces the transformation from external action that is 
symbolic in itself to the romantic paradigm where action is derived internally from the 
spirit. Browning traces this development through “Artemis Prologuizes” to his other 
monologues in the collection to express the further gradations of spirit that Browning 
sees throughout history. Thus when Artemis proclaims that “I, in a flood of glory 
visible, / Stood o’er my dying votary and, deed / By deed, revealed, as all took place, 
the truth” (ll. 67-9), Browning shows that classical action proceeds from moment to 
moment without reflection because soul is already embodied in the chain of cause-
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and-effect events. 
Browning’s heavy and pervasive alliteration is unique to this monologue and it 
asserts the sensuousness of the classical world and its emphasis on the material as the 
instinctive expression of the ideal. This emphasis on form sets up an ordered natural 
universe wherein everything has its place; thus Artemis explains that as the moon 
goddess she is responsible for safeguarding all kinds of pregnant animals and all of 
the men who offer her sacrifice (ll. 6-12), and she in turn derives power from her 
supplicants and is bound to them as they are to her (74-83). This reciprocal unity of 
the classical world is enacted through the inextricable framework of men and the 
gods, an example of which can be seen in Browning’s detail that Hippolytus’ death is 
caused by the fact that he cannot jump off his chariot before it crashes: “Hippolutos, 
whose feet were trammelled fast” (l. 51), “into the fixed boots of the car” (l. 40). 
Through Artemis’ narrative, Browning shows how the inexorable sequence of events 
beginning with Hippolytus’ vow of chastity to Artemis, for which he is killed and 
subsequently saved, comprises discrete and successive actions that express the unified 
truth that is the order of the Greek world. This is contrasted by Browning in Sordello 
when he shows that for the romantic paradigm action will no longer be external but 
internal and will be expressed through the spirit and not the body. 
 Indeed in “Artemis Prologizes” the emphasis is on Hippolytus’ body as the 
externalized center of the action as opposed to an internal motivation. There are 
lengthy descriptions of his body as it is torn apart — “that detested beach, was bright 
with blood / And morsels of flesh” (ll. 58-9) — and put together through the 
ministrations of Asclepios who “laid the strips and jagged ends of flesh / Even once 
more, and slacked the sinew’s knot / Of every tortured limb” (ll. 109-11). 
Furthermore, the family’s mourning of Hippolytus’ death — the grieving cries of “ai 
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ai” (l. 39) — and Artemis’ call to celebration of his revivification — “oh cheer” (l. 
113) — constitute ritualized public reactions to outside events and are in themselves 
outside events rather than actions based on interior feeling. Thus they are not internal 
but external, not states of being but events: even death is characterized as a “mere 
sleep” (l. 112) and as “the event” (l. 121). Even the seemingly divine process of 
revivification is actually enacted through the material world, as it is a mortal and not a 
god who performs the action: Artemis explains that Asclepios is able to restore 
Hippolytus’ body because Apollo taught him “The doctrine of each herb and flower 
and root, / To know their secret’st virtue and express / The saving soul of all” (ll. 103-
5). The fact that the plants have medicinal knowledge to save the body offers a key to 
the poem because it shows that the soul is located in the natural world in the same 
way that the soul is infused in the body— the internal is fixed in the external. It is 
further crucial to note that Hippolytus’ salvation is merely a corporeal restoration 
rather than the spiritual transportation that will later define the Incarnation in the 
Christian age. 
 Browning incorporated “Artemis Prologizes” into the revised romantic 
drama of Men and Women as a contrast from which to affirm the dramatic monologue 
as a romantic modern form, and this transition from the classical union of the 
subjective and the objective to the romantic interiority that will define the monologue 
is explored symbolically through the historical and epistemological contrast that 
Browning makes between the early and late classical period in “Cleon.” Although 
Cleon is still part of the classical world, the self-contained perfection of time and 
place that characterized the early Greeks and that is demonstrated in “Artemis 
Prologizes” has grown and been diluted into the sprawling cultural empire in which 
Cleon finds himself; Browning places it historically at the very dawn of Christianity, 
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just as rumors of Christ's life are beginning to circulate, in order to show that the poet 
is on the edge of a fading paradigm and also to presage the coming of the romantic 
age. 
 Cleon’s responses to the questions posed by Protus make it clear that the 
emperor has written to the famed poet in the hope that he will be able to solve the 
existential crisis that plagues the ruler as his spirit has begun to probe for 
confirmation of its existence beyond death. Cleon perceives an affinity between 
himself and Protus whereby the emperor’s mastery of the temporal constitutes a step 
further in the progress of mankind. He sees that Protus: “Hadst ever in thy heart the 
luring hope / Of some eventual rest a-top of it, / Whence, all the tumult of the building 
hushed, / Thou first of men mightst look out to the east. / The vulgar saw thy tower: 
thou sawest the sun (ll. 32-6). While the “vulgar” people can only see the tower that is 
circumscribed by the temporal, Protus looks to the horizon because he wants to place 
the progress of his work in the perspective of the infinite. 
 In responding to Protus’ praise of his consummate talent, Cleon sees the 
distinction between the intellectual mastery of his own age and the organic wholeness 
of the early classical man: 
We of these latter days, with greater mind 
Than our forerunners, since more composite, 
Look not so great, beside their simple way, 
To a judge who only sees one way at once, 
One mind-point, and no other at a time, — 
Compares the small part of a man of us 
With some whole man of the heroic age, 
Great in his way, —not ours, nor meant for ours. (ll. 64-71) 
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Cleon argues that the intellectual reach of his day far surpasses the totality of the 
heroic age, yet as the modern “composite” mind is made up of separate parts that 
were once perfect in and of themselves, it only appears to be inferior to that which 
came before. Cleon then makes a parallel between the progressive syntheses of these 
isolated forms and his achievements in art: while he concedes that he has not “chanted 
verse like Homer’s,” has not “swept string like Terpender” nor “painted men like 
Phidias” — “I am not as great as they are, point by point” — he believes himself to be 
nevertheless an improvement beyond them since “I have entered into sympathy / With 
these four, running these into one soul, / Who, separate, ignored each other’s arts” (ll. 
139-45). Cleon likens these first “perfect separate forms” to unified separate shapes 
that are then overlaid to create the “checkerboard” of the late classical age to 
demonstrate to the emperor that in his art he has effected a simple refinement of an 
existing truth. 
The poet uses the metaphor of the water in the sphere to show Protus that 
while he is correct in perceiving that the earlier classical period fulfilled the intention 
of their age perfectly, it is nevertheless still part of the teleological progress of 
mankind:  
Now mark me! those divine men of old time 
Have reached, thou sayest well, each at one point 
The outside verge that rounds our faculty; 
And where they reached, who can do more than reach?  
It takes but little water just to touch 
At some one point the inside of a sphere, 
And, as we turn the sphere, touch all the rest 
In due succession. (ll. 95-102) 
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In this metaphor, the drops of water are the Greek heroes touching the circumference 
of their available truth and as such they reached as far as they could go. In turning the 
sphere so that the water touches all parts of the sphere sequentially, Cleon shows how 
each age builds upon the pinnacle of knowledge that was reached before. Yet, Cleon 
exclaims that, while it is easy to see progress, it is more difficult to see how this linear 
continuation of the mind is just a point in the totality of the soul: “but the finer air / 
Which not so palpably nor obviously, / Though not less universally, / Can touch the 
whole circumference of that emptied sphere, / Fills it more fully than the water did (ll. 
99-106).  
In comparing the transition from the early flourish of the Greek mind to the 
later cultural empire, Browning brings up the issue of epistemology that is integral to 
the dialectic of romantic drama. In his discussion of the classical and the romantic 
paradigms, Friedrich Schlegel asserts that the intuitive totality of the Greeks was “the 
first flower of youthful imagination, directly joining and imitating what was most 
immediate and vital in the sensuous world” (Dialogue on Poetry 82). Where the 
Greeks created through the imagination, Browning makes it clear in “Cleon” that the 
philosophy of the later period is that of the reason. Thus Cleon answers Protus’ fears 
about the futility of progress by arguing that the progression of improvement logically 
infers that the soul should continue its progress as well: “What, and the soul alone 
deteriorates?” (l. 138). Cleon tells Protus that if he looked back to the “morning of 
philosophy” (l. 187), he would see that the natural world was perfect and complete in 
and of itself, but that he would also be able to hypothesize that it would continue its 
evolution into a yet further stage of completion: “Thou wouldst have seen them 
perfect, and deduced / The perfectness of others yet unseen” (ll. 192-3). Yet the use of 
the verb “deduced” emphasizes that Cleon’s conclusion about the progress of the soul 
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has not been reached through an intuitive, imaginative leap but rather through the 
logical cause-and-effect calculations of the reason.  
Cleon describes to the emperor the next stage in the development of mankind, 
which is the emergence of the “introactive” soul that can reflect upon and feel the 
force of its own power. Yet Protus and Cleon both perceive the sadness that is 
inherent in this progress of self-consciousness. In his Lectures on Dramatic Art and 
Literature, August Schlegel uses the term “joy” to express the intuitive totality of the 
Greek world and uses “desire” to express the romantic reaching for the infinite. When 
Cleon exclaims that “life’s inadequate to joy, / As the soul sees joy, tempting life to 
take” he observes that while the soul seeks totality the temporal circumscription of 
life precludes it. Thus Cleon admits that “I dare at times imagine to my need / Some 
future state revealed to us by Zeus, / Unlimited in capability / For joy, as this is in 
desire for joy, / To seek which, the joy-hunger forces us” (ll. 324-5). He dreams of a 
future condition that might experience totality in the same capacity that he desires it 
in the present, a future state that he will be impelled to seek through his desire for 
eternity— his “joy-hunger.”    
Yet Cleon’s logical insistence traps him within a temporal scope and prevents 
an intuitive knowledge of the infinity that he desires. Although the poet has sketched 
a “fiction” that might reveal the connection between the material and the immaterial, 
he does not really conceive of it as a truth:  
Long since, I imaged, wrote the fiction out,  
That he or other God, descended here 
And, once for all, showed simultaneously 
What, in its nature, never can be shown 
Piecemeal or in succession; —showed, I say, 
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The worth both absolute and relative 
Of all His children from the birth of time, 
His instruments for all appointed work. 
I now go on to image, —might we hear  
The judgment which should give the due to each, 
Show where the labour lay and where the ease, 
And prove Zeus’ self, the latent everywhere1 
This is a dream... (ll.115-127) 
The nature of Cleon’s dream emphasizes that the relationship between the absolute 
and the relative cannot be perceived through the reason as it is the faculty that 
comprehends the world of cause and effect— the “Piecemeal or in succession.” In 
comparing Cleon to the first flowering of the Greek mind, Browning suggests that it is 
only through the faculty of imagination or the transcendent intuitions of feeling that 
mankind can intuit what is at once linear and simultaneous, temporal and eternal. 
Indeed, it is Cleon’s rational and logical deductions about the soul that deny the 
possibility of an afterlife: “But, no! / Zeus has not yet revealed it; and, alas! / He must 
have done so—were it possible!” (ll. 333-5).  
 In seeking answers to his existential dilemma, Protus asks Cleon to pass 
another of his letters to Paul, who has begun to spread abroad the news of Jesus 
Christ, in the hope that the apostle might provide him with the knowledge that he 
seeks; however, Cleon chastises the emperor for thinking that “a mere barbarian jew” 
could have the answer to a secret that they themselves do not have access to, 
proclaiming that such a thought “wrongst our philosophy” (l. 346). Browning means 
“philosophy” here as a way of looking at the world and he shows through Cleon’s 
rational rejection of Christianity that the logical deductions of the reason cannot 
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aspire to the ideal.  
 Browning places Cleon’s logical conclusions and the connection that he 
posits between the finite and the infinite against the historical context of the dawn of 
Christianity to show that it is the Christian Incarnation that forges the new union 
between the subjective and the objective. As Browning established in Sordello, it is 
the work of the romantic poet who expresses this manifestation of spirit in the forms 
of art; however, as the romantic soul can never be fully embodied in the material, this 
manifestation is achieved in art by means of the symbol, which only approximates the 
relationship between the ideal and the real. That this historical progression is part of 
the symbolic plot of Men and Women is clear from the fact that he follows “Cleon” 
with “Rudel to the Lady of Tripoli,” which like “Artemis Prologizes” was originally 
part of Dramatic Lyrics. In following “Cleon” with “Rudel,” Browning indicates the 
epistemological shift from the end of the classical world to the start of the romantic 
paradigm in art, which the Schlegels argued was first expressed in the love poetry of 
the troubadours, a point of symbolic transition that Browning explored himself in 
Sordello. Browning’s short poem follows the legend of Rudel, a twelfth century 
troubadour who fell in love with the lady of Tripoli after hearing of her beauty. When 
Rudel set off on a pilgrimage to find his love he was taken ill on the journey, but he 
lived just long enough to see once his lady who had heard of his famous love for her. 
As “men applaud / In vain this Rudel, he not looking here / But to the East—the East! 
Go, say this, Pilgrim dear!” (ll. 34-6), Browning shows that he is the prototype of the 
romantic poet whose art reflects the romantic quest to embody the ideal even though 
he knows that in part that it will fail. 
The monologues of Men and Women trace the historical progression of the 
romantic from the inception of Christianity, through the medieval and the 
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Renaissance up until the nineteenth century, and as romantic symbols, Browning’s 
monologues explore different iterations of irony between the relative and the absolute 
as it manifests in these different stages of history. “Bishop Blougram’s Apology” is 
an important example of how romantic irony works in Browning’s monologues as the 
interpolation of the poet’s voice at the close of the poem provides a unique insight 
into how the dramatic persona represents the ontology of the modern mind as the 
culmination of romantic interiority. Indeed, unlike the perfect fusion of the internal 
and the internal in the Greek world represented in “Artemis’ Prologue,” Browning 
explains that the Bishop’s monologue is essentially a problem of manifestation; like 
Chiappino’s monologue in A Soul’s Tragedy, it displays the tension between his 
“poetry” and his “prose:” 
For Blougram, he believed, say, half he spoke. 
The other portion, as he shaped it thus 
For argumentatory purposes, 
He felt his foe was foolish to dispute. 
Some arbritrary accidental thoughts 
That crossed his mind, amusing because new, 
He chose to represent as fixtures there, 
Invariable convictions (such as they seemed 
Beside his interlocutor’s loose cards 
Flung down daily, and not the same way twice 
While certain hell-deep instincts, man’s weak tongue 
Is never bold to utter in their truth 
Because styled hell-deep (‘t is an old mistake 
To place hell at the bottom of the earth) 
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He ignored these, —not having in readiness 
Their nomenclature and philosophy: 
He said true things but called them by wrong names (ll. 990-6) 
Browning’s depiction of Blougram’s instincts as “hell-deep” utilizes the image of hell 
as a spatial metaphor to denote the raw, amorphous realm of the soul. Following 
Schopenhauer in his conviction that music is the most immediate manifestation of the 
will, Browning also uses the image of hell in “Abt Vogler” to visualize the notes that 
manifest his soul, and again in “Charles Avison” to depict the “abysmal” groundless 
realm of spirit. For Browning, the noumenal is both “hell-deep” and “heaven-high” 
because the soul has both spiritual potentiality that seeks to find form in the world and 
also a transcendent goal to strive towards. That Browning’s interpolation offers an 
existential summation of the monologue can also be seen when he interjects in 
parenthesis his conviction that it an “old mistake / To place hell at the bottom of the 
earth” as it suggests that the state of hell, or to be fallen, is not below earth but is 
actually in embodiment— in the many diverse symbols that at once express and 
obscure their divine foundation. In being “styled hell-deep,” Blougram’s instincts are 
profound—as its etymological meaning conveys—but he cannot impart these deepest 
instincts because language— “man’s weak tongue” — which belongs to the realm of 
conceptual thought, is unable to express the ineffable. Browning also tells the reader 
that Blougram’s monologue is a problem of “philosophy,” which, as in “Cleon,” 
brings up the question of epistemology in the poem, and asks the reader to consider 
how Blougram and Gigadibs each approach this tension between the temporal and the 
spiritual. 
This tension is expressed through the interaction of Blougram with his implied 
listener, the journalist Gigadibs, where the Bishop address Gigadibs’ assumption—
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and the assumption of his age—that theology and religion are the same thing. 
Browning’s concept of faith and religion is not tied to a theological position, the 
specific creeds and dogmas of theology are merely the particular expression or 
material form that embodies the ideas of religion, and living form is that which still 
has an organic connection with the truth that it bodies forth. This has an 
epistemological significance for Browning because it is fancy and feeling that 
perceives form as the embodiment of internal truth whereas the reason can only 
apprehend form in its empirical relations. Browning already explored this idea in the 
tragedy of Luria when Luria, who embodied the intuition of the East was able to show 
the intellect of the West that their forms were merely founded on tradition and no 
longer had an organic connection to the inward idea. Thus in “Bishop Blougram’s 
Apology,” romantic irony arises in the discrepancy that Browning perceives between 
Roman Catholic theology as form and the underlying essence of Christianity, and the 
way in which Gigadibs and the Bishop respond to the space between them.  
Browning makes it clear in the monologue that Gigadibs’ “philosophy” is that 
of the reason and we know this because in using cause-and-effect logic, he argues that 
if the empirical, historical form of Christianity has been disproved, it necessarily 
follows that the inner idea that it supported is invalidated as well. Browning sets off in 
parentheses the Bishop’s clarification of Gigadibs’ premise about faith in order to 
draw attention to the fact that Blougram is aware of and is responding to the fact that 
Gigadibs’ assumption about the nature of belief is contingent on its empirical validity:  
Why first, you don’t believe, you don’t and can’t, 
(Not statedly, that is, and fixedly 
And absolutely and exclusively) 
In any revelation called divine.  
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No dogmas nail your faith—and what remains 
But say so, like the honest man you are? 
First, therefore, overhaul theology! (ll. 150-6) 
Based on his rational evaluation of the Church, Gigadibs accuses the Bishop of being 
hypocritical, since as a learned man, he cannot possibly defend all of the theological 
tenets of Catholicism, and therefore it follows that he cannot possibly have faith or 
really “believe.” 
Blougram tells Gigadibs that he is fully aware that the default position of the 
age is unbelief. Where it was once belief it is now unbelief: instead of the calling the 
chessboard white with black squares on it, we now call it black with white squares on 
it. The foundation of Gigadibs’ argument is that it is not possible to stand on both 
squares at the same time—one must have either complete faith or complete doubt. 
Browning brings this back to epistemology as the monologue implies that, along with 
unbelief, the default epistemological faculty of the age is the reason. In A Blot in the 
Scutcheon, Browning revealed his conviction that the reason can only deal with 
polarities and as such it cannot see how the relative is part of the absolute. Blougram 
echoes this view in his metaphor of “the gross weights, course scales, and labels 
broad” that Gigadibs uses to put men into categories of weight to measure belief and 
unbelief without taking into account the “thousand diamond weights between”— the 
subtle measures that make up the whole spectrum of faith (ll. 403-4). According to 
this reasoning, Blougram is either a believing bishop and therefore a fool or an 
unbelieving bishop and therefore a knave. As a result: 
Your picked Twelve, you’ll find, 
Profess themselves indignant, scandalized 
At thus being held unable to explain 
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How a superior man who disbelieves  
May not believe as well: that's Schelling’s way! (ll. 407-11) 
It is possible for Schelling to believe and disbelieve at the same time because he sees, 
like Browning, the material forms of the world, including theology, as the evolving 
manifestations of the divine – and as such belief and unbelief are not antithetical. It is 
significant that Blougram refers to Schelling here as it reveals the importance of 
German idealism for Browning’s emphasis on embodiment and the importance of 
recognizing the difference between external form and inward soul. 
As the reason cannot separate material form from the transcendent content, it 
can only take the historicity and temporality of the Church as the basis of belief. For 
Gigadibs, if the Church and belief are based on a lie, using cause-and-effect 
reasoning, since you cannot get to truth from a lie, it is not possible to reach the ideal 
through belief. Thus we know from Blougram’s response that Gigadibs has said that 
he will seek truth in unbelief, and that he sees himself as right and the Bishop as 
wrong.  
Blougram admits that he cannot express his intuitions about faith as they lie 
outside of the bounds of the reason: “Meanwhile, I know where difficulties lie / I 
could not, cannot solve, nor ever shall, / So give up hope accordingly to solve— / (To 
you and over the wine)” (ll. 165-8). Thus he says that in defending himself against 
Gigadibs’ judgment, he will meet the writer on his own ground—the assumption that 
it is not possible to believe and disbelieve—which Browning has shown is founded on 
the reason. Blougram makes it clear that when he admits his unbelief, he is only 
speaking about the nature of belief that is based on Gigadibs’ own assumptions: “I do 
not believe— / If you’ll accept no faith that is not fixed, / Absolute and exclusive, as 
you say. / You’re wrong— I mean to prove it in due time” (ll. 161-4). He emphasizes 
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this several times through the monologue when he reminds his opponent that “I mean 
to meet you on your own premise” (l. 171) and again in parentheses: “In our common 
primal element / Of unbelief (we can’t believe, you know— / We’re still at that 
admission, recollect” (ll. 439-41). Thus it is not that the Bishop does not have faith, 
but that he knows he cannot defend his belief within the realm of the reason; 
therefore, he chooses to utilize Gigadibs’ own premises to supplant his opponent: “ 
‘On the whole,’ he thought, I justify myself / ‘On every point where cavillers like this 
/ ‘Oppugn my life: he tries one kind of fence, / ‘I close, he’s worsted, that’s enough 
for him (ll. 997-1003). However, when the Bishop says, “ ‘He’s on the ground; if 
ground should break away / ‘I take my stand on, there’s a firmer yet / ‘Beneath it, 
both of us may sink and reach” (ll. 1001-1003), he acknowledges that although his 
argument meets Gigadibs in the realm of reason, the truths intuited by the soul will 
always precede and supersede the conclusions of the mind. 
If, according to reason, one must accept the totality of theology to have belief, 
Blougram’s argument to Gigadibs implies that in choosing unbelief he has no form 
through which to realize his search for truth—an idea he first explored in A Soul’s 
Tragedy. Like Chiappino, it only results in an abstract idealism that cannot act in any 
way upon the world: 
Is— not to fancy what were fair in life 
Provided it could be, —but, finding first 
What may be, then find out how to make it fair 
Up to our means: a very different thing! 
No abstract intellectual plan of life 
Quite irrespective of life’s plainest laws, 
But one man, a man, who is man and nothing more, 
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May lead within a world which (by your leave) 
Is Rome or London—not Fool’s-paradise. (ll. 88-96) 
In using his own reason against him, Blougram argues that Gigadibs founders in 
unbelief because he cannot realize any of the noble truths that he seeks, whereas since 
he pretends to have complete belief and chooses to be a bishop of the Roman Catholic 
Church, his hypocrisy means that he does not aim as high but that in doing so he 
realizes more. He uses several metaphors to express this logic: Blougram compares 
himself to Shakespeare, who had imagination but also wanted to realize material 
things — as evidenced by the bard's purchasing of a coat of arms, owning a house and 
engaging in commerce — exclaiming that although Shakespeare aimed higher in his 
art he realized less in his life than the Bishop who has secured all of the material gains 
of the Catholic Church (of course this a deliberately facetious view of art and one that 
he qualifies later in his argument). Blougram also uses the metaphor of packing for a 
voyage to show that while Gigadibs brings his fine paintings and furniture, his 
abstract ideals, they do not fit to the circumscribed size of the berth; therefore, 
although Gigadibs disapproves of the arrangement of Blougram’s own cabin and 
ponders what he would have done with the design, he has been left without any 
furnishings to realize his vision. The Bishop also uses the metaphor of night and day 
to show that although Gigadibs’ recognizes the night and its dreams, it is at the 
expense of the Bishop’s emphasis on the day, which is the realm of action and 
realization. Moreover, if Blougram is dishonourable, he asks Gigadibs to consider 
whether Napoleon would be his “pattern man” who seeks an ideal; however, he 
argues that without a form to express belief, Gigadibs cannot see the higher ideal—
the star that impels Napoleon—but, in the same way as Berthold, he can see only the 
shimmer of the star's light, which in this case is Napoleon's seeming meaningless and 
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mad action in the temporal world. 
Blougram, who has based his argument up until this point on the default 
position of unbelief, now switches his perspective to argue from the foundation of 
belief and observes that in starting from belief, his previous argument starts to 
deteriorate. The Bishop declares that “Enthusiasm is the best thing” — which he 
means in its etymological sense of being divinely inspired — although he maintains 
that “we can’t command it” (ll. 556-7). Blougram goes on to express his conviction 
that whether this inspiration is a “mad dream or God’s very breath, belief’s fire, once 
in us, / Makes of all else mere stuff to show itself” (ll. 559-60). Returning to the 
question of epistemology, he argues that it is only through inspiration — the divine 
feeling that Browning always contrasts to the reason — that it is possible to see the 
semblance of material forms in their true relation to the noumenal truths that they 
express. Yet because the default position of the age is disbelief people only care about 
the “flare,” which, like the shimmer of Napoleon’s star, is the action that belief 
produces in the temporal and not the ideal that impels it.   
Although Blougram admires Luther, he feels that he cannot follow in his 
footsteps because Luther achieved all that he set out to do in his age and in his own 
time “Strauss is the next advance” (l. 576). Yet Strauss’ advance is a defence of belief 
through the reason, which leads the Bishop to ask: “What can I gain on the denying 
side? / Ice makes no conflagration” (l. 580-1) in contrast to Luther’s inspiration that 
shows us how “fire and life / Are all, dead matter’s nothing” (l. 557-8). Even though 
Blougram admits that he cannot know empirically whether Luther or Strauss is right, 
he proclaims that he would rather be Luther as it was he “who secured / A real heaven 
in his heart throughout his life” (l. 598-90), which Browning shows is outside the 
scope of the reason. 
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In continuing to look at faith through the faculty of reason, however, Gigadibs 
argues that there is no point in having such imperfect faith: it is not viable to swing 
between the two poles of complete faith and doubt represented by Paul and Strauss. 
Yet it is at this point of the argument when the Bishop finds that he is back on 
Christian ground — the foundation that Browning takes to be the eternal idea of 
Christianity that precedes all the forms that bring it forth: 
It is the idea, the feeling and the love 
God means mankind should strive for and show forth,  
Whatever be the process to that end, —  
And not historic knowledge, logic sound, 
And metaphysical acumen, sure! (ll. 621-5)  
The Bishop juxtaposes history and logic, which endeavors to find the empirical 
validity of Christianity, with metaphysical thought, which seeks for knowledge of an 
abstract ideal, in order to show that it is in the gap between them — the space of 
romantic irony — that the soul is able to see how the real is always informed by the 
ideal. Raymond Williams argues that the similarity between Browning’s beliefs and 
Blougram’s at this point of the monologue suggests that Browning finds himself 
tangled in casuistry, however, I would argue that it reveals the connection between the 
monologue and romantic drama because the Maker-See shows that it is in this space 
that the cooperating fancy of the reader can perceive the relationship between the real 
and the ideal. Indeed it is within the poles of belief and unbelief that Browning’s 
deepest convictions are conveyed: that as embodied beings we cannot fully know God 
and that only in the striving can we perceive intimations of the divine. 
 It is this ironic space between ideal and the real that connects “Bishop 
Blougram’s Apology” across the collection of Men and Women conceptually with 
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“An epistle containing the strange medical experience of Karshish, the Arab 
physician” where Abib, who is the recipient of Karshish’s letter, represents the 
empirical scientific method, which is juxtaposed with the total vision of Lazarus after 
he has been raised by Christ from the dead. Significantly it is within this discrepancy 
between the particular and the universal that Karshish can intimate the divine. Indeed 
it is between belief (Lazarus) and disbelief (Abib) that the essence of Christianity for 
Browning can be apprehended — the love of God that is expressed in the Incarnation 
and that will define the symbolic art of the romantic objective poet. 
Blougram explains to Gigadibs that the problem with unbelief, as the writer 
defines it, is that it still leaves an intuition of something beyond empirical fact. The 
Bishop also addressed this at the very opening of the monologue when he exclaims 
that: 
Just when we are safest, there’s a sunset-touch, 
A fancy from a flower-bell, some one’s death, 
A chorus-ending from Euripides, — 
And that’s enough for fifty hopes and fears 
As old and new at once as nature’s self, 
To rap and knock and enter in our soul, 
Take hands and dance there, a fantastic ring, 
Round the ancient idol, on his base again, — 
The grand Perhaps! (ll. 182-90) 
In these moments, the Bishop feels that it is possible to discover a way in which what 
has been disproved might also be true: “Why not, ‘the Way, the Truth, the Life” (l. 
197). Returning to epistemology, Blougram asks Gigadibs whether “Trust you an 
instinct silenced long ago / That will break silence and enjoin you love / What 
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mortified philosophy is hoarse, / And all in vain, with bidding you despise? (ll. 630-
4). Using himself as a parallel to the question of the historicity of Christ, Blougram 
argues that the “mortified philosophy” of the reason cannot form a favourable notion 
of him “Because of contradictions in the facts. / One proves, for instance, he was born 
in Rome, / This Blougram—yet throughout the tales of him / I see he figures as an 
Englishman ” (ll. 639-42). Blougram declares that “Well, the two things are 
reconcilable” (l. 643) but that Gigadbids is not interested in discovering how. 
 Although Blougram suggests that the idea of Christianity can still be true even 
though its historicity has been disproved, he does not seek a new form of expression. 
Much criticism of the monologue has seen the Bishop’s ultimate failure to lie in his 
materialism and in the fact that he does not strive to be better than the way God has 
made him, but I would argue that this analysis misses some of the complexity of the 
monologue as a romantic drama whereby this tragic space facilitates a recognition in 
the reader that material forms are evolving embodiments of the ideal. While the 
Bishop’s argument makes it clear that he can separate the idea of Christianity from its 
manifestation in form through his intuition, he departs from Browning in that he 
concedes to the faculty of reason, not only in his argument with Gigadibs but also in 
his life. Blougram has decided that if the default position of the age is unbelief, he 
must accept all of theology, which includes all of the miracles that the Church 
purports to be empirical reality, because if one part of belief is disproved, the faculty 
of reason will necessarily invalidate it all. According to the Bishop this is why: 
I say, I see all, 
And swear to each detail the most minute 
In what I think a man’s face—you, mere cloud: 
I swear I hear him speak and see him wink, 
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For fear if I drop the emphasis, 
Mankind may doubt if there’s a cloud at all. (ll. 866-11) 
He fears that in discarding any part of the established form through which belief is 
realized, he will only continue to see further aspects that need changing: “There’s 
ever a next in size, now grown as big, / That meets the knife—I cut and cut again! / 
First cut the Liquefaction, what comes last / But Fichte’s clever cut at God himself?” 
(ll. 741-4). Blougram’s reference to Fichte here, as well as Schelling earlier, reveals 
Browning’s awareness of trends in philosophical idealism and the Bishop is clearly 
referring to the accusations of atheism levelled against Fichte after the publication of 
his essay “On the Ground of Our Belief in a Divine World-Governance” (1798). To 
avoid any such ambiguity, Blougram defers to the reason and goes to the other 
extreme in choosing Catholicism, which he declares to be “The most pronounced 
moreover, fixed, precise / And absolute form of faith in the whole world— / 
Accordingly, most potent of all forms / For working on the world” (ll. 306-9). Thus 
Blougram chooses a form even if he does not believe that it is the living embodiment 
of Christianity in much the same way that Strafford clings to the king even though he 
knows that he no longer embodies the truth of his age. 
The irony of the monologue—that comprises the tragic space between the 
ideal and the real—is that although Blougram perceives the discrepancy between 
Christian truths (the ideal) and Catholic theology (the real), he does not have the fire 
to break with an established form to find a fresh and living expression of the ideal. 
Although he admires Luther’s inspirational fire above Strauss’ icy doubt, Blougram 
also ends up defending faith through the reason. This is why the Bishop admits to 
Gigadibs that the men who seek to realize their intuitions are better than him: 
          A zealot with a mad ideal in reach, 
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A poet just about to print his ode, 
A statesman with a scheme to stop this war, 
An artist whose religion is his art, 
I should have nothing to object! Such men 
Carry the fire, all things grow warm to them, 
Their drugget’s worth my purple, they beat me. 
But you—you’re just as little as I— .” (ll. 936-43) 
All these men who “carry the fire”—who have inspiration—live their lives striving to 
embody an ideal. Carlyle proclaims in his Lectures on Hero-Worship that it is the 
duty of man to unfold and act upon his inward perception of the ideal, and Blougram 
acknowledges that those heroes who seek to realize truth are superior to himself but 
also shows his opponent that in deferring to the totality of theology, he is no worse 
than Gigadibs, who himself only views belief through the reason. 
 Not only does Browning’s “Bishop Blougram” demonstrate the romantic 
epistemology of the dramatic monologue through irony, the transformation in 
Gigadibs’ perspective also offers a unique insight into the change in perception that 
Browning hopes to bring about by means of irony in the monologue. That the space of 
recognition intended for the reader is also elicited in the auditor makes “Bishop 
Blougram’s Apology” integral to understanding the connection between the 
monologue form and romantic drama. When Browning explains that “Something had 
struck him in the “Outward-Bound” / Another way than Blougrams’s purpose was,” 
he implies that Gigadibs has seen through the example of Blougram’s life that the 
reason will not enable him to pursue the ideal. 
In his closing interjection, Browning explains that Gigadibs did not purchase 
“cabin-furniture / But settler’s-implements (enough for three)” to take to Australia 
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where “there, I hope, / By this time he has tested his first plough, / And studied his 
last chapter of St. John” (ll. 1008-14). This is rather a vague conclusion, but if we 
look again to Carlyle we see the significance in Gigadibs’ decision to settle and work 
upon an uninhabited land. For Carlyle, symbolically speaking, “work” is the 
endeavour to make the ideal real and in Past and Present he exclaims: “Labour is 
Life: from the inmost heart of the Worker rises his god-given Force, the sacred 
celestial Life-essence breathed into him by Almighty God; from his inmost heart 
awakens him to all nobleness, — to all knowledge, 'self-knowledge' and much else, so 
soon as Work fitly begins” (164). Work is how man acts upon his inspiration and 
Gigadibs’ decision to buy tools instead of furniture suggests that his adventure is an 
endeavor to forge new forms to embody soul. 
 Through the dialectic between Blougram and Gigadibs, Browning emphasizes 
the different epistemological responses to the question of material forms and symbolic 
embodiment, and this is how the monologue is juxtaposed to the others in Men and 
Women to create a broader dialectic across the series of poems. Although Blougram 
emphasizes form through the acceptance of theology in his argument with Gigadibs, 
he does not adhere to the rigid totality of theology that imprisons Johannes Agricola 
in his own ego, and although Blougram enjoys the material comforts of the Church, 
he does not have the same level of materialism that is demonstrated in “The Bishop 
Orders His Tomb at St Praxed.” Indeed in his discussion of faith and intuition, the 
Bishop reveals his awareness of the distinction that Browning sees between the 
Platonic Ideas and their particular material expressions, which places him 
conceptually between “Pictor Ignitos” and “Andrea Del Sarto.” On the cusp of the 
Renaissance, Pictor Ignotis feels that he has the fire of inspiration, as Raphael does, 
that could enable him to break away from the old forms of ecclesiastical art, but he 
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fears for the future of art’s sacredness outside of the Church. Andrea Del Sarto sees 
that the arm in Raphael’s painting is not empirically correct, but he acknowledges that 
Raphael’s composition is superior to his own as it is the soul — which can never be 
fully embodied — that makes a true work of art; and if Raphael is the romantic artist, 
it is Fra Lippo Lippi who is the Maker-See — the artist who recreates the phenomenal 
world so as to reveal the soul that is embodied within it. 
The relationship between soul and its embodiment leads to Browning’s 
concluding poem “One Word More” that is addressed to Elizabeth, which bookends 
his opening poem “Transcendentalism” and is critical for understanding the 
relationship for Browning between philosophical idealism, the concept of romantic 
subjectivity and symbolic form. “One Word More” is an important statement of his 
poetics as it explores the way in which the poetry of self-expression relates to 
objective poetry, but it is important to note that when Browning refers to self-
expression in the poem he intends the imperfect embodiment of the transcendental 
self, as he reiterates through Sordello. Browning admired Elizabeth for what he saw 
as the expression of her essential self in her poetry and he laments the fact that he is 
unable to do the same. In a letter to his future wife he writes that the “scenes and 
song-scraps” of Bells and Pomegranates: 
are such mere and very escapes of my inner power, — which lives in me like 
the light in those    crazy Mediterranean phares I have watched at sea — 
wherein the light is ever revolving in a dark gallery, bright and alive, and only 
after a weary interval leaps out, for a moment, from the one narrow chink, and 
then goes on with the blind wall between it and you.  
Browning uses the imagery of the burning light to express the fire of soul that seeks to 
find form but then recedes again into potentiality; therefore he says that “I never have 
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begun, even, what I hope I was born to begin and end, — “R.B. a poem” (10, 69-72). 
In “One Word More,” which he signed “RB,” Browning expresses his desire to find a 
language for expressing his love for his wife — a love that both arises from and 
expresses the transcendent source of his inward self. 
It is clear that Browning sees embodiment as the next stage of idealism and as 
the culmination of the romantic inward spirit in that he prefaces his own search for a 
language that will verbalize his love with similar artistic pursuits by Raphael and 
Dante. Significantly in Sordello it is Dante who, as Friedrich Schlegel also observes, 
forges the new romantic symbolism that unites religion and poetry; in “Andrea Del 
Sarto” and “Pictor Ignotis,” Browning shows that it is Raphael’s humanistic art that is 
the next stage in the embodiment of the transcendent romantic soul even though the 
romantic soul will always exceed its expression. Browning tells an anecdote about 
how Dante and Raphael endeavoured to work in different artistic mediums to 
articulate their love with the hope that in giving less thought to material form they 
might be able to render a less mediated utterance of truth. Browning exclaims that we 
covet these works, as he says in the Essay on Shelley that we covet the work of the 
subjective poet because they are works that express most clearly the soul of the artist. 
In trying to give form to the inward soul, however, it is inevitable that 
“Heaven’s gift takes earth’s abatement” (l.73). Browning turns to Moses here, in the 
same way that he figures as an example of the “Maker-See” in Sordello, to show that 
although Moses revealed to the Jewish people an act of God in the world, in striking 
the rock “Even he, the minute makes immortal, / Proves, perchance, but mortal in the 
minute” and “Desecrates the deed in doing” (ll. 76-78). Browning proceeds to liken 
Moses’ lack of appreciation at the hands of the Jewish people to the criticism that 
Browning himself has received as a poet, and while the people desire to see in Moses 
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the magical brilliance of one who bears witness to royal decrees from God, Browning 
ponders whether the prophet might ever have wanted to express his connection to the 
divine through his personal love of a woman. 
Similarly to Dante and Raphael, Browning proclaims that just this one time he 
will try to express his love in poetry. Browning points out that up until now, Elizabeth 
has only seen him write objective poetry, the poetry that Sordello foresees as the next 
stage in romantic idealism: “by my fancy, / Enter each and all, and use their service, / 
Speak from every mouth, — the speech, a poem” (ll. 129-32). The speech is a poem 
because he shares with Shelley the conviction that “A poem is the very image of life 
expressed in its eternal truth” (313). Thus in an early letter to Elizabeth, Browning 
says that “I only make men and women speak, give you truth broken into prismatic 
hues” (10, 21-23), which shows that he saw his dramatic personas as various 
refractions or embodiments of his own white light, the transcendent totality of his 
own subjective soul; however, this one time, Browning says to Elizabeth that he 
wants to speak in his own voice: 
Let me speak this once in my true person, 
Not as Lippo, Roland or Andrea, 
Though the fruit of speech be just this sentence: 
Pray you, look on these my men and women, 
Take and keep my fifty poems finished; 
Where my heart lies, let my brain lie also! 
Poor the speech; be how I speak for all things (ll. 137-3)   
Yet when Browning tries to speak, the only thing he can say to his wife is to ask her 
to look upon his objective poetry. Returning to the same symbolic language that he 
utilized for his epistemological demarcation between soul and mind in Luria and The 
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Return of the Druses, Browning declares that the “heart” perceives the love that 
comes from the source of his soul and the “brain” is how he fashions it in the material 
world. Like Sordello, Browning cannot express fully his subjective transcendent 
soul—“Poor the speech;’ be how I speak for all things”—but he can strive to body it 
forth in his new mythology—the multifarious symbols that make up the manifested 
spiritual lives of his dramatic personas. Browning reiterates the importance of 
symbolic embodiment not only for his poetics but also for his epistemological stance 
when he says to Elizabeth in the first stanza to “Take them, Love, the book and me 
together: / Where the heart lies, let the brain lie also” (ll. 3-4). 
Browning uses the image of the dark side and the visible side of the moon to 
symbolize the two aspects of the world and mankind that are dependent on and 
inseparable from the other: the side that looks to the inward-infinite and the side that 
looks to the outward-embodiment. Browning fancies that if the moon fell in love with 
a mortal she would reveal the side that faces inward to the noumenal rather than 
outward to the phenomenal: she would reveal the half-hidden shard crystals of the 
iceberg under the ocean or its surface paved with sapphire like the path that God stood 
upon to face Moses. 
Figuring himself and his wife as the moon, Browning exclaims that he is 
fortunate to have these “two soul-sides,” “one to face the world with, / One to show a 
woman when he loves her!” (ll. 185-6). Therefore, although Browning cannot fully 
express the infinity of his soul in poetry, his wife knows it in his personal love for her, 
and in turn although Elizabeth’s readers see her from the world side, she does not 
fully express her soul in her poetry but only in her love for him. Thus for Browning: 
“the best is when I glide from out them, / Cross a step or two of dubious twilight, / 
Come out on the other side, the novel / Silent silver lights and darks undreamed of, / 
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Where I hush and bless myself with silence” (ll. 193-97). What Browning here means 
by the silent side of the moon is explained by Carlyle’s definition of the romantic 
symbol wherein speech and silence are blended together, speech being of the 
embodied world and silence of the infinite; thus, Browning is saying that to bathe in 
the light of his love for Elizabeth is to bask in the noumenal aspect of the world.  
As a man and as an artist, Browning wants to body forth his love for 
Elizabeth, but he admits to his wife that he will never find a form “that should all-
express me” (l.111). Although “Rafael of the dear Madonnas” and “Dante of the 
dread Inferno” wrote one song and drew one angel, Browning can only sing Dante’s 
song in his brain — through fashioning — and carry Raphael’s angel in his heart. The 
idea of song here looks back to the call for song in his opening poem 
“Transcendentalism: a Poem in Twelve Books” because for Browning song, as the 
expression of the soul, can only be known in its manifestation, which is best 
represented in dramatic form and yet can only ever achieve an approximation. In 
“One Word More” Browning shows that the work of the “synthetist” poet is to 
explore through the irony inherent in the many symbols derived from the formed 
world — his men and women — how the objective world is but an embodiment of the 
subjective soul that is divine, and like God’s love that is the Incarnation of Jesus 
Christ, the work of the romantic poet is an act of love that reveals the relationship 
between the relative and the absolute. This concept of romantic drama is the 
foundation of both Browning’s plays and his monologues and by enacting 
embodiment throughout his dramatic poetry he pioneers a completely new and 
innovative Christian poetics. In becoming the synthetist romantic poet, the Maker-
See, Browning occupies body and soul, the real and the ideal, a transcendental 
dialectic that he does not attempt to resolve but rather resolves to attempt. 
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